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ABSTRACT 
The international legal framework on money laundering encourages states to put in 
place effective systems for the identification, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of 
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. While the international legal framework 
obligates countries to adopt conviction-based forfeiture (criminal forfeiture), it only 
encourages them to consider adopting non-conviction based asset forfeiture (civil 
forfeiture). This has led to a situation where countries, such as Malawi, adopt only 
criminal forfeiture and not civil forfeiture. This study analyses the efficiency of the 
existing Malawian criminal forfeiture regime in curbing and preventing the 
proliferation of underlying profit-generating crimes and money laundering. 
This thesis contends, in part, that some countries have not adopted civil forfeiture 
because there is no international obligation to do so. It argues that the fact that 
states are not obligated to adopt civil forfeiture by international legal frameworks 
and national arrangements undermines the deterrent aim of the anti-money 
laundering and asset forfeiture systems in combating economic crimes. Some justify 
the casual approach to civil forfeiture by arguing that its implementation harbours 
the danger of violating human rights and constitutional guarantees. This thesis, 
however, advocates for the adoption of civil forfeiture within the limits of John 
Locke’s social contract theory, which guides states on how they can pursue policies 
and implement laws without limiting the rights of their people arbitrarily. 
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The adoption of both criminal and civil forfeiture of the proceeds and 
instrumentalities of crime is indispensable for the implementation of an effective 
anti-money laundering regime.1 Generally, the theory is that asset forfeiture 
deprives criminals from profiting financially from economic or profit-crimes2 and, 
therefore, it prevents the laundering of illicit proceeds.3 Forfeiture, hence, is 
regarded as the most important legal tool for depriving offenders of illegal profits 
and dealing with the problem of money laundering. 4 Therefore, money laundering 
cannot be combated effectively without implementing both civil and criminal 
forfeiture procedures. This thesis examines the usefulness of asset forfeiture in 
Malawi’s fight against money laundering. In order to recommend features of asset 
forfeiture that could work for Malawi, the thesis draws lessons from countries that 
have adopted both civil and criminal forfeiture, such as the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom and the Republic of South Africa. The study is 
informed by John Locke’s social contract theory, and a mixed theory of punishment.  
1.2 Forfeiture 
Forfeiture implies the taking back of proceeds that were gained unlawfully, or of 
property used to facilitate the commission of a crime.5 It is referred to also as 
                                                          
1  FATF Guidance Document: Best Practices Confiscation (2010: 1).  
2  Levi (1997: 228). 
3  FATF Guidance Document: Best Practices Confiscation (2010: 1). 
4  Stessens (2000: 29). 
5   Eissa et al (2011: 3).  
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confiscation. It is termed asset forfeiture in the United States of America (USA) and 
confiscation in the United Kingdom (UK).6 It is defined generally as a governmental 
decision through which property rights can be affected as a consequence of a 
criminal offence.7 To clarify further, forfeiture is defined also as the permanent 
deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority.8 There 
are two main types of forfeiture. These are criminal or conviction-based forfeiture, 
and civil or non-conviction based forfeiture. There is yet another type of forfeiture, 
which is called administrative forfeiture.9  
1.2.1 Types of property subject to forfeiture 
Forfeiture applies to proceeds of crime, as well as to instrumentalities of crime. 
Proceeds of crime refer to property which derives from a criminal activity.10 
Instrumentalities of crime refer to property that is used in the commission of 
crime.11 
Furthermore, forfeiture applies to contraband, which is property, and the 
possession of which is illegal or subject to control.12 This thesis, however, focuses 
on proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. The term ‘property’ will be used in this 
study to refer to funds and other assets.13 
                                                          
6   Levi (1997: 228). 
7   Stessens (2000: 30). 
8  Article 1(f) of the Vienna Convention. Adopted on 20 December 1988 in Vienna. Entered 
into force on 11 November 1990. 
9  Greenberg  et al (2009: 22). Administrative forfeiture is a non-judicial mechanism for  
uncontested non-conviction based asset recovery. In this type of forfeiture an officer other 
than a judicial officer issues a declaration of forfeiture. 
10  Cassella (2007: 9). 
11   Cassella (2007: 9). 
12   Rainbolt et al (1997: 40). 
13   FATF Guidance Paper on Forfeiture (2010: 3). 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1.2.2 Criminal forfeiture 
Criminal forfeiture is an effect by way of in personam order, that is, an order made 
against a person convicted of a criminal offence. The order directs a convict to 
surrender to the state either the proceeds of the crime or the instrumentalities 
with which the crime was committed.14 This simply means that where, say, a Mr 
Phiri is prosecuted for and convicted of drug trafficking, the court makes an order 
that he forfeit the funds and assets he has gained from such trafficking. The order 
may extend also to instrumentalities of drug trafficking, for instance, the car he 
used to transport the drugs. The order is part of the sentencing process in a criminal 
case 15 and is pronounced at the end of the trial, at the sentencing stage.16  
In the scenario sketched above, Mr Phiri is, himself, the subject of the proceedings, 
due to his involvement in drug trafficking. The forfeiture order is issued only after 
his conviction, in accordance with the procedural rule that criminal forfeiture can 
be ordered only against property belonging to the convicted person.17 This 
circumstance limits the reach of criminal forfeiture, as it cannot be ordered against 
property which the convict has transferred to a purchased in good faith.18 Since 
forfeiture is based on conviction, if the latter is set aside on appeal, the forfeiture 
order, too, collapses for lack of a legal basis.19   
                                                          
14   Greenberg  et al (2009: 13). 
15  Greenberg  et al (2009: 13). 
16  Cassella (2009: 41). 
17   Friedler (2013: 285). 
18  Cassella (2009: 40). 
19  Gaumer (2007: 24). 
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1.2.3 Civil forfeiture 
Civil forfeiture is the permanent deprivation of illicit property through an order 
made by a civil court or any other competent authority, without a need for the 
conviction of an offender.20 It is also called an in rem action because the application 
is made against an object, for the reason that the law ascribes “to the property a 
certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong”.21 The guilt of the 
individual who commits the underlying crime has no bearing on the forfeiture 
order, which means that the order may be made against property which is in the 
hands of a person other than the perpetrator. Further, the order can be made 
where the individual has been acquitted of criminal charges, which is why it is 
referred to also as non-conviction based forfeiture.  As the forfeiture order is made 
against the property and not the person, as is the case in criminal forfeiture, 22 the 
parties to the forfeiture application would read, for example, The State vs Toyota 
Corolla Registration Number 1234, instead of The State vs John Phiri. 
One could ask why the state chooses to proceed against property and not an 
individual? The answer is that the concept of civil forfeiture is based on the legal 
fiction that it is the property, and not the owner, that is guilty of wrongdoing.23 
However, this fiction is not compelling, for people, not things, commit crimes, and 
                                                          
20   Nikolov (2011: 17). 
21   See US v  One 6.5mm Mainlicher-Carcaro military rifle, 250 F.Supp. 410 (N.D Tx.1966) in 
Which case, the court ordered the forfeiture of the rifle used in assassinating President  
John. F. Kennedy. 
22   Greenberg  et al (2009: 14). 
23  Penna (1993: 363). 
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by doing so people use or gain things that become forfeitable to the state 
subsequently.24  
As it is the case with criminal forfeiture, the property that is subject to civil 
forfeiture ought to be linked to a criminal activity, either because it has a criminal 
provenance (proceeds) or it was used to commit the crime (instrumentality). In the 
case of the former, the state must prove on a balance of probabilities that the 
provenance of the title to the property lies in some criminal activity.25 If that illicit 
provenance is proved, the court is then empowered to transfer the title to the 
state.26 In the case of forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime, the court is to inquire 
into the property’s usage. If it was used indeed to facilitate the crime, then the 
court may order its forfeiture to avoid its being used again for a criminal purpose.27 
A civil forfeiture order, therefore, is made against the property, solely for being 
linked to the violation of the law.28  
The hallmark of civil forfeiture is the in rem character that runs across all stages of 
the process, from application for a forfeiture order to its enforcement.29 
Consequently, the forfeiture action bears the characteristics of a civil action. For 
instance, if one John Phiri commits the offence of drug trafficking, using his Toyota 
Corolla, and as a result benefits to the tune of $3000.00, the parties to the civil 
forfeiture action would be the state, the Toyota Corolla and the $3000.00, hence 
the citation would be The State vs Toyota Corolla and $3000.00 and not The State 
                                                          
24  Cassella (2009: 42). 
25  Simser (2009: 13). See also Cassella (2009: 44). 
26  Simser (2009: 13). Property law abhors a void in title, and forfeiture ensures that the title is  
passed to the state in a seamless way. 
27  Simser (2009: 13). 
28  Nikolov (2011: 23). 
29  Young (2009: 2). 
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vs Mr Phiri. So the government will be the plaintiff and the property will be the 
defendant, and persons objecting to the forfeiture are interveners, also referred to 
as claimants.30 Claimants are people who have interests in the property that is 
subject to forfeiture, and who are allowed to appear in court to argue their 
interests in the property and show cause why it should not be forfeited to the state. 
1.2.4 Relevance of civil forfeiture 
Civil forfeiture does not require the presence of a suspect in court because the 
proceedings are against the property that is connected to a criminal activity, and 
not the suspect. Civil forfeiture, therefore, becomes relevant in cases where it is not 
feasible for the state to prosecute an offender first and then to apply for forfeiture 
on the basis of the offender’s conviction. Such cases include instances where the 
individual has fled the jurisdiction; is unknown; is dead; is physically too ill to attend 
court; is immune from criminal process; or is too powerful to prosecute.31 Leaving 
such people to continue enjoying the proceeds of their crimes contradicts the 
commonly uttered axiom that ‘crime does not pay’. The state has to meet a lower 
standard proof in civil than in criminal proceedings, as it only has to prove that the 
property is probably tainted or represents proceeds of crime.32  
Civil forfeiture proceedings can be resorted to also where property is found but a 
conviction could not be obtained for procedural or technical reasons, for example, 
that the statute of limitations has expired.33 It is also appropriate where property is 
                                                          
30  Cassella (2008:  9). These claimants intervene so as to claim ownership in the property and  
to prevent  the state from taking it away from them. This issue will be tackled in greater 
detail later,  in the discussion of the forfeiture procedure. 
31  Greenberg (2009: 1). 
32  Brun et al (2011:  4). 
33  FATF Guidance Document: Best Practices Confiscation (2012: 6). 
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found and substantial evidence exists to establish that it was generated from 
criminal activity, although there is insufficient evidence to meet the criminal burden 
of proof which is necessary for the conviction of a person before instituting criminal 
forfeiture.34 Furthermore, civil forfeiture can be used in cases where a criminal 
investigation or prosecution is unrealistic or impossible,35 or even where the 
perpetrator has been acquitted of the predicate offence because of insufficient 
admissible evidence or a failure to meet the burden of proof.36  
The various instances in which civil forfeiture may become handy, makes it a potent 
tool with which societies that are serious about fighting economic crimes can strip 
criminals of their ill-gotten profits. For instance, in cases of organised crime, civil 
forfeiture serves to take away illicit property from high-ranking criminals who plan 
and finance the commission of the crimes but leave the execution of the plans to 
low-ranking members. Given their clandestine participation in the actual 
perpetration of the crimes, in practice, high-ranking members of the criminal 
syndicate escape being prosecuted for want of sufficient evidence. This, thereby, 
renders their illicit property untouchable.37 Civil forfeiture is one way of subverting 
their impunity. 
1.2.5 Relevance of asset forfeiture in the fight against money laundering  
Forfeiture is aimed at depriving criminals of the proceeds of the crimes they 
commit. The process by which criminals integrate the illicit proceeds of their 
criminal deeds into the lawful economy generally has accelerated over the past 30 
                                                          
34  Greenberg  et al (2009: 15). 
35  Greenberg  et al (2009: 15). 
36  FATF Guidance Document: Best Practices Confiscation (2012: 6). 
37  Simser (2009: 13). 
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years. This process, otherwise known as money laundering,38 is a criminal route 
used to make property obtained illegally to appear legal.39 Forfeiture is thus a 
strategic weapon of which the state can avail itself to combat the harmful effects of 
money laundering on the economy. It serves as a complete deterrent for organised 
and economic crime, for it hits the criminal where it hurts most, namely, in the 
pocket.40 Once forfeiture is implemented effectively, it will become hard for 
criminals to launder their criminal profits successfully. This is the link between 
forfeiture and money laundering. 
Given the crucial role forfeiture can play in fighting economic criminality, 
international conventions and legal instruments encourage states to adopt 
forfeiture measures. The international legal instruments will be discussed in 
Chapter Three. 
1.3 Contextual background 
The history of asset forfeiture in Malawi dates back to 1966, when the Forfeiture 
Act41 was promulgated. This was soon after Malawi attained her independence 
from Britain.42 Malawi’s first Republican president, Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, was 
a strong proponent of the enactment of this law.43 
Under Banda’s rule, Malawi was a one-party state governed by the Malawi 
Congress Party, as proclaimed by the Republican Constitution of 1966.44 A 
                                                          
38  Nikolov (2011: 16). 
39  Bell (2004: 107). 
40  Cabana (2010: 109). 
41   Act Number 1 of 1966. 
42   Malawi was under British colonial rule from 1889 to 1964. 
43  Roberts (1966: 134). 
44   Section 14 of the 1966 Constitution. 
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subsequent amendment to the Constitution made Banda life president of Malawi.45 
The 1966 Constitution did not provide expressly for civil and socio-economic rights. 
The government instead recognised human rights by implication, through a 
declaration that it would uphold the sanctity of personal liberties enshrined in the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)46 and that it would 
adhere to international law.47  
Banda’s one-party regime exercised total control over the state and society by 
intimidating would-be opponents and eliminating existing ones.48 This iron grip on 
the affairs of state was accompanied by gross violations of the civil and political 
rights of the citizenry.49 The suppression of socio-economic rights was reinforced by 
the implementation of the Forfeiture Act.50 This law authorised, the responsible 
minister to order the forfeiture of the property of persons who, in his 
determination, had acted in a manner that prejudiced state security or the national 
economy, or in a way that subverted the authority of the government.51 The 
minister referred to in the Act was none other than the life president himself.52  
The then prime minister said in a speech that the Forfeiture Act was meant for 
people who fled to seek refuge in other countries. The people in question were 
those who fled in the aftermath of political turbulences, which were referred to 
commonly as the cabinet crisis. This political trouble, which took place in 
                                                          
45   Section 10(3) of the 1966 Constitution, under Amendment Act No 35 of 1970. 
46   Proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948. 
47   Section 2(1)(iii) of the 1966 Constitution. 
48   Phiri (1998: 9-10). See also Wanda (1996: 222) and Phiri (2013: 5). 
48   Human Rights Watch (1990). 
49   Human Rights Watch (1990). 
50   Chirwa (2005: 209). 
51   Section 2 of the Forfeiture Act. 
52   Wanda (1996: 224). 
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September and October 1964, was regarded as an open challenge to Banda’s 
authority.53 According to the prime minister, the Act was intended also to expose 
Indian businessmen who were said to be transferring money abroad illegally.54 The 
omnibus reach of the Act encompassed public servants who had stolen money or 
caused the loss of public funds through negligence.55 The Forfeiture Act, in effect, 
allowed for the forfeiture of the property of the above-mentioned categories of 
people, yet it prohibited them challenging the forfeiture orders before Malawian 
courts.56 Essentially, then, no one had the right to challenge a forfeiture order in 
court or in any other forum.57 Suffice to say that forfeiture under this Act was not 
conviction-based. 
Banda’s autocratic rule ended in 1993 when the Malawian people chose, in a 
referendum, to replace the one-party state with democratic rule.58 Thus, unlike the 
former Constitution, the new Constitution of 1994 contained a comprehensive bill 
of rights.59 The new Constitution also marked the abolition of the notion of life 
presidency.60 Importantly, it paved the way for the repeal of the notorious 
Forfeiture Act. 
In 2006, following international pressure, Malawi enacted the Money Laundering, 
Proceeds of Crime and Terrorist Financing Act,61 which is the main legislative 
weapon against money laundering and terrorist financing. The Act re-introduced 
                                                          
53  Eight out of ten cabinet ministers opposed certain policies pursued by Kamuzu Banda. 
54  Speech of the Prime Minister, Introducing the Forfeiture Bill (1966: 435). 
55   Section 2 of the Forfeiture Act. Wanda (1996: 224). 
56  Speech of the Prime Minister, Introducing the Forfeiture Bill (1966: 435).  
57  Section 7 of the Forfeiture Act. 
58   Chirwa (2005: 210). 
59   See Chapter 4 of the 1994 Constitution. 
60   Wanda (1996: 221). 
61   Chapter 8:07 of the Laws of Malawi.  
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asset forfeiture, but this time stipulated that it should apply only to property of 
those convicted of a crime, a procedure commonly referred to as criminal 
forfeiture. 
1.4 Statement of the problem 
The first problem this thesis investigates is that the international anti-money 
laundering instruments place more emphasis on the need to adopt criminal 
forfeiture than civil forfeiture. Consequently, countries such as Malawi adopted 
criminal forfeiture, while ignoring civil forfeiture. The exclusion of civil forfeiture 
undermines one of the professed goal of the international AML legal framework, 
which is to deter money laundering by broadening the extent of illicit assets subject 
to forfeiture. 
Furthermore, criminal forfeiture depends on the successful conviction of an 
offender. However, the complexity of the money laundering process, and its 
transnational character, make it a crime that is difficult to investigate and prosecute 
successfully.62 This is especially true of Malawi, with its limited investigative 
resources, more so since forfeiture depends on conviction.63 The conviction 
requirement implies that there must be enough resources to cover both the 
criminal trial proceedings and the subsequent forfeiture proceedings. Government 
agencies in Malawi rightly have voiced their concern about the shortages of both 
human and technical resources, given the tasks they face.64 All this has a bearing on 
                                                          
62
  The diferent stages of money laundering, that is placement, layering and integreation 
obscure the illicit nature of the assets being laundered. This renders the money laundering 
process complex. 
63  Brun et al (2011: 2). 
64  Mutual Evaluation Report for the Republic of Malawi (2008: 12). 
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Malawi’s success in stripping criminals of their illicit gains and deterring them and 
others from committing further crimes. 
In addition, given the historical abuse of forfeiture to suppress political opposition 
in Malawi, the current system of criminal forfeiture has to contend with human 
rights challenges before the courts. The rights include the right to property and the 
right to be presumed innocent. The same human rights objections arise in civil 
forfeiture proceedings in other countries, and are bound to arise in the Malawian 
courts also once civil forfeiture is introduced. 
1.5 Research question 
The overarching question that this study seeks to address is this: How is asset 
forfeiture implemented in Malawi and how effective is it in enabling Malawi to 
combat money laundering? A subordinate question is whether all states ought to 
adopt mandatory civil forfeiture to advance the deterrence of economic criminality. 
1.6 Objectives of the study 
The general objective of this thesis is to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of 
the existing criminal forfeiture regime in Malawi in combating money laundering. In 
this regard, the study will survey the legal and institutional frameworks in Malawi 
that relate to the successful forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime 
under its current criminal forfeiture system. An issue worth examining is whether 
civil forfeiture is at all relevant for low capacity countries such as Malawi, where 
criminal forfeiture alone is relied upon to deter economic criminality by depriving 
criminals of their criminal profits. The study, therefore, will examine the need for 
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the introduction of civil forfeiture in Malawi, but this will be done with caution, 
bearing in mind the legacy left behind by the repealed Forfeiture Act of 1966. 
It is helpful examining, too, why the international anti-money laundering regime 
does not set great score by civil forfeiture. This thesis will assess the merits and 
demerits of making civil forfeiture obligatory, in the light of its beneficial usage for 
the effective recovery of proceeds and instrumentalities of crime. This will be done 
by establishing the implications of introducing civil forfeiture, as well as suggesting 
the prerequisite safeguards that need to be put in place to avoid governments using 
it as a political tool, as was the case with Malawi during the Banda era. 
1.7 Significance of the study 
There are three main contributions this study makes. First, very little literature 
exists on the asset forfeiture regime in Malawi. The only comparatively detailed 
document on this topic is the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing 
of Terrorism Mutual Evaluation Report for the Republic of Malawi (2008), which 
does no more than evaluate Malawi’s anti-money laundering system for compliance 
with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations. This study, therefore, 
constitutes the first attempt to deal comprehensively with the subject of forfeiture 
in Malawi and its implications for the country’s fight against money laundering.  
It is hoped that the findings made in this study will help the Malawi government, as 
well as the criminal justice authorities and the courts, to pay particular attention to 
the crucial issues, raised here, which have been overlooked so far by both the 
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mutual evaluation assessment team and the legislature.65 The conclusions drawn 
and the recommendations made in this study could prove useful and beneficial, not 
only for Malawi, but also for other jurisdictions which are grappling with the idea of 
implementing an effective system of forfeiture. 
This thesis is argued from the standpoint that a criminal forfeiture regime alone is 
not a sufficient deterrent to a criminal lifestyle; it needs to be supplemented by a 
regime of civil forfeiture, which should be made obligatory for all states by 
international anti-money laundering and anti-corruption instruments.  
Significant, too, is that this thesis studies the subject of asset forfeiture from the 
perspective of John Locke’s theory of the social contract and his mixed theory of 
punishment, which could serve as a guideline on how best to implement a system 
of asset forfeiture at the international level and in Malawi.  
1.8 Hypotheses 
The study is based on the following hypotheses: 
 The criminal forfeiture regime currently existing in Malawi is not adequate 
to combat money laundering and economic crimes effectively. 
 The introduction of civil forfeiture would best complement criminal 
forfeiture in Malawi. 
                                                          
65  The evaluation process looked broadly at so many aspects of the Malawi legal and 
Institutional frameworks, touching on each of the FATF’S 40+9 Recommendations. As a  
result, the discussion on forfeiture was not extensive. 
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 Making the adoption of civil forfeiture mandatory at the international level 
will show the seriousness of the global community about preventing 
economic crimes and money laundering.  
1.9 Literature review 
Much has been written on forfeiture, asset recovery and money laundering, but 
very little has been produced on these topics in so far as they pertain to Malawi. 
The few authors that have written on Malawi have dealt with forfeiture only in 
passing, perhaps in a paragraph or two. Literature on this subject is, therefore, 
sparse. 
Jai Banda, has commented on Malawian laws relating to forfeiture in his article 
titled “Institutional responses to organised crime in Malawi”.66 The article discusses 
extensively the increase of organised criminal activities in Malawi since the advent 
of democracy, and evaluates the efficacy of Malawi’s measures against organised 
crime. 67 Banda highlights the misuse of the Forfeiture Act under President Banda’s 
rule and the events that led to its being repealed when Malawi became a 
democracy. 68 The article identifies existing pieces of legislation that have forfeiture 
provisions,69 and it notes that all the laws provide for conviction-based forfeiture.70 
Banda concludes with a recommendation that the laws regulating crimes such as 
                                                          
66  Banda (2001: 2). 
67  Banda (2001: 2). 
68  Banda (2001: 9). 
69  Penal Code, Corrupt Practices Act and the Exchange Control Regulations. 
70   Banda (2001: 10). 
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money laundering, trafficking in dangerous drugs and firearms, as well as theft of 
motor vehicles, should make specific provision for forfeiture.71  
Banda’s article was written in 2001, before Malawi adopted the anti-money 
laundering law (AML) legislation in 2006. The article does not state how forfeiture 
was implemented after the repeal of the Forfeiture Act. This study will therefore go 
beyond this article, analysing the forfeiture regime as it now stands. 
Banda wrote another article on anti-money laundering developments in Malawi, 
covering the period between 2004 and 2006.72 He comments on Malawi’s adoption 
of an AML Strategy,73 the adoption of the AML legislation and the challenges that 
delayed its adoption for four years.74 His brief discussion of forfeiture starts by 
pointing out that Malawians are mistrustful of confiscation because of its previous 
misuse as a punitive tool against political opponents.75 The article surveys Malawi’s 
AML provisions, including those dealing with the forfeiture of both proceeds and 
instrumentalities of crime.76 He contends that asset forfeiture needs to be balanced 
against the individual’s right not to be deprived of property without due process of 
law.77 He also points out that the forfeiture in the current law is conviction-based.78 
In essence, Banda gives an overview of the forfeiture provisions in the AML 
legislation as well as in the Corrupt Practices Act,79 but does not examine how these 
laws are implemented in Malawi or what their implications are. This study will 
                                                          
71  Banda (2001: 10). 
72  Banda (2007: 1). 
73  Banda (2007: 1). 
74  Banda (2007: 2-3). 
75  Banda (2007: 14). 
76  Banda (2007: 14). 
77  Banda (2007: 14). 
78   Banda (2007: 14). 
79  Banda (2007: 14). 
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attempt to make good these omissions by analysing all the laws pertaining to 
forfeiture as well as their implementation, before discussing their implications for 
the fight against money laundering.  
Goredema has written on money laundering in Malawi, though not particularly on 
forfeiture.80 He overviews the dimensions of economic crimes and money 
laundering within Eastern and Southern Africa, focusing on countries that are 
members of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group 
(ESAAMLG).81 His is essentially a survey of economic crimes that are predicate 
crimes of money laundering in each country. For Malawi, such crimes include drug 
trafficking,82 tax evasion, fraud and corruption.83 Goredema concludes that money 
laundering is rife in East and Southern Africa.84 This observation is relevant for this 
thesis, especially when it comes to justifying why Malawi and other countries in the 
region need to have in place an efficient forfeiture regime, as a powerful AML tool. 
Recently, the World Bank conducted research into the economic magnitude of ill-
gotten money generated by criminal, illegal and unethical activities in Malawi and 
Namibia, and then estimated their impact on economic development.85 The 
findings revealed that corruption and tax evasion are by far the largest sources of 
ill-gotten gains in Malawi.86 The Malawi Revenue Authority is said already to have 
used the AML framework to track the proceeds from tax evasion, but the Anti-
                                                          
80  Goredema (2003: 1).  
81  The member countries are Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
82  Goredema (2003: 3). 
83  Goredema (2003: 8-9). 
84  Goredema (2003: 16). 
85  Yikona et al (2011: vii). 
86  Yikona et al (2011: 46). 
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Corruption Bureau has yet to use the Financial Intelligence Unit’s database to follow 
the trail of suspected proceeds of corruption.87  
The World Bank study further identified fraud, smuggling of counterfeit goods, the 
production and export of cannabis, organised motor vehicle theft, violent house-
breaking, human trafficking and labour exploitation as profit-generating crimes 
prevalent in Malawi.88 Money gained from these crimes is used mainly to buy food 
and household necessities, and the surplus is invested usually in luxury items such 
as mansions and posh cars, or hoarded in national bank accounts.89  
The study recommends, inter alia, that Malawi should focus significant law 
enforcement and Financial Intelligence Unit resources on using an AML framework 
to combat corruption and tax evasion.90 However, the recommendations do not go 
as far as stating how best the AML framework can be used in this regard. This thesis 
will go a step further to show specifically that an effective forfeiture regime is an 
essential AML tool to recover the proceeds of crime in Malawi. 
Several authors have written on forfeiture in general, while others have focused 
specifically on civil forfeiture. The World Bank’s Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative 
(StAR), through Greenberg and others, has produced a good practices guide which 
advocates for civil forfeiture.91 It is a practical guide that identifies legal, operational 
and practical concepts that an effective asset forfeiture system should have in order 
to recover stolen assets. The guide proposes the implementation of civil forfeiture, 
                                                          
87  Yikona et al (2011: 47). 
88  Yikona et al (2011: 28). 
89  Yikona et al (2011: 46). 
90  Yikona et al (2011: 89). 
91  Greenberg  et al (2009: 7). 
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especially in developing countries, the resources of which place constraints on their 
ability to overcome the challenges posed by criminal forfeiture.92 The guide has 
been written with reference to countries such as Switzerland, Kuwait, Ireland, 
Colombia, United Kingdom, Thailand, Guernsey and the Philippines.93 This study will 
consider these concepts with respect to Malawi, on which there is as yet no 
elaborate literature on the subject.  
In addition to the foregoing, the FATF has issued a guidance document on best 
practices to help countries in their implementation of Recommendations 3 and 
38.94 Recommendation 3 focuses on the measures required to identify, trace, locate 
and evaluate property subject to confiscation. Recommendation 38 requires states 
to take quick action in response to requests by other states to identify property 
which may be confiscated. The FATF supports both criminal and civil forfeiture, so 
as to achieve a robust AML and CFT regime. This study will assess the possibility of 
making the adoption of civil forfeiture regime mandatory, so as to have an effective 
global AML framework. 
All in all, this thesis offers an in-depth consideration of the philosophical and legal 
questions pertaining to asset forfeiture, especially as they relate to Malawi. 
                                                          
92  Greenberg  et al (2009: 7). 
93   Greenberg  et al (2009: xvii). 
94  FAFT Best Practices on Confiscation (2010: 3). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSET FORFEITURE 
“The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, 
and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their 
property.”1 
2.1 Introduction 
The global fight against economic crimes has propelled the adoption of asset 
forfeiture as a law enforcement tool. Malawi has embraced also the usefulness of 
this tool in its efforts to curb and combat economic crimes. However, the legacy of 
Malawi’s previous asset forfeiture regime that was marred with injustice and 
arbitrariness, poses a threat to the comprehensive implementation of asset 
forfeiture in the country. Malawi, therefore, needs to put in place guarantees for a 
just and fair asset forfeiture regime as an assurance that this tool will not bring back 
the injustices of the past.  
This thesis argues that, given the usefulness of civil forfeiture, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, it is imperative for Malawi to introduce civil forfeiture fully into 
its criminal justice system. However, this too will demand solid guarantees from the 
state that civil forfeiture will not lead to injustice and unfairness.  
This thesis contends that the establishment of a just and fair asset forfeiture regime 
demands the limitation of state powers, where the state is limited to rule only in 
the best interests of the people and in recognition of their human rights. This is one 
way of ensuring that the state would not limit the rights (such as property rights) of 
                                                          
1  Locke (1990: 180) IX 124. 
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its citizens arbitrarily, in the guise of combating economic crimes through the tool 
of asset forfeiture. I will, thus, investigate Thomas Hobbes and John Locke’s 
accounts of the social contract theory, in order to explain the philosophical 
underpinnings for limited state powers.  
I embark also on a philosophical exposition of the principles and aims of 
punishment in order to develop a philosophical framework for asset forfeiture. I, 
therefore, discuss retribution and deterrence theories of punishment and depict 
their relevance to asset forfeiture. I go further to explore mixed theories of 
punishment as propounded by John Locke, Herbert Hart, Andrew Von Hirsch and 
John Rawls to illustrate how asset forfeiture can be explained within a mixed theory 
of retribution and deterrence. 
2.2 Limited government through the lens of the social contract theory 
A social contract is an agreement entered into by individuals to form a state or an 
organised society in pursuit of peace and protection, which entails the surrender of 
some or all personal liberties to a government.2 There are different accounts of the 
social contract theory, but the thesis will compare only the versions of two 
philosophers, namely, Thomas Hobbes’s and John Locke. The two accounts differ in 
that Hobbes’ account defends absolutism while Locke’s account supports limited 
constitutionalism.3 The thesis contends that unlike Hobbes’s social contract, Locke’s 
account meets the objectives of this thesis as it offers a better framework for a 
limited state. Locke’s theory offers the foundation for minimum checks against the 
                                                          
2  Chirwa (2008: 296). 
3  Olynyk (2010: 132). 
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abuse of the asset forfeiture tool unlike Hobbes’ account that would justify the 
implementation of an unjust asset forfeiture regime. 
2.2.1 Thomas Hobbes’s social contract perspective 
Hobbes based his ideas on a state of nature, which is a hypothetical condition in 
which people lived without a government. Everyone pursued their own interests 
because people were selfish, often leading to constant conflicts. Thus, life was 
generally solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.4 This led to perpetual conflict and 
war.5 To avoid such chaos, people entered into a social contract, which was a 
covenant not to harm one another in order to attain security and peace.6 However, 
compliance with the social contract required some coercive power which could be 
provided by a sovereign power only.7 Thus, the people agreed to surrender their 
rights of self-government and liberties to a sovereign power, a government, to rule 
over them and protect them from human predicaments that existed in the state of 
nature.8 But each person surrendered his rights and liberties to the state on the 
agreement that everyone gives up his governing power also.9 In Hobbes’s words, 
this is how people in society gave power to a sovereign: 
“I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to 
this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, 
and Authorize all his Actions in like manner”10 
According to Hobbes, the sovereign is not a party to the social contract.11 The 
sovereign is a mere recipient of the governing power from people who enter into 
                                                          
4  Hobbes (1651: 113) XIII.1. 
5  Hobbes (1651 : 113) XIII.I. 
6  Hobbes (1651 : 157-58) XVII.2. 
7  Hobbes (1651 : 153-54) XVII.2. 
8  Hobbes (1651: 157). See also Gauthier (1988: 134-137). 
9  Hobbes (1651 : 118) XIV. 
10  Hobbes (1651 : 158) XVII.2. 
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the contract amongst themselves.12 For this reason, Hobbes asserted that the 
sovereign cannot be held accountable or responsible for anything, for he cannot be 
in breach of a pact to which he was not a party.13 In Hobbes’ view: 
“The Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to him they make 
Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of him to any of 
them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the 
Soveraigne.”14 
Thus, the role of the sovereign (the state), Hobbes contends, is merely to enforce 
the social contract that the people entered into amongst themselves. 
In addition, Hobbes asserted that the government is an absolute or near absolute 
sovereign with unlimited powers, and incapable of occasioning injustice on the 
people.15 He reasoned that there would be chaos again in the society if the people 
were to limit or challenge the sovereign’s power and actions. Thus, the people 
cannot question the absolute sovereign.16 The sole task of the government is to 
keep order in the society. The government has the absolute power to deal with its 
citizens in any manner it deems fit, as long as that yields the peace and security 
towards which the citizens aspired. Further, the sovereign has the power to 
determine the means of achieving the ends, that is, the means to maintaining 
peace and safety.17 
In relation to asset forfeiture, Hobbes’ account means that the government would 
have unlimited powers to impose forfeiture of its citizens’ property arbitrarily, as 
                                                                                                                                                                    
11  Samek (1974: 98). 
12  Gough (1936: 100). 
13  Kelly (1992: 212). 
14  Hobbes (1651: 161). 
15  Hobbes (1651: 163) XIII.4. 
16  Hobbes (1651: 163). 
17  Hobbes (1651: 164) XIII.6. 
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long as doing so brings peace and safety to the people. Citizens would have no right 
to challenge such orders, since Hobbes states that the people cannot challenge the 
government in the first place. Such an outcome is contrary to what this thesis is 
advancing, i.e. an asset forfeiture regime that is just in both its means and its end. 
The means must justify the end. Focusing merely on the goal of asset forfeiture, i.e 
crime reduction, while ignoring the need to protect the people’s rights as much as 
possible, is acceptable only in Hobbes’ account, but is rejected by this thesis. It 
leads to injustice through unjust practices such as asset forfeiture.  
2.2.2 John Locke’s social contract perspective 
Locke’s account of the social contract theory, like Hobbes’, begins with a 
description of a state of nature. Contrary to Hobbes, in Locke’s state of nature 
people exist in perfect freedom and are guided by laws of nature.18 In the state of 
nature, people had inalienable natural rights such as rights to life, liberty and 
property.19 Unlike Hobbes, Locke contends these natural rights are not dependent 
on the existence of a sovereign lawgiver, but they are an intrinsic part of human 
existence.20 However, Locke contends that in the state of nature, there was no 
central authority to enforce laws or an impartial judge to hear cases, so everyone 
could be a judge in his own case.21 This could lead to chaos, a state of war, where 
everyone enforced the law and punished a transgressor as he pleased.22 
                                                          
18  Locke (1990: 118) II.4. 
19  Locke (1990: 118 ) II.4. 
20  Roederer (2004: 44). 
21  Locke (1990:123) II.13. 
22  Locke (1990: 126) III.19. 
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In order to secure their peace and safety, and the security of their property, people 
joined together in a civil society and entered into a social contract to live in peace 
with one another (pactum unionis).23 Further, they undertook to create and obey a 
civil government (pactum subjectionis), which was meant to provide remedies for 
the problems they encountered with the individual enforcement of natural law in 
the state of nature.24 Thus, the civil government was tasked to exercise its power 
through clearly defined laws, through impartial judges and judgments, to ensure 
peace and liberty for the people.25 Locke emphasised this when he said: 
“The great and chief end, therefore, of men’s uniting into commonwealths, 
and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their 
property.”26 
Until today, Locke’s account dictates that the government’s exercise of its powers is 
limited to the preservation of the people’s property, a general name he uses to 
refer to rights to lives, liberties and estates,27 and its purpose is to achieve peace, 
safety and public good.28 The government must act only within the limits of the 
power which the people had in a state of nature. The people did not have, and 
therefore, could not give unto the government the power to occasion injustice. For 
this reason, the state has no basis for causing injustice, because the people could 
not give more power than what they had.29 Furthermore, men aspired for the 
amelioration and not the deterioration of their welfare when they entered into the 
social contract. Consequently, the government must strive to meet the people’s 
                                                          
23  Locke (1990: 179-180) IX.123. 
24  Locke (1990: 123) II.13. 
25  Roederer (2004: 44). 
26  Locke (1990: 180) IX.124. 
27  Locke (1990: 182) IX.131. 
28  Locke (1990:182) IX.131. 
29  Locke (1990: 185) XI.135. See also Nyamaka (2011: 5). 
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reasons for creating a civil government, “for no rational creature can be supposed 
to change his condition with an intention to be worse”.30 
Most importantly, the government’s powers are not absolute. The people merely 
entrust the governing power to the civil government and they may revoke their 
trust if the government fails to meet their ends.31 Unlike Hobbes, Locke’s account 
forms the bedrock of the democracy theory i.e. a government of the people, by the 
people and for the people.32 Locke’s contention that the people are the source of 
the governing power provides citizens with the ability to assert the inviolability of 
their natural rights against the positive law of the state.33 
Furthermore, Locke’s theory offers the basis and scope of the government’s power 
to punish, and for purposes of this thesis, the power to impose forfeiture of illicit 
property. According to Locke, punishment plays an integral role in defining, 
developing and presenting both individual rights and limited government power.34 
Hence, punishment becomes a measure of the rule of law and the final protection 
of individual rights.35 By extension, too, the implementation of an asset forfeiture 
regime should be a measure of a government’s commitment to the rule of law and 
the protection of its people’s rights. 
The emphasis on the limited government power is of particular importance to this 
thesis because asset forfeiture, by its nature, often borders on the limitation or 
                                                          
30  Locke (1690: 182) IX.131. 
31  Locke (1690: 192). 
32  Nyamwaka (2011: 9). 
33  Roederer (2004: 44). 
34  McBride (2007: 104). 
35  McBride (2007: 115). 
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deprivation of property rights.36 Thus, there ought to be a sound basis and 
justification for the limitation of rights by the government. Suffice to say that 
Locke’s conception of natural rights is quite influential, as it has led to the current 
conception of fully justiciable constitutional rights.37 Thus, Locke’s account provides 
a sound framework for a limited government, requiring it to be accountable to its 
people in the manner in which it exercises the power to punish through asset 
forfeiture, in order to combat economic crimes and money laundering.  
2.2.3 The social contract and the constitution 
Modern day republican constitutions reflect the tenets of the traditional social 
contract. A constitution comprises a legal framework of a social contract among 
present and future members of a society.38 Going by John Locke’s account of the 
social contract, “a constitution is social contract implying the aspirations of the 
people and their government to comply with constitutional norms”.39 Since human 
beings no longer live in the state of nature, citizens consent to the rule of the 
government implicitly through residence in a given country, acceptance of benefits 
and through political participation.40 Thus, modern day republican constitutions 
embody the spirit of Locke’s contract that is based on consent. 
A constitution articulates the general rights and responsibilities of the people and 
the state.41 The people make a pact among themselves to respect the government 
                                                          
36   Van der Walt (2005: 205). 
37  Roederer (2004: 45). 
38  Norrie ( 1991: 226). 
39  Nyamwaka (2011: 11). 
40  Nyamwaka (2011: 3). 
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and to abide by its laws in accordance with agreed procedures.42 In addition, the 
government is mandated to secure the rights of the people, such as the right to 
property, life and liberty.43 As a social contract, the constitution contains human 
rights guarantees and it empowers the people to enforce the realisation of their 
needs and aspirations.44 Furthermore, the constitution addresses and circumscribes 
government action.45 In the case of Malawi, the current Republican Constitution 
(1994) obligates the government to protect the interests of its people.46 The 
government’s actions will be deemed unconstitutional if it goes beyond the 
constitutional limits that are set by the people through the constitution. Therefore, 
the legitimacy of government policy and authority derives from the people, through 
the constitution.47 
In relation to asset forfeiture, the government’s actions, through the creation and 
implementation of asset forfeiture laws, must be evaluated against the 
constitutional principles and limitations. This is because the constitution is the 
fundamental norm (grundnorm) in a legal system which forms the blueprint for the 
creation of other laws,48 such as asset forfeiture laws. The trust relationship 
between the government and the people is enforced by the courts.49 Courts make 
sure that the government does not limit the people’s rights without due process.50 
Thus, courts must safeguard that the government does not limit people’s rights 
                                                          
42  Henkin (1987: 265). 
43  Henkin (1987: 265). 
44  Nyamwaka (2011: 11). 
45  Henkin (1987: 65). 
46   Sections 12(1), 13, 14, and 44(4) of the Constitution of Malawi. 
47  Okoth-Ogendo (1991: 7). 
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arbitrarily through the implementation of asset forfeiture laws. Notably, from the 
social contract emerge constitutionalism, jurisprudence and human rights 
matters,51 which are relevant for the development of a comprehensive and 
justifiable asset forfeiture framework. 
2.2.4 Asset forfeiture vs human rights 
As defined in the first chapter, asset forfeiture is the government’s disgorgement of 
the proceeds or instrumentalities of crime from the people.52 This definition 
indicates that asset forfeiture affects the property rights of the people, in one way 
or the other. 
The significance of the right to property gained universal recognition through the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights53 (UDHR). The UDHR states that every 
person has the right to own property.54 It also emphasises that no one should be 
deprived of his property, arbitrarily.55 The concept of property cannot be delinked 
from ownership rights, and whenever rights attach to property, any inference with 
the property will invariably amount to an interference with the rights of a person 
who has an interest in the property.56 This is why it is necessary for the government 
to justify its limitation of or interference with the people’s rights when it 
implements measures such as asset forfeiture. Most importantly, the limitation of 
rights must not be arbitrary.  
                                                          
51  Nyamwaka (2011: 11). 
52  Eissa (2011: 3). 
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54  Article 17(1) of the UDHR. 
55  Article 17(2) of the UDHR. 
56  Pretorius (1988: 412). 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
The UDHR permits only limitations that are determined by law for the sole purpose 
of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others.57 It 
permits also limitations that aim at meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.58 Thus, the 
government’s limitation of property rights through asset forfeiture for example, can 
be justified only if the limitation is necessary to maintain public order or welfare of 
the people through crime reduction.  
2.2.5 Locke’s views on property rights 
The basis for the recognition of human rights, including the right to property, can 
be drawn from Locke’s views on the government and its interaction with the 
property of its people. Locke reasoned that the government has a negative 
obligation to refrain from violating property rights, as well as an affirmative 
obligation to ensure their preservation.59 He further emphasised that the 
government cannot take the property of any of its subjects arbitrarily.60 
In relation to asset forfeiture, the government should enact and enforce only asset 
forfeiture laws that aim at preserving all or any of the natural rights of its people. 
Any laws or actions by the government that are contrary to the preservation of the 
peoples’ rights would be rendered unjustifiable and arbitrary. Such laws and actions 
would be beyond the scope of what the people agreed to when they gave up their 
executive power to the government. People did not give their power to a civil 
government for it to do things or pass laws that threaten the preservation of their 
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58  Article 29(2) of the UDHR. 
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rights. Neither did they empower the government to deprive them of their legally 
acquired property, anyhow. 
2.3 The Rationale for asset forfeiture 
It is imperative to understand the theories and motivations that justify asset 
forfeiture.61 There are different rationales for recognising asset forfeiture as a law 
enforcement tool. The identification of these rationales assists in the adoption of 
measures that are best suited for each type of forfeiture. 
2.3.1 Taking the profit out of the crime 
“The first thing the law should do is to ensure that those who break it…should not 
make any money out of their wrongdoing.”62 The argument is that “gains from 
unlawful activity ought not to accrue and accumulate in the hands of those who 
commit unlawful activity”.63 Thus, criminals must not be accorded property rights 
and privileges that accrue in civil property law.64 Since proceeds of crime refer to 
property which has been derived illegally, the rationale for their forfeiture is that 
the possessor has no rightful claim in them. Proceeds of crime, therefore, 
constitute property to which some other individual or society has a higher claim by 
virtue of the current possessor’s wrongful acquisition.65 The forfeiture of the 
proceeds of crime finds its basis also in John Locke and Robert Nozick’s 
philosophical accounts on the acquisition of property, as discussed below. 
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2.3.1.1 John Locke’s account of lawful acquisition of property 
In his account on acquisition of property, John Locke contended that a person 
acquires property legally only through their labour.66 Thus, criminality does not 
constitute a basis for the acquisition of property. This justifies the forfeiture of 
proceeds of crime, as they are not proceeds of one’s clean labour, but illicit labour. 
They are proceeds of criminal acts that threaten the peace and security which men 
strived for when they entered into a social contract and formed a civil government. 
No one, therefore, should be allowed to benefit from breaking the law, and the 
forfeiture of the proceeds of crime makes sure of this. 
2.3.1.2 Robert Nozick’s theory of justice 
The principle of lawful acquisition of property and the need to disgorge unlawful 
gains can also be understood through Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory. He 
propounds that whether a distribution (one’s acquisition of property) is just or not 
depends entirely on how it came about.67 Nozick’s entitlement theory is concerned 
primarily with the distribution of property, and he argues that justice involves three 
principles. These are justice in acquisition, justice in transfer and rectification of 
injustice. 
The justice in acquisition principle surveys how one acquires property rights over 
something that was not owned previously.68 On this principle, Nozick was inspired 
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by Locke’s labour-mixing principle as the basis of property acquisition.69 Nozick 
rejects acquisition of property through criminal acts such as theft and fraud.70 
Secondly, the justice in transfer principle determines how one acquires property 
rights over property that has been transferred (e.g. by gift or exchange) to them by 
someone else.71 Nozick stresses that the processes of change of property 
ownership through a transfer must preserve the thread of justice.72 Thus, a holding 
in property is just if it has been acquired through a legitimate transfer from 
someone who acquired it through a legitimate transfer or through legitimate 
acquisition.73 If a person is entitled to a specific piece of property, then he can 
transfer it justly to any person. 
Thirdly, the rectification of injustice principle expresses the need to restore 
property to its rightful owner, in case there was injustice in either its acquisition or 
its transfer.74 The injustice must be rectified by returning the property to its rightful 
owner, such as victims of fraud. This is a way of “wiping clean the historical slate of 
injustices”.75 
Asset forfeiture is, therefore, an important mechanism for achieving the 
rectification of both injustice of acquisition and injustice in transfer of illicit 
property. The acquisition of proceeds of crime is rooted in the impermissible and 
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unjust mode of acquisition, i.e. criminal activities. Hence the transfer of such 
proceeds must be rectified through asset forfeiture.  
In particular, civil forfeiture finds its explanation in Nozick’s rectification of justice 
principle. Unlike criminal forfeiture which can be made only against the property 
owned by a convict, civil forfeiture order relates back to the date the property was 
acquired or used illegally, regardless of whether it is still held by the offender or a 
third person.76 Thus, Nozick’s reasoning justifies why the state should be allowed to 
recover tainted property without being required to prove the guilt of the person 
who holds the property, as long as the tainted nature of the property can be proved 
to the requisite standard of proof on a balance of probabilities. However, as will be 
explained later in the discussion, the pursuit of tainted property held by a third 
party may be halted if they prove that they are a bona fide purchaser or innocent 
owner who had no knowledge of the property’s illegal use.  
2.3.2 Suppressing incentives for unlawful activities 
The forfeiture of proceeds of crime aims also at suppressing the conditions that 
lead to unlawful activities.77 By taking away what does not belong to criminals, 
forfeiture of the proceeds of crime is intended to stop them from benefiting from 
crime, thereby, deterring them from committing more profit-crimes. 
 
 
                                                          
76   Van der Walt (2000: 5). 
77  Simser (2009: 13). 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 This point was also expressed by Lawton J in R v Waterfield when he said: 
“This Court is firmly of the opinion that if those who take part in this kind of 
trade know that on conviction they are likely to be stripped of every penny 
of profit that they make and a good deal more, then the desire to enter it 
will be diminished.”78 
For example, if a drug trafficker is sent to prison and his drug profits remain with 
him, the profits would constitute his capital for more drug trafficking after serving 
his prison sentence.79 Leaving a criminal with the illicit proceeds would also serve as 
an incentive for him and others to engage a criminal lifestyle because it makes such 
a life profitable. Forfeiture, therefore, would have a deterrent effect.  
Furthermore, although forfeiture does not incapacitate offenders in the sense that 
traditional punishment of imprisonment usually does by removing individuals from 
society, it seeks to incapacitate criminal organisations and 'reduce their power and 
influence' by 'divesting major criminals of their ill-gotten gains'.80 Forfeiture, 
therefore, introduces the concept of financial incapacitation on criminals, which can 
lead to the overall reduction of organised economic crimes. 
In addition, the forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime ensures that tools of crime 
are removed from circulation so that they should not be used again either by the 
offender or anyone else to commit further crimes.81 This, in turn, works as a 
deterrent.82 The argument here is that for example, leaving to a criminal a house 
that he used as a base for drug production and distribution, would create an 
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environment for further drug activities.83 Forfeiture of instruments of crime, 
therefore, ensures that law enforcement authorities do not only arrest an offender 
and put him in jail, but they also remove the tools for crime from circulation so that 
they are not used again by either the offender or his associates.84 The bottom line is 
that property, regardless of its illegal or dangerous nature, is hazardous in the 
hands of an owner who either uses it to commit crimes, or allows others to do so. 
The owner should be held accountable for the misuse of the property. 
Going back to Locke’s account of the social contract, one can argue that when 
entering into the social contract, people undertook to observe the law, which 
included a promise to use their property to the best interests of the society, and 
not as a tool for the commission of a crime. In the state of nature, people had the 
power to restrain an offender from reoffending.85 Furthermore, people had the 
power to destroy anything that is noxious to them.86 These powers were 
transferred to the state at the creation of a civil government. Hence, the state must 
use measures such as asset forfeiture to restrain offenders from reoffending, and 
also to remove of property that is noxious to the society, such as instrumentalities 
of crime.  
2.3.3 Compensation of victims 
Forfeiture also serves as a means for recovering property and compensating victims 
of crime.87 This relates to victims of property offences such as theft and fraud.88 In 
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such cases, forfeiture is said to have a reparative function. Locke states also that in 
the state of nature, the compensation of victims of crime is one aim of the aims of 
punishment.89 Nozick argues for the compensation of victims of crime as well, 
through his rectification of injustice theory.90 Thus, asset forfeiture is one way of 
ensuring that there is property through which a victim can be compensated. In 
cases where it is difficult to identify individual victims, the society becomes a victim 
deserving compensation for the negative effects of crime.91 Such effects include 
non-delivery of building materials for a village bridge or school due to 
embezzlement of public funds, or the lack of order and security in a society due to 
drug crimes and organised criminal activities. 
2.3.4 Rationale for civil asset forfeiture 
As stated in Chapter One, civil asset forfeiture is the deprivation of either proceeds 
of instrumentalities of crime, without requiring the conviction of an offender.92 The 
state has to prove merely on a balance of probabilities that the property in question 
is related to an offence, either as an instrumentality or proceeds.93 Because of the 
irrelevance of a conviction, civil asset forfeiture has attracted criticism due to its 
potential of violating property rights and fair trial rights, such as the right to be 
presumed innocent.94 It allows the state to limit the people’s rights without proving 
their guilt to the requisite standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt first.  
                                                          
89  Locke (1990: 121) II.8. 
90  Nozick (1974: 152). 
91  Van der Walt (2000: 7). 
92  Nikolov (2011: 17). 
93  Simser (2009: 13). 
94  Sanbei (2012: 6). 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Given all the risks that civil forfeiture poses, this thesis submits that it is still a 
relevant and necessary law enforcement tool. The argument is that it is a necessary 
tool for the establishment of a comprehensive crime prevention scheme. Civil 
forfeiture emerges in response to the shortcomings of the criminal forfeiture 
model.95 It has been established earlier in the discussion that the forfeiture of 
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime is necessary as a deterrent tool and also for 
the compensation of victims of crime. These aims of forfeiture must not be put to a 
halt just because the situation at hand does not allow the state to prosecute 
offenders first because they are ill or immune from prosecution, before the state 
can touch their illicit possessions. Civil forfeiture does not allow an offender who 
has chosen to flee the jurisdiction to continue holding illicit property. It makes 
certain that people do not continue using their property as instruments of crime. 
Civil forfeiture ensures also that the family of a dead offender does not benefit 
from an illicitly-acquired estate. 
Allowing criminals to enjoy their illicit gains just because they cannot be prosecuted 
would encourage them to continue committing profit-crimes, as long as they evade 
an arrest and prosecution. Criminals would take advantage of the conviction 
requirement for criminal forfeiture and decide to avoid prosecution at all costs. 
Thus, a system that is serious about combating economic crime ought to include 
civil forfeiture in its laws to cater for situations where a prosecution and conviction 
cannot be obtained.  
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Turning to the social contract theory, leaving an offender with criminal proceeds 
would be contrary to Locke’s principle that property must be acquired through 
clean labour and not through criminal activities. Further, leaving criminals with 
illegal proceeds would encourage them and others to breach the social contract by 
breaking the law, which is a violation of the covenant that people will obey the law. 
The government must be empowered to get hold of criminal proceeds through civil 
forfeiture. Otherwise, its inability to confiscate such proceeds, owing to its failure to 
prosecute offenders, would result in chaos (a state of war) and the perpetual 
breach of the social contract by people. 
Furthermore, Nozick’s justice in distribution theory offers also the basis for non-
conviction-based forfeiture of proceeds of crime. The acquisition of the proceeds is 
unjust because they derive from criminality, not labour, and this injustice must be 
rectified. There should be nothing, therefore, to stop the state from rectifying this 
injustice through forfeiture, even when a prosecution is impossible. The same 
applies to criminal proceeds that have been transferred to another person. The 
transfer of the proceeds is unjust because they originate from an unjust acquisition. 
Hence, civil forfeiture must rectify this injustice even when the law breaker is not 
available for his prosecution.  
In relation to victims of crime, it would be unjust to fail to compensate them from 
the proceeds of crime, just because the state cannot prosecute an offender. Victims 
would be left uncompensated, while an offender or his family or friends benefit 
from the proceeds of the very same crime that has led to the victim’s ordeal. There 
would be no rectification of this injustice should the state be precluded from 
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getting hold of that property for purposes of victim compensation, in the event that 
it must obtain a conviction first. 
However, even though justice would demand the use of civil forfeiture in situations 
where the state cannot obtain the conviction of an offender, the state must avoid 
using this mechanism to perpetrate injustice on property owners. The state must 
stick to the tenets of Locke’s limited government as discussed earlier, in order to 
avoid the arbitrary use of the civil forfeiture mechanism. The usefulness of civil 
forfeiture must not cloud the need to avoid the arbitrary limitation of the people’s 
rights. The interests of the public, as anticipated by the people when they entered 
into the social contract, must prevail at all times. Thus, there must be due process 
safeguards to avoid any arbitrary deprivation of property. This is the only way 
through which civil forfeiture can find its legitimacy. 
2.4 Asset forfeiture as punishment 
There is an ongoing debate about whether or not asset forfeiture in general 
constitutes punishment. Asset forfeiture carries with it punitive elements that arise 
from the deprivation of property, through either criminal or civil forfeiture. It is 
imperative to assess if the punitive elements make forfeiture a form of punishment. 
Punishment is defined as an unpleasant experience imposed on someone as a 
result of a criminal or wrongful act.96 
John Locke defined punishment as “some evil, some inconvenience, some suffering; 
by taking away or abridging some good thing, which he who is punished has 
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otherwise a right to”.97 Furthermore, Hart defined punishment by listing the 
following elements: 
”(i)  It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered 
unpleasant, 
(ii) It must be for the offence against legal rules, 
(iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence,  
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than 
the offender [and]  
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted 
by a legal system against which the offence is committed.”98 
All these definitions point to the fact that punishment is unpleasant. It is an 
inconvenience that one experiences due to the commission of a criminal or 
wrongful act. 
2.4.1 Criminal forfeiture as punishment 
Criminal forfeiture is said to be part of the sentence in a criminal case.99 A forfeiture 
order is, thus, pronounced at the end of the criminal trial, in the judgment of the 
court at the sentencing stage.100 Is criminal forfeiture of proceeds and instruments 
of crime punishment in itself or just because it is ordered after a conviction? 
2.4.1.1 Forfeiture of proceeds of crime 
According to Locke’s definition, punishment concerns the deprivation of something 
to which the punished person has a right. In light of the argument made earlier that 
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an offender does not have any property rights in the proceeds of crime, it would 
seem, at first glance, that on Locke’s terms, forfeiture of the proceeds of crime 
would not constitute punishment per se. Nonetheless, even though a criminal has 
no clean title to criminal gains, he still treats them as his. Hence losing them should 
be unpleasant because he commits crime to gain some benefit. 
However, going by Hart’s definition of punishment, forfeiture of the proceeds of 
crime does constitute punishment. This forfeiture involves pain and an unpleasant 
consequence of a criminal losing his criminal gains which are the very incentive for 
his engagement in economic crimes. The basis of forfeiture is the commission of an 
offence and it affects the property of an actual or supposed offender on account of 
his engagement in an offence. Here again, even though an offender has no clean 
title to criminal gains, he still treats them as his property, and losing them should be 
an unpleasant consequence. Further, forfeiture is administered intentionally by 
human beings other than the offender, i.e. officers of the court and prosecutors. 
Finally, forfeiture is imposed and administered by an authority (the courts) 
constituted by a legal system against which the offence is committed. Thus, 
proceeds forfeiture constitutes punishment, according to Hart’s definition. 
Others have argued that forfeiture of the proceeds of crime is a typical example of a 
penalty which returns the offender to the position he was in before committing the 
offence.101 They further submit such forfeiture has more in common with civil 
restitution than with traditional punishments because, like restitution, it merely 
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restores the status quo ante.102 It, therefore, lacks the expressive quality of 
traditional punishments which have the capacity to express the moral scorn of the 
community.103 But is the disgorging of criminal proceeds not an expression of the 
moral scorn of the community at the tendency of committing crimes for economic 
gain? It is submitted that it is. A punitive expression is registered when an offender 
is deprived of the proceeds of crime.104 It is, therefore, punishment even though it 
also restores the status quo ante.  
2.4.1.2 Forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime 
The deprivation of instrumentalities of crime also amounts to punishment. This is 
because through a forfeiture order, one suffers the inconvenience of losing one’s 
legally acquired property because it was used in the commission of a crime. This 
resonates with Locke’s definition that punishment concerns the deprivation of 
something that an offender had rights to.  
In the same way, Hart’s definition of punishment captures the forfeiture of 
instrumentalities. The forfeiture involves an unpleasant consequence which a 
property owner experiences for using or letting others to use his property in the 
commission of a crime. The basis for the forfeiture is the commission of an offence. 
Forfeiture is administered intentionally by human beings other than the offender, 
i.e. court officials and prosecutors. In addition, forfeiture is imposed and 
administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the 
offence is committed. Hart also said that the punishment must be of an actual or 
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supposed offender for his offence. This last element ensures that punishment, and 
in this case, forfeiture, is imposed only against the property of a person who is 
culpable of wrong doing.  
2.4.2 Civil forfeiture as punishment 
Does the punitive nature of the forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities of 
crime change when it comes to civil forfeiture? Having established that civil 
forfeiture is not based on the conviction of an offender, it begs to question whether 
it constitutes punishment. One argument is that civil forfeiture is not punishment 
under a penal system; rather, it is a specific adverse consequence of a crime, unlike 
criminal forfeiture, which is based on a conviction.105 
It is also argued that civil law’s primary aim is not punishment, but rather to 
facilitate that things should go back to the way they were, the status quo ante, so as 
to restore the position of an injured party.106 Another argument is that just because 
in civil forfeiture proceedings the state is required to establish the underlying 
offence which taints the property in question, this does not make civil forfeiture 
punishment.107 The establishment of the offence serves merely as basis for the 
removal of the tainted property.108 
But is civil forfeiture not “criminal forfeiture dressed up in sheep’s clothing?”.109 
This question stems from a criticism that civil forfeiture achieves the same punitive 
objectives as criminal forfeiture, yet without the procedural safeguards and human 
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rights protections that apply to criminal proceedings.110 Others claim that civil 
forfeiture is not characterised by search, arrest, charge, conviction and sentence, 
hence it is not criminal.111  
It should be mentioned at this point that the USA and the UK have comprehensive 
jurisprudence on asset forfeiture, hence, this thesis will make reference to some of 
American and English case law to clarify certain elements of the subject. While 
trying to illustrate the difficulty of categorising civil asset forfeiture, the court in R 
(Mc Cann and Others) v Crown112 reasoned that: 
“What is criminal, as opposed to civil proceedings, is a matter which can be 
difficult to determine … To some extent, it is like describing an elephant; it is 
recognised when seen but it is difficult extremely to describe.”113 
Furthermore, the quasi-criminal nature of civil forfeiture was noted in the case of 
Boyd v United States in which the Court said: 
“We are ... clearly of opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of 
declaring the forfeiture of a man’s property by reason of offences 
committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature 
criminal.”114 
It is further contended that civil forfeiture belongs to the public law sphere, since it 
relates to public relations in which the state possesses ‘imperium’.115 Another 
argument is that it is a branch of public law because invariably the state seeks to 
have private property forfeited pursuant to legislation that has high public policy 
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content and undertones.116 In the case of United States v Ward,117 the US Supreme 
Court offers further guidance on this matter. It outlined criteria for determining 
whether a particular proceeding is criminal or civil. The court stated that it must 
establish first whether the legislature, in introducing the mechanism, indicated 
either expressly or impliedly, a preference for the label of civil or criminal. If an 
intention to establish a civil penalty is established, the court must second, 
determine if the statutory scheme was so punitive, either in purpose or effect, as to 
negate that intention. 
It is important to determine whether civil forfeiture is as punitive either in purpose 
or effect as a criminal forfeiture, because if it is in fact punitive, then it must be 
subject to all the constitutional safeguards that apply in criminal proceedings.118 It 
would seem that it is the civil nature of the civil forfeiture proceedings that gives 
rise to all this debate. The thesis argues, however, that the punitive element of civil 
forfeiture cannot be determined by looking merely at the civil nature of its form 
and procedure. Thus, this thesis agrees with Justice Frankfurter’s reasoning in the 
case of United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess119 that punitive ends may be pursued in 
civil proceedings. The mere labelling of a proceeding as civil or penal can never be 
decisive of its nature in actual fact.120 Hence, the punitive nature of civil forfeiture 
should not be overshadowed by the fact that proceedings are civil in both 
procedure and enforcement.  
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But why should we labour with the question of punishment when the defendant in 
civil proceedings is an object or property and not a human being? The legal fiction 
stated earlier in Chapter One is that the civil forfeiture action is instituted against 
the property, for its illicit provenance or use. However, Cassella argues that it is 
people, and not objects, who commit crime.121 Hence, civil forfeiture actions are in 
essence actions against property owners and not the property itself. The forfeited 
property is a mere means to an end, i.e. punishing a perpetrator for unlawful 
conduct.122 However, the nexus between an offence, the property earmarked for 
forfeiture and the conduct of its owner, should at no time be too far removed.123 
This is to make sure that forfeiture applies to property that belongs to a person 
who is guilty of some culpable wrongdoing, and not property of an innocent person 
or property that has no criminal connection. 
This argument was tackled in the case of Austin v United States,124 where the court 
characterised civil forfeiture of real property as punishment. In determining 
whether forfeiture is punitive or remedial, the court examined the historical origins 
of forfeiture and eventually concluded that forfeiture constitutes payment to a 
sovereign as punishment for some offence. The State in this case argued that 
forfeiture is remedial rather than punitive because it removes the instrumentalities 
of the drug trade, “thereby protecting the community”.125 
Nevertheless, the court reviewed previous Supreme Court forfeiture case law and 
held that forfeiture had long been viewed as imposing punishment in the least part, 
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upon the owner of property which has been tainted by criminal activity.126 Justice 
Scalia stated that the object of punishment in forfeiture is more realistically the 
property owner rather than the property itself.127 The court in Austin v United 
States128 therefore, abandoned reliance on the old ‘guilty property’ or 
personification of property fiction that characterised in rem or civil forfeitures. It 
held instead that such forfeitures should be based on the notion that the owner 
was negligent in letting his property be used in the commission of a crime, so he 
should be punished for his negligence.129 
Cassella argues further that the civil proceedings in civil asset forfeiture offer only 
procedural convenience to the government to facilitate forfeiture.130 It is indeed 
procedurally convenient to the state to achieve the aims of asset forfeiture, i.e. 
deterrence and victim compensation, in cases where it cannot prosecute an 
offender. This argument is buttressed by the fact that even though the proceedings 
are civil in nature, civil forfeiture of proceeds of crime, just as is the case with 
criminal forfeiture, is an inconvenience to offenders, and it serves also as 
deterrence to both an offender and the public at large. It carries with it the 
message that crime does not pay.  
Civil forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime carries also the message that property 
owners must not use or let their property be used in the commission of crimes. 
Notably, this deterrence message is not directed at the property, but at the 
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property owners. The legal fiction of in rem forfeiture ought not to be given any 
weight in any modern democratic society, because if property were to replace a 
person as an offender, constitutional guarantees would become obsolete.131 This 
would lead to injustice since property owners would not be given a chance to 
challenge forfeiture orders. 
Therefore, one can conclude that civil forfeiture is indeed punitive in nature. It 
punishes offenders and owners of illicit property, while carrying with it a deterrent 
message. With this conclusion, civil forfeiture demands also a good measure of due 
process protections so as to avoid unjustified limitation of the people’s rights.  
2.5 Government’s right to punish through asset forfeiture 
Having established that asset forfeiture is indeed punishment, it begs to question 
where the government gets the power to punish offenders, and therefore, the 
power to order forfeiture. As stated earlier, individuals in the state of nature have a 
right to punish transgressors and to destroy all things that are noxious to them.132 
Every man in the state of nature has the general right to preserve mankind, and this 
gives each one of them the right to punish anyone who breaks the law and 
threatens other people’s peace and safety. By committing an offence, an offender 
breaks his promise not to bring harm to his fellow men.133 The explanation is that 
when one commits a crime, he violates the law of nature, which forbids him ‘’to 
take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the 
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liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.134 This justifies the society’s right to 
punish.135 
However, upon entering into a civil society, members relinquish to a civil 
government the right to punish offenders.136 Thus, the government gets the power 
to punish from the people. This, then, indicates also where the government gets 
the power to impose forfeiture of illicit property. The government must enforce 
forfeiture laws only in the best interests of the people, thus, to preserve their 
natural rights. Using forfeiture to meet the aspirations of the people should be the 
yardstick for assessing the legitimacy of the government’s exercise of forfeiture 
powers.  
2.6 Theory of punishment in asset forfeiture 
What aims of punishment should guide the government in the enforcement of 
asset forfeiture laws? There are three major theories of punishment, i.e. 
deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation.137 Deterrence is forward-looking or 
consequentialist in nature. It justifies punishment by its good consequences.138 
Retribution, however, is backward-looking and non-consequentialist. It justifies 
punishment on the basis that an offender has broken the law, and not because of 
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the consequences that punishment will yield. Rehabilitation is also forward-looking 
as it aims at reforming an offender.139 
The argument in this thesis is that asset forfeiture has both retributive and 
deterrent elements. In addition, forfeiture of proceeds of crime has reparative 
undertones. Thus, this thesis argues for an asset forfeiture regime which finds itself 
within a context of a mixed theory of punishment. This is a theory which recognises 
that the competing theories of retribution and deterrence are not mutually 
exclusive.  
2.6.1 Deterrence 
Deterrence is an application of the general utilitarian theory of morality to the 
specific issue of punishment.140 Bentham, in his account of the utilitarian theory, 
resonates with John Locke’s contention that the chief end of a government is the 
preservation of the people’s rights to life, estate and liberty. Bentham states that 
the sole end of the legislator (the state) is the happiness of people in a community, 
which manifests in their pleasures and their security.141 Thus, the test for the 
necessity of government’s actions is whether the actions ameliorate the welfare of 
the people. 
Utilitarian or consequentialist theorists define punishment as the infliction of pain 
on a person in order to deter him from repeating a crime, or to deter others from 
imitating a crime which they believe he has committed.142 Deterrence operates on 
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two levels. There is specific deterrence and general deterrence. Specific deterrence 
aims at deterring the offender from committing further crimes, while general 
deterrence aims at deterring other people from committing crimes.143 
Unlike retributivists, utilitarian theorists have a forward-looking approach because 
they place the justification of punishment in future results of deterrence by 
severely punishing the offender.144 The overall good consequence is crime 
reduction through deterrence.145 Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian account on 
punishment states that the threat of punishment discourages people from 
committing crime, and therefore, it increases utility by acting as a deterrent.146 
However, he says punishment must not be imposed if it cannot deter further crime, 
if it is unprofitable, needless, or groundless.147 
Notably, deterrence is one of the main aims of punishment in the state of nature.148 
It is contended that by virtue of their membership to society, men submit 
themselves to societal controls, such that when someone does something out of 
order, society will try various means to cease the damaging activity.149 Therefore, 
the implicit assumption of deterrence is that without certain controls, society 
would return to a state of war, so we need laws and policing to be kept in line.150 
Consequently, deterrence must obtain also in the new social order ruled by a civil 
government. This proposition is based on the understanding within the context of 
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Locke’s social contract theory, when man surrendered to the civil government his 
power to punish, he anticipated also that punishment should have the same 
deterrence and reparative aims which applied in the state of nature. 
However, it begs to question whether deterrence should apply to asset forfeiture 
also, bearing in mind that deterrence attracts some significant criticism. Critics have 
questioned the efficacy of deterrence as a sound basis for punishment. One of the 
criticisms is that there is no evidence that punishment really achieves deterrence 
and that it makes offenders more likely to become law abiding citizens in the 
future.151 The argument is that forfeiture does not achieve deterrence because it 
merely recoups what was not legitimately owned. Therefore, it does not render an 
offender any worse off than he was before the criminal conduct.152 In response to 
this criticism, this thesis argues that deterrence is bound to work when it comes to 
economic crimes such as fraud, bribery and tax evasion. This is because the 
economic benefit is the actual incentive for committing economic crimes. If 
criminals are convinced that ‘crime does not pay’ and that if caught, they will be 
unable to retain criminal proceeds, then presumably, at least they and other would-
be criminals will be deterred from committing economic crimes for gain.153 In 
addition, this thesis contends that just because not all people are deterred, does 
not mean that no one is deterred.154 
In addition, some have argued that deterrence assumes that people behave 
rationally and weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of a proposed course of 
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conduct.155 An example would be the commission of an offence such as a murder 
that is committed in the heat of passion. One may argue that in such a case, the 
fear of being punished does not exercise the mind of an offender because the 
offender has no or very little time to do a cost-benefit analysis of the killing. 
However, this criticism would not apply to most of the economic crimes, which an 
offender commits solely for their economic incentive. There is, therefore, some 
considerable level of prior calculation or anticipation of the benefits of the crime, 
on the part of the offender. Therefore, asset forfeiture’s deterrent assumptions 
that people weigh the advantages and disadvantages of economic crime could be 
valid. 
Furthermore, it is argued that a consequentialist approach to punishment would 
justify the infliction of sentences that are too harsh.156 Disproportionately harsh 
sentences yield to injustice, which cannot be justified morally even if they can 
achieve crime reduction. However, Jeremy Bentham, a utilitarian theorist, diverts 
from pure utilitarianism by arguing that punishment must not be excessive. 
Punishment must not be more than what is necessary to achieve deterrence.157 This 
is Bentham’s way of bringing proportionality within a consequentialist framework. 
Finally, critics argue that the utilitarian theory might justify the punishment of the 
innocent, as long as the punishment yields a good consequence.158 Some have 
responded to this criticism by saying that an understanding of the concept of 
punishment itself implies that punishment should result from wrongdoing, hence, 
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utilitarians do not envisage the punishment of the innocent.159 However, some 
consequentialist proponents would respond to this criticism by arguing that 
undesirable results, i.e. punishing the innocent must be accepted if doing so 
contributes to crime reduction.160 However, there is injustice in punishing the 
innocent. Innocence gives one the right not to be punished, so the state must 
refrain from punishing the innocent.161 The state must establish first the guilt of a 
person before the imposition of punishment.162 Thus, “punishment must not only 
be for an offender; it must also be for her offence”.163 But a purely consequentialist 
theory would have no regard to an innocent person’s right not to be punished.164. 
Owing to the weaknesses highlighted by the criticisms discussed above, this thesis 
objects to the reliance on deterrence which stems from a pure consequentialist 
theory, to justify asset forfeiture. This is owing to the injustice the forfeiture of 
innocent people’s property may occasion, for that would be arbitrary forfeiture, to 
which this thesis objects. Such a deterrence theory has no strong foundation for the 
prohibition of punishing the innocent, or the meting out of disproportionately harsh 
punishments in order to achieve deterrence. Even though its consequential aspects 
resonate with the deterrent rationale for asset forfeiture, the theory in its pure 
state does not offer a solid framework for a fair and just asset forfeiture scheme. 
Thus, it is prudent to look elsewhere for a framework that is consequentialist in its 
aims, but prohibits expressly both the punishment of the innocent and the 
imposition of disproportionately harsh punishments. 
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2.6.2 Retribution 
The retributive theory defines punishment as the infliction of pain by an 
appropriate authority, on a person because he is guilty of a crime i.e. for a crime 
that he committed.165 Retributivists argue that a person should be punished only 
because he has performed a culpable wrongdoing,166 not because we want to deter 
him or others from committing the same offence. Kant, a retributivist, argued that a 
person ought to be punished for committing a crime and not for the purpose of 
promoting some good for the society or the individual.167 This is why retributivists 
are said to approach punishment from a backward-looking perspective.168 
Retribution advances the notion that punishment must fit the crime through the 
just desert notion of retributive justice. The just desert notion stresses that the 
state must punish a person because he deserves hard treatment due to, and in 
proportion to his offence. The worse his offence, the harsher his penalty should 
be.169 The ground for desert or punishment is a person’s wrongdoing.170 Just desert 
or deserved punishment gives a guilty person the harm they deserve for breaking a 
just law, culpably.171 The concept of blaming the guilty entails that the subject of 
desert is a person because only a person can be morally responsible for his or her 
actions.172 
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In relation to asset forfeiture, the just desert theory addresses the shortcomings of 
pure consequentialist deterrence discussed earlier. It offers guidance on how much 
property should be forfeited, to make sure it is proportional to the offence one has 
committed. An offender must lose only the property he deserves to lose. If he has 
benefitted $5000.00 from fraud, his just desert will be the forfeiture of property 
valued at $5000.00 plus any other income made from the investment of the stolen 
money. The just desert notion will not justify the forfeiture of any property on top 
of the value of the criminal gains. Forfeiture of property which exceeds criminal 
gains would be arbitrary and unjustifiable. 
Furthermore, the retribution theory’s emphasis on punishing a person because he 
is guilty of an offence ensures that forfeiture does not apply to the property of 
innocent people. Thus, it can be distinguished from pure consequentialism, which 
does not rule out expressly the need to reserve punishment for the guilty only, and 
to spare the innocent in the quest for deterrence and crime reduction. 
But utilitarian theorists contend that if there is no good that would accrue to 
society as a result of punishing an individual or individuals, then it amounts to 
revenge and not punishment.173 This thesis agrees with this observation, because 
an eye for an eye approach bears vengeful undertones. Is it feasible to have a 
forfeiture regime that does not find its aims and justification in the future, but in 
the past only as retribution does? Going by the rationale for asset forfeiture 
discussed earlier, the answer is no. The overall aim of asset forfeiture is to combat 
economic crimes, and not merely to wreak revenge on people who benefit from 
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economic crimes or who use their property to commit crimes. Further, the power 
to punish that was handed over to a civil government within the social contract 
context has the aims of punishment sprayed with consequentialist undertones. It is 
consequentialist, while acknowledging retributive elements of proportionality and 
the sparing of the innocent from punishment.  
Notably, if punishment were just a matter of censuring offenders as retribution 
suggests, then traditional forms of punishment such as imprisonment would be 
sufficient punishment. The addition of asset forfeiture offers a more direct 
deterrent effect than imprisonment, because forfeiture targets the very incentive 
for engaging in economic crimes. Hence, the consequentialist element of asset 
forfeiture must be recognised, and this is possible only within the context of a 
mixed theory of punishment. 
2.6.3 Mixed theory of punishment 
From the discussion above, it appears that a fair and just asset forfeiture regime 
would demand a framework that accommodates aspects of both deterrence and 
retribution. This is a framework that has consequentialist aims, but prohibits the 
punishment of the innocent and the imposition of disproportionately harsh 
sentences. Is it possible, philosophically, to explain the concept of forfeiture using 
the two competing theories of retribution and deterrence within one framework? 
Can asset forfeiture be really backward-looking in its distribution, yet forward-
looking in its aims?  
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2.6.3.1 Hart’s account of mixed theory of punishment 
At first glance, the reconciliation of the two theories seems impossible. However, 
Hart reasoned that the reconciliation of the two theories seems impossible because 
most people have made the mistake of using them to answer the general question 
of the justification of punishment. He argued that it is untenable to have a penal 
system that is absolutely retributive or consequentialist, due to the shortcomings of 
each theory.  
According to Hart, the utilitarian aim of crime reduction provides the general 
justification of punishment, which he terms “the general justifying aim of 
punishment”.174 However, the pursuit of this consequentialist goal is constrained by 
a notion of justice which he refers to as “retribution in distribution”.175 Retribution 
determines two questions of punishment: who should be punished and to what 
extent.176 These two questions ensure that only the guilty are punished, and they 
are punished in proportion to their offence or harm caused by their offence. Hart’s 
main reason for invoking the two principles of retribution to act as side constraints 
on the utilitarian tenets is that these principles cannot be derived from pure 
utilitarianism.177 
2.6.3.2 John Locke’s account of mixed theory of punishment 
John Locke also confirmed the possibility of having a penal framework that looks 
both backwards and forward. He reasoned that we must ‘retribute’ or punish an 
offender, in proportion to his offence, so as to achieve deterrence and 
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reparation.178 This situates deterrence and reparation as aims of forfeiture, while 
affirming retribution as the determinant of who must be punished and to what 
extent.  
As stated earlier, pure utilitarianism suggests that punishment must be viewed in 
terms of what it produces and not how it achieves this goal.179 Locke has a contrary 
view. He submitted that the government exists within a special relationship with 
the law. It has the power to punish, but the manner in which punishment is 
imposed becomes the key to perceiving whether it uses this power within or 
beyond the bounds that were set by the people.180 This is Locke’s rejection of pure 
utilitarianism which, arguably, does not prohibit expressly the use of unjust means 
such as punishing the innocent and imposing disproportionately harsh sentences in 
pursuit of deterrence and reparation of victims. Indeed, Locke’s social contract 
prohibits the use of unjust means in the implementation of asset forfeiture in order 
to combat economic crimes.  
Locke is, therefore, consequentialist, but only as far the consequentialist aims are 
achieved through the just means. Thus, both retribution and deterrence find their 
place in John Locke’s account of punishment within the social contract theory. He, 
like Hart, makes deterrence and reparation the aims of punishment, and retribution 
its constraint. 
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2.6.3.3 Andrew Von Hirsch’s account of mixed theory 
Retribution critics argue that there should be reasons for punishment, other than 
the mere impulse to punish.181 Andrew Von Hirsch contended that even though 
deterrence is not a sufficient reason for punishment, he claims it is a necessary one. 
He said 
“If punishment has no usefulness in preventing crime, there should ... not 
be a criminal sanction.”182 
He is a consequentialist in part, because he recognises retribution as the primary 
justification for punishment, and deterrence as its secondary objective.183 His 
theory of punishment is contingent upon punishment having a deterrent effect. The 
only difference with Hart and Locke’s accounts is that Hirsch used both retribution 
and deterrence to answer the same question of what is the objective of 
punishment. He said retribution is the primary objective, while deterrence is a 
secondary objective.184 However, it is untenable to use both theories to answer one 
question of punishment, that is the justification of punishment, and this makes it 
impossible to reconcile the two within one framework as Hirsh has suggested. Only 
one of the theories must be the objective of punishment, within a given penal 
framework. 
2.6.3.4 John Rawls’s account of mixed theory 
John Rawls argued that crime reduction should be the aim of punishment, and 
legislators should have this goal at the back of their minds when they set up 
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institutions for the realisation of this aim.185 They must focus into the future, not 
the past. Nevertheless, courts must take a retributive approach and look into the 
past in order to determine who committed an offence and what punishment he 
deserves.186 
Rawls disapproves also with the punishment of the innocent. He argues that 
utilitarian legislators should reject the practice of “telishment,” by prohibiting 
judges or other relevant officials from punishing the innocent in order to achieve 
deterrence.187 However, one criticism for his theory is that if judges are to be left to 
determine punishment on purely retributive tenets, then the crime reduction aim 
of the legislature would be reduced to an abstract justifying aim of punishment 
“whose important details would be filled in by retributive aims and concerns”.188 Or 
could the legislators set up a punishment framework which aims at achieving 
deterrence, but leave the courts to determine punishment on a case by case basis 
using retributive principles? The answer is yes.  
Rawls’ account would lead us to a penal framework that is similar to the one that is 
suggested by Hart and Locke. This framework is one way of avoiding the 
achievement of deterrence through the unjust means of punishing the innocent 
and imposing disproportionately harsh sentences. An asset forfeiture regime that is 
grounded within this framework would be fair and just. 
A just asset forfeiture system must be limited to the property of those who are 
culpable of wrong doing and the amount of the forfeited property must be 
                                                          
185  Rawls (1955: 6). 
186  Rawls (1955: 6). 
187  Rawls (1955: 11-12). 
188  Lipkke (2006: 278). 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
proportional to the offence and to the damage it caused to victims. This is where 
retribution comes in, as a constraint on how we should arrive at the deterrent and 
reparative aims of forfeiture. Unlike Hart, Hirsch and Rawl’s accounts of mixed 
theory of punishment, Locke’s account is most suited at explaining asset forfeiture, 
for his recognition of both deterrence and reparation of victims as aims of 
punishment. These are aims of asset forfeiture. 
 
2.7 Developing an asset forfeiture framework through Locke’s mixed theory of 
punishment 
Locke explained different principles on punishment in the following statement: 
“And thus in the State of Nature, one Man comes by a Power over another; 
but yet no Absolute or Arbitrary Power, to use a Criminal when he has got 
him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or boundless 
extravagancy of his own Will, but only to retribute to him, so far as calm 
reason and conscience dictates, what is proportionate to his Transgression, 
which is so much as may serve for Reparation and Restraint. For these two 
are the only reasons, why one Man may lawfully do harm to another, which 
is that [which] we call punishment.”189 
From this statement, one can decipher a comprehensive framework for 
punishment, which can also serve as the ideal framework for asset forfeiture. 
2.7.1 Punishment must not be arbitrary 
The first principle that Locke raised is that the power to punish is not absolute or 
arbitrary. Thus, the state should not punish arbitrarily. In relation to asset 
forfeiture, this means that the forfeiture of illicit property must not be arbitrary. 
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This is the limitation which must guide the state when implementing asset 
forfeiture laws. 
If punishment is within the boundaries of the law, it will be acceptable.190 But this is 
an assumption that the law itself is a good law. Is it just any law, or the law which 
reflects the aspirations and interests of the people? Shall we take a positivist 
approach to accept a law just because it has been made by the relevant authorities, 
or must we determine its goodness by looking at its effects on the people? To this 
end, Locke introduced a notion of a limited legislature. This is the law-making 
institution that must pass only laws that reflect the interests of the people.191 The 
legislature must not act against the trust of the people, by refraining from making 
laws that limit the rights of the people arbitrarily.192 
In relation to the asset forfeiture discourse, Locke’s approach would disapprove of a 
legislature that passes anti-money laundering and asset forfeiture laws that do not 
reflect the interests of the general populace. People make clear their best interests 
when they enter into a civil society and surrender their liberties power to a civil 
government.  They cannot be said to have agreed to an arbitrary rule through 
arbitrary and unjust laws that may be passed by the legislature.193 
2.7.2 Punishment of offenders, not the innocent 
Forfeiture may target proceeds or instrumentalities of crime that belong to, or are 
in the possession of a person other than the offender. It is prudent and just to let 
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innocent owners continue to enjoy their rights in that property, since any limitation 
of any of their property rights would be arbitrary.  
As stated earlier, Locke stressed that punishment must be imposed on offenders 
and not the innocent. Locke further explained that “to punish men for that, which it 
is visible cannot be known whether they have performed or no, is so palpable an 
injustice.”194 From this statement, Locke is afﬁrming that the state must not punish 
the innocent, or people who cannot be known to have committed the crime.195 This 
is a retributive notion of punishing offenders only, which is consistent with the 
social contract theory.196 The same notion must apply to asset forfeiture. The state 
must target only property of offenders. 
But what if an offender transfers or sells quickly illicit property to an innocent 
person in a bid to escape the tentacles of the law on asset forfeiture? Or what if an 
offender uses property which belongs to an innocent person as an instrumentality 
of crime? Here, the interests of an innocent property owner must be balanced with 
the interests of the public in order to avoid occasioning some injustice. The state 
must be aware that offenders can collude with innocent people to transfer title of 
their illicit proceeds so as to avoid forfeiture. Thus, innocent owners must be given 
a chance to exclude their property from forfeiture proceedings. How can this be 
done?  
First, the law must give an opportunity to innocent owners to show that they were 
not aware that their property was being used in criminal activities, or that they did 
                                                          
194  Locke (1990: 79). 
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all that could be reasonably expected of them to prevent the criminal use of their 
property.197 Second, the law must exclude the property of good faith purchasers 
who did not know of the tainted nature of the property at the time they acquired 
their interest in it.198 
As Stevens J noted in his dissenting judgment in the Ursery 199 case, linking 
forfeiture directly to the commission of an offence, coupled with the innocent 
owner defence, strongly indicates that culpability is a requirement for forfeiture. 
Kennedy J in the same Ursery case argued also that in the forfeiture of real property 
used to facilitate a drug offence, only the culpable stand to lose their property. No 
interest of any owner is forfeited if he can show he did not know of or consent to 
the crime. However, in his opinion, the key distinction is that in the case of 
forfeiture of instrumentalities, statutes are not directed at those who carry out the 
crimes, but at owners who are culpable for the criminal misuse of the property. 
In principle, any law that allows for the forfeiture of property without giving the 
owners an opportunity to show why their property must be excluded from 
forfeiture would be arbitrary and unjustifiable. 
2.7.3 Punishment to meet deterrent and reparative aims 
To sum up his thoughts on punishment, Locke said that punishment must serve two 
purposes, restraint and reparation. He emphasised on deterrence by saying that 
“each Transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much Severity as 
                                                          
197  Doyle (2015: 12). 
198  Doyle (2015: 12). 
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will sufﬁce to make it an ill bargain to the Offender, give him cause to repent, and 
terrify others from doing the like”.200 
Further, Locke presents punishment as a means of repairing the social order as can 
be appreciated from his emphasis on deterrence, public safety, and restitution as 
aims of the punishments which must be administered by the government. 
Forfeiture, being punitive, must aim also at deterrence of offenders and the public, 
as well as the reparation of victims.  
Locke recognised the harm that some offences cause to specific individuals in a 
society, (victims), so there is need to undo that harm and to compensate the 
victims. He said a victim of crime has the right to punish an offender, as well as the 
right to seek reparation from an offender. The right to reparation can be exercised 
by the victim himself, or any other person may join the victim to seek such 
reparation, to such an extent as it may be required in order to satisfy the harm he 
has suffered.201 
The most concrete form of reparation is the payment of compensation.202 When 
Locke says that besides the right to punish, a victim has a right to seek reparation, 
he recognises the need to deal with an offender at two levels. First, punish him for 
the offence. Second, cause him to make reparation for the harm that his 
transgression has occasioned the victims of his offence. 
One must note though, that Locke does not describe reparation as either forward-
looking or backward-looking, adequately. It is rather as a rationale of punishment 
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which allocates future beneﬁts on a victim, on the basis of historically grounded 
claims.203 
2.7.4 Proportionality of punishment 
As mentioned earlier, retributivists emphasise that punishment must fit the 
crime.204 This is the basis for the proportionality principle in retributive justice. 
Locke advanced the retributive justice principle of proportionality when he said that 
punishment must be enough to retribute or punish the offender, and the amount of 
punishment must be proportionate to the transgression. In terms of asset 
forfeiture, this means that the amount or value of the property which is subject to 
forfeiture must be proportionate to the offence in question.  
Can proportionate forfeiture achieve deterrence? In relation to economic crime, 
the answer is in the affirmative. Proportionate punishment such as proportionate 
forfeiture orders can achieve deterrence. This answer is based on the argument 
made earlier, that the incentive for engaging in economic crimes is the economic 
gain. Hence, forfeiture of every criminal benefit is likely to have a deterrent effect 
because offenders and other members of a society will know that the state is 
focused on disgorging all illicit gains. 
Can proportionate punishments really have a deterrent effect on offenders, 
especially where the detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders do not 
seem likely?205 It is indeed questionable if deterrence can be achieved if there is 
less likelihood of detection of the economic crimes and the apprehension of the 
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offenders by law enforcement authorities. Similarly, it is questionable if 
proportionate forfeitures can have a deterrent effect if offenders and the public are 
convinced that there is very little likelihood that the state can detect economic 
crimes and trace illicit property. This, then, calls for states to put in place measures 
for ensuring the detection of crimes and the tracing of illicit property which may be 
liable for forfeiture. Only then can proportional forfeitures have a deterrent effect 
on offenders and the public. 
2.7.4.1 Proportionality of the forfeiture of proceeds of crime 
The forfeiture of proceeds of crime can be proportional if what is forfeited is what 
represents the totality of the unlawful gain. There is nothing disproportional about 
depriving someone of something he did not deserve or own in the first place. This is 
why it is said that proceeds of crime which are in the possession or ownership of a 
culpable owner are never excessive.206 Advancing this argument, Justice Kennedy in 
Bajakajian contended as follows: 
“As a rule, forfeitures of criminal proceeds serve the nonpunitive ends of 
making restitution to the rightful owner and of compelling the surrender of 
property held without right of ownership. Most forfeitures of proceeds, as a 
consequence, are not fines at all, let alone excessive fines”.207 
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, which I agree with, stresses the point that the issue of 
excessiveness of forfeiture will not arise as long as what is forfeited is the amount 
that was gained or acquired unlawfully. The state must, therefore, make sure it 
observes the proportionality principle when imposing forfeitures. 
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2.7.4.2 Proportionality of the forfeiture of instrumentalities 
The proportionality of the forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime ought to be 
considered carefully, to avoid occasioning injustice. It has been stated earlier that 
instrumentalities are in most cases property that was acquired legally, but used 
illegally. Thus, there are property rights that are usually at stake. The forfeiture of 
instrumentalities of crime that are in the hands of a culpable owner may be 
sometimes excessive.208 Furthermore, the forfeiture of instrumentalities that are in 
the hands of an innocent owner, are usually excessive.209 This calls for the 
application of the principle of proportionality. The value of instrumentalities that 
are liable to forfeiture must be in proportion to an offender’s culpability in the use 
of property to commit a crime. 
Nevertheless, to say that punishment must be proportional to an offence sounds 
immediately appealing, though we are confronted with the problem of how best to 
determine proportionality in cases where it does not seem obvious what 
proportionate punishment ought to be.210 The principle of proportionality on its 
own does not give guidance on how much a penalty should be.211 It sounds very 
abstract. 
Be that as it may, I argue that the forfeiture of instrumentalities would be 
disproportional only if it applies to property that cannot be regarded as an 
instrumentality in the first place. An example would be a hotel guest who engages 
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in an isolated drug sale in the hotel foyer. The forfeiture of the hotel would be 
excessive. It would be excessive because the question of excessiveness of the 
forfeiture of an instrumentality of crime is not how much the confiscated property 
is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close enough relationship to 
the offence.212 One needs to ask whether the offence could be committed 
elsewhere apart from this hotel, or whether the hotel was specially designated and 
designed to facilitate the sale of drugs. 
Stretching the argument a bit further, suppose there is one room in a five-roomed 
mansion that is constantly used for the production and packaging of drugs. How 
much of the house should be forfeited? Should it be just that specific room or the 
whole house? If it should be just the one room, how shall we sever it from the rest 
of the house so as to satisfy a forfeiture order made against the room? Shall the 
court require the owner to pay the value of that one room instead? Or the house 
must be sold in order for the state to deduct the value of that one room and return 
the balance to the owner? These are some of the difficult, yet practical questions 
that exercise one’s mind when considering the issue of proportionality. Whether a 
court decides to order the sale of the whole house or to order forfeiture of the 
value of that one room, or to order an offender to pay an amount to the value of 
the room, is an issue for the courts to determine. Whichever option the court picks, 
proportionality must be of paramount concern to avoid occasioning some injustice 
and arbitrariness. 
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2.7.4.3 Proportionality of compensation 
Proportionality should also apply to the reparative aim of punishment. The right of 
reparation demands that an offender must compensate the victim of a crime for 
the harm suffered through the injustice that is occasioned by crime.213 Thus, 
reparative justice derives its proportionality in the harm suffered by the victim.214 
According to the principle of strict proportionality, the amount of reparation should 
be limited to that which is necessary to compensate the victim fully. This means 
that there should not be over-compensation or under-compensation.215 Notably, 
this sounds appealing to the victim, but what happens in cases where the value of 
the property that has been recovered is too little to satisfy full compensation within 
the tenets of strict proportionality?  
In practice, and in fairness to an offender, the amount of compensation is scaled 
down below what is proportional to the harm, just to accommodate the 
circumstances of the offender.216 Consequently, courts would face the challenge of 
ordering the compensation of a victim, based on the property that has been traced 
and recovered. In case of criminal forfeiture, since the proceedings are in 
personam, the court may make a money judgement requiring a convict to pay 
compensation through any of his property, other than the proceeds of crime. But in 
relation to civil forfeiture, because proceedings are instituted against specific 
property, it means that compensation will be made only out of property that has 
been recovered. Thus, in civil forfeiture proceedings, the reparative aim of 
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forfeiture is limited by the amount or value of property which the state manages to 
trace and recover. This places an obligation on the state to ensure that there are 
measures for the effective tracing and recovery of property, so that victims are fully 
compensated. 
2.7.4.4 Excessiveness of forfeiture ordered in addition to another penalty 
Since forfeiture is punitive, should the courts choose not to order forfeiture on top 
of an imprisonment sentence in order to avoid violation of the double jeopardy 
principle? This was a bone of contention in the USA, where most of the current civil 
asset forfeiture jurisprudence developed first. In United States v Usurey,217 the state 
instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against the property of the defendant on the 
basis that he was cultivating marijuana. The defendant entered into a settlement 
agreement where he was to pay money instead of forfeiting his residence. Shortly 
after, the defendant was convicted in a criminal case for manufacturing marijuana 
and he was sentenced to 63 months’ imprisonment.  
The Court of Appeals (Sixth Circuit) reversed the conviction, arguing that because 
the civil forfeiture constituted punishment for the drug offence, the criminal 
conviction constituted an unconstitutional second sentence which violated the 
double jeopardy principle. This reasoning would mean that the court has to decide 
whether to punish an offender through the traditional punishments of 
imprisonment or fines, or asset forfeiture. Ordering forfeiture would, according this 
reasoning, amount to double jeopardy. But is this situation desirable?  
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Going by the retributive distribution of punishment, the answer to the question 
asked above would be no. If we recover stolen property, or if a person repays the 
money obtained by fraud, then, although restitution has been made, the 
retributivists would say that punishment was still due, i.e. the loss has been 
annulled by the restitution but the crime has not.218 Only physically are things as 
they were before the crime.219 But the forfeiture is not regarded as a second in 
personam punishment for the offence, which is all the double jeopardy principle 
prohibits.220 The retributive distribution of punishment would, therefore, justify 
ordering of forfeiture on top of imprisonment. Holding otherwise would take a 
society to a situation where an offender is sent to prison, but is allowed to keep 
illicit property to himself. Thus, even though asset forfeiture constitutes 
punishment, it does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
2.8 Conclusion 
A good asset forfeiture regime is one that is within the constraints of a social 
contract, as propounded by John Locke. Locke’s idea of limited state powers 
presents the best framework for the realisation of a just asset forfeiture regime. It 
offers also the basis for the inclusion of civil forfeiture in the overall asset forfeiture 
scheme. 
The state’s power to punish offenders through asset forfeiture derives from the 
people. Hence the state must exercise this power to the best interests of the 
people, to augment the welfare of the people, and not to diminish it. Thus, the 
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state’s power to impose forfeiture of illicit property must not be arbitrary. Asset 
forfeiture should not result into unjustified limitation of the people’s rights. 
Forfeiture would be arbitrary if it targets property of innocent people, and also if it 
is unduly proportional to the underlying offence. 
Finally, forfeiture must serve two aims, i.e. deterrence and compensation of 
victims. The forfeited property must be enough to deter an offender and others 
from breaking the law. It must be enough to compensate victims also. However, 
deterrence and compensation of victims must be achieved within the constraints of 
the retributive justice theory.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ASSET FORFEITURE 
3.1 Introduction 
Several international legal instruments have been adopted as a result of the need 
for concerted international action to combat economic crimes and the laundering 
of the proceeds of economic crimes.1 The legal instruments encourage states to put 
in place various law enforcement measures such as asset forfeiture. Consequently, 
there has been a proliferation of forfeiture laws in response to the increasing 
sophistication of economic crimes that transcend borders, and perpetrators use 
every innovative means to obscure the trail of criminal income.2 Malawi, as part of 
the international community, has joined the implementation of the international 
legal instruments also. 
This chapter investigates the extent to which the international legal framework on 
asset forfeiture offers a model for a just and fair asset forfeiture regime that was 
discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis. 
3.2 International legal instruments 
The following are the international legal instruments which constitute the 
international legal framework on asset forfeiture. 
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3.2.1 The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances  
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (The Vienna Convention)3 is the first international treaty 
against money laundering. It obliges States Parties to criminalise drug cultivation, 
manufacture, transportation, and sale, among other drug-related offences.4 
Further, it requires States Parties to criminalise the laundering of drug- related 
proceeds.5 This Convention is thus considered as a landmark instrument in the 
development of a coordinated international response to global money laundering.6 
This is despite the fact that it focuses only on the laundering of proceeds of drug-
related offences. 
The Vienna Convention is also the first international legal instrument to tackle the 
issue of forfeiture, albeit the fact that it applies only to the forfeiture of proceeds of 
drug offences.7  
3.2.2 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime  
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (The 
Palermo Convention)8 is the first international legal instrument to tackle organised 
crime holistically. It is also the first Convention to tackle the laundering of all serious 
crimes, unlike the Vienna Convention which focused only on the laundering of drug-
                                                          
3  Adopted on 20 December 1988 in Vienna. Entered into force on 11 November 1990. 
4  Article 3(a) of the Vienna Convention. 
5  Article 3 (b) of the Vienna Convention. 
6  Richards (1999: 224). 
7  Aldridge (2009: 93). However, the first serious venture of the UN in this area was the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs (520 UNTS 204, 1961). This Convention provided for the 
seizure and confiscation of drugs substances and equipment under its article 37. This  
Convention was followed by the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. 
8  Adopted by the UN General Assembly in its resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000. Entered  
into force on 29 September 2003. 
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related assets. In order to curb organised crime, the Palermo Convention urges 
countries to criminalise conduct such as participation in an organised criminal 
group,9 the laundering of the proceeds of crime,10 corruption,11 and obstruction of 
justice.12 
The Palermo Convention is also the first international legal instrument to include 
the liability of companies and corporations which participate or profit from money 
laundering and organised criminal activities.13 Making corporations liable is 
commendable because criminals often launder their transnational profits through 
legitimate businesses.  
3.2.3 The United Nations Convention against Corruption  
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)14 is a global anti-
corruption legal instrument.15 UNCAC is special when compared to other 
international legal instruments in terms of the weight that is given to asset 
recovery. It is the first convention to position asset recovery as a fundamental 
principle.16 It places asset recovery as the most important legal tool to deprive 
offenders of their ill-gotten gain, and the regime it promotes is organised around 
the concept of the forfeiture of proceeds of crime.17 This contrasts with the Vienna 
and Palermo Conventions, in which the recovery of criminal proceeds appears as a 
                                                          
9   Article 5 of the Palermo Convention. 
10  Article 6 of the Palermo Convention. 
11  Article 8 of the Palermo Convention. 
12  Article 23 of the Palermo Convention. 
13  Article 10 of the Palermo Convention. 
14  Adopted by the UN General Assembly following its resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003  
entered into force on 14 December 2005. 
15  Larson (2005: 191). 
16  Article 51 UNCAC. 
17  UNCAC Technical Guide (2009: 91-92). 
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somewhat important, but subordinate element.18 These conventions address asset 
recovery by merely including a generalised forfeiture article, without being as 
elaborate as UNCAC.19 
3.2.4 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption  
The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU 
Convention)20 signifies a regional collective stand against corruption among African 
Union (AU) member countries. The Convention recognises the negative effects of 
corruption in Africa. It affirms that corruption undermines accountability in the 
management of public affairs and acknowledges the need to address the root 
causes of corruption in the African continent.21  
The Convention obliges its States Parties to criminalise corrupt acts and other 
related offences such as bribery (both soliciting and offering bribes), embezzlement 
of public funds and trading in influence22 and the laundering of proceeds of 
corruption.23 Further, it obligates States Parties to confiscate proceeds of 
corruption.24  
Notably, this Convention is human rights-centric as it provides expressly for 
minimum guarantees for fair trial for those alleged to have committed corrupt 
acts.25 This is a commendable provision as it ensures that governments must not 
                                                          
18  Claman (2008: 337). See Palermo Convention Article 13 (1) and Vienna Convention  
Article 5 (4)(a). 
19  Claman (2008: 337). 
20  Adopted in Maputo on 11 July 2003. Entered into force on 5 August 2006. 
21  Preamble for the AU Convention. 
22  Articles 4(1) (1) (a), (b), (d) and (f) of the AU Convention. 
23  Article 6 of the AU Convention. 
24  Article 16 of the AU Convention. 
25  Article 14 of the AU Convention. This is not surprising, given the fact 
that The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights came into force on 25 January 
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subject their citizens to any law enforcement measures, proceedings or actions 
arbitrarily. 
3.2.5 Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption 
The Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption (SADC 
Protocol)26 is a sub-regional instrument that binds member states of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). Its focus is on corruption and it has 14 
member countries.27 The Protocol reflects the concern of the States Parties on the 
adverse and destabilising effects of corruption,28 and that corruption is a serious 
international problem which calls for concerted action.29 The Protocol calls for the 
criminalisation of corrupt acts, such as bribery,30 diversion of public funds31 and 
trading in influence32 and the laundering of the proceeds of corruption.33  
3.2.6 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 
1989 by the G7 countries.34 It was established for the sole purpose of setting up 
global standards for the combating of money laundering.35 Currently, its mandate 
has been extended to the promotion of effective implementation of legal, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 2005, seven months before the AU Convention. 
26  Adopted on 14th August, 2001. Entered into force on 6th July, 2005.  The Protocol was  
Established pursuant to Article 21 of the Treaty establishing the Southern African  
Development Community which enjoins Member States to cooperate in all areas necessary 
to foster regional development, integration and cooperation. Article 22 of the Treaty  
mandates member States to conclude Protocols as may be necessary in each area of 
Cooperation. 
27  Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,  
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
28  Paragraph 2 of the Preamble for the SADC Protocol. 
29  Paragraph 3 of the Preamble for the SADC Protocol. 
30  Article 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the SADC Protocol. 
31  Article 3 (1) (d) of the SADC Protocol. 
32  Article 3 (1) (f) of the SADC Protocol. 
33  Article 3(1)(g) of the SADC Protocol. 
34  The G7 countries are the USA, France, Canada, Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan. 
35  World Bank (2009: 24). 
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regulatory and operational money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing 
of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.36  
The FATF sets the global standards through a set of recommendations. Currently, 
there is a set of forty recommendations that have so far been adopted by 180 
countries. The recommendations are recognised universally as the blueprint for 
combating money laundering, terrorist financing and also the financing of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.37 The recommendations are in the 
form of soft law.38 This means that they are merely best practice guidelines that are 
not legally binding. They just offer guidance to countries on what measures they 
should put in place in order to combat crimes. 
3.3 Asset forfeiture  
The international legal framework recognises both criminal and civil forfeiture. 
3.3.1 Criminal forfeiture and civil forfeiture 
At first glance, it is  not clear if the SADC Protocol and the Vienna, Palermo and AU 
Conventions provide for criminal or civil forfeiture because they do not mention 
expressly whether the forfeiture they refer to should be conviction-based or not.39 
Notably, UNCAC and the FATF provide expressly that states should consider 
adopting non-conviction-based forfeiture also. Therefore, this thesis concludes that 
the other instruments envisage only conviction-based forfeiture. 
                                                          
36  FATF Recommendations (2012: 7). 
37  FATF Recommendations (2012: 7). 
38    Blazejewski (2008: 10).  
39  Article 5 of the Vienna Convention, Article 12 of the Palermo Convention and 
Article 16 (1)(b) of the AU Convention. 
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The FATF recommends that states should consider adopting measures that allow 
the forfeiture of proceeds or instrumentalities of crime without requiring a criminal 
conviction.40 It says “countries should adopt” criminal forfeiture, but when it comes 
to civil forfeiture, the tone changes. It says “countries should consider” adopting 
civil forfeiture. This places the adoption of civil forfeiture as a weak 
recommendation, and a country will not be taken to task during mutual evaluation 
exercises if it chooses not to adopt civil forfeiture at all. 
Among the conventions, UNCAC is revolutionary for being the first convention to 
contain a specific provision on civil forfeiture. UNCAC encourages States Parties to 
adopt civil forfeiture, and use it in cases where an offender cannot be prosecuted 
for reasons such as the offender’s death, flight or absence from a jurisdiction.41 
Thus, the Convention ensures that States Parties pursue remedial action in such 
cases, through civil forfeiture. Usually, in countries where corrupt officials control 
the principal organs of the state, asset recovery efforts cannot begin until after the 
corrupt official has died or absconded.42 This is why it is commendable for each 
country to adopt civil forfeiture, to enable the recovery of proceeds of corruption 
committed by such public officials, even after they have died or fled. 
In the case of death of a corrupt official, it is an established principle that criminal 
sanctions cannot be imposed on heirs.43 Nevertheless, States Parties must use 
forfeiture as remedial or reparative action on the premise that transfer or 
                                                          
40  FATF Recommendation 4.  
41  Article 54 (1) (c) of UNCAC. 
42  Claman (2008: 347). 
43  UNCAC Technical Guide (2009: 208). 
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conversion of assets cannot alter their illegality.44 In addition, transfer or 
conversion cannot alter the right of a victim State Party to reclaim illicit property 
from heirs of an offender.45  
Furthermore, relying on Nozick’s justice in distribution theory, victim States Parties 
must institute civil forfeiture proceedings in pursuit of illicit property that has been 
passed on to an offender’s heirs. Nozick calls for the rectification of the injustice 
that occurs when illegally acquired property is transferred to people such us heirs 
of an offender. 
It is, therefore, surprising that most of the international legal instruments, do not 
provide for civil forfeiture at all, and that the FATF and UNCAC introduce it but they 
do not make its adoption mandatory. Jorge Godinho suggests that historically, civil 
forfeiture has been a common law tradition, and it remains an alien concept for civil 
law jurisdictions.46 For this reason, it is difficult to obtain support for its inclusion in 
international legal instruments.47 Be that as it may, this thesis submits that an 
international legal framework that is geared towards the ultimate reduction of 
economic crimes ought to make civil forfeiture mandatory, to make sure that in all 
situations, there is rectification of injustice in Nozick’s terms.  
3.3.2 Establishment of asset forfeiture as a form of punishment 
All the international legal instruments mentioned above provide for asset forfeiture 
as a tool for combating of crimes. The Vienna Convention captures forfeiture 
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(termed confiscation in the Convention) as a form of punishment or sanction.48 By 
capturing forfeiture as a mode of punishment, the Convention recognises it as such. 
Furthermore, the Palermo Convention captures forfeiture as one of the measures 
envisaged to facilitate the prevention and combating of transnational organised 
crime.49 It defines confiscation as the permanent deprivation of property by order 
of a court or other competent authority.50 The UNCAC and the AU Convention also 
bear a similar definition for forfeiture.51 As discussed in Chapter Two, the 
deprivation of property constitutes punishment. 
The SADC Protocol makes the punitive element of forfeiture clear in its definition. It 
defines forfeiture as any penalty or measure resulting in a final deprivation of 
property, i.e. proceeds or instrumentalities, ordered by a court of law following 
proceedings in relation to a criminal offence or offences connected with or related 
to corruption.52  
This thesis submits that the international legal framework recognises asset 
forfeiture as a form of punishment. This finding is consistent with the conclusion 
made in Chapter Two of this thesis, that asset forfeiture, be it criminal or civil, 
constitutes punishment. Hence, it demands due process safeguards that apply to 
criminal proceedings. The discussion will assess how far the international legal 
framework gone to require the recognition of due process guarantees by states 
when they are implementing both civil and criminal forfeiture laws. 
                                                          
48  Article 3 (4)(a) of the Vienna Convention. 
49  Article 12 of the Palermo Convention. 
50  Article 2(g) of the Palermo Convention. 
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3.3.3 In pursuit of a mixed theory of punishment 
It begs to question how the international legal framework justifies asset forfeiture. 
The social contract discussed in Chapter Two dictates that punishment must be 
pursued in order to achieve deterrence and victim compensation, while applying 
retributive principles. Being a form of punishment, asset forfeiture must be 
forward-looking, aiming at financial incapacitation, deterrence and reparation 
objectives, while applying retributive principles. There is, therefore, need to assess 
what approach the international legal instruments on asset forfeiture has 
advanced. 
3.3.3.1 Deterrence 
The utilitarian theory, the root of deterrence, states that the object of the law is to 
prevent, so far as possible, the commission of crimes.53 Thus, the international legal 
framework must reflect a crime-prevention theme. The Vienna Convention’s 
Preamble indicates the determination of States Parties to deprive persons engaged 
in drug trade of the proceeds of their criminal activities, and to eliminate their main 
incentive for engaging in such activities.54  
Two words are crucial in this part of the preamble, and these are “deprive” and 
“eliminating their incentive”. “Deprive” denotes the wish to incapacitate criminals, 
by taking away that which they gain from crime, which they may re-invest in further 
criminal activities. “Eliminating their incentive” signifies specific deterrence, by 
discouraging criminals from committing further crimes because states are keen to 
deprive them of their criminal gains. This can also serve as general deterrence to 
                                                          
53  Bentham (1781: 140). 
54  Preamble to the Vienna Convention Para 5. 
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the public, because it sends the message that due to the implementation of 
forfeiture laws, there is no economic incentive for engaging in economic crimes. In 
this regard, the Vienna Convention has approached forfeiture through the lens of 
deterrence.  
Going further, the Palermo Convention’s statement of purpose states clearly that 
the Convention aims to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational 
organised crime more effectively.55 This shows that the aim is not just to punish 
organised crime for retribution’s sake, but ultimately, to prevent and fight crime. 
In addition, the FATF justified the necessity of adopting asset forfeiture in its Best 
Practices Paper on Confiscation. The FATF’s approach carries with it a 
predominantly deterrent message which is packed in these sentences: 
“Confiscation prevents criminal property from being laundered or 
reinvested either to facilitate other forms of crime or to conceal illicit 
proceeds. In itself, this can significantly stifle organised criminal operations, 
break them or frustrate the movement of proceeds realised from crime. 
Reducing the rewards of crime, affects the balance of risk and reward, and 
the prospect of losing profits may deter some from crime. It may also allow 
the victim of the crime to be partially or fully compensated, even when the 
proceeds are moved around the world.”56 
The above text shows that by advocating for forfeiture, the FATF aims at preventing 
the laundering or reinvestment of illicit property. When such property is left in the 
hands of criminals, they may conceal its illicit nature, or they may use it to facilitate 
the commission of other crimes. The FATF also anticipates that that the forfeiture 
of proceeds of crime would deter those who hope to gain from crime, from living a 
criminal lifestyle. 
                                                          
55  Article 1 of Palermo Convention. 
56   FAFT Best Practices Paper (2010: 3). 
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Furthermore, the SADC Protocol carries a deterrent approach to the combating of 
corruption. Its States Parties took note of the link between corruption and other 
criminal activities and reaffirmed the need to eliminate corruption through 
effective preventative and deterrent measures.57 One of such measures is asset 
forfeiture. 
Going further, the AU Convention seeks to promote and strengthen the 
development in Africa by putting in place mechanisms to prevent, detect, punish 
and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors.58 
The AU Convention has eradication of corruption as its overarching aim, as this has 
a bearing on development. This resonates with the crime reduction aim of 
punishment, since the efforts do not stop at punishing for the sake of punishment, 
but are aimed at the ultimate eradication of corruption.  
UNCAC’s deterrent approach is reflected in its Preamble, where States Parties 
declared that they are “determined to prevent, detect, and deter in a more 
effective manner international transfers of illicitly acquired asset.”59  
The international legal framework, therefore, offers a solid foundation for building 
asset forfeiture systems that are adequate to deter the commission of economic 
crimes and the laundering of criminal proceeds. 
3.3.3.2 Compensation 
Apart from achieving deterrence, forfeiture must aim at compensating victims of 
crimes also. The FATF aims to achieve reparative objectives, when it says: 
                                                          
57  Preamble for the SADC Protocol. 
58  Article 2 (1) of the AU Convention. 
59  Preamble of the UNCAC. 
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“Confiscation … may also allow the victim of the crime to be partially or fully 
compensated, even when the proceeds are moved around the world.”60 
Furthermore, UNCAC obligates its States Parties to return confiscated property to 
compensate victims of crime.61 Moreover, UNCAC requires its States Parties to 
permit their courts to order the payment of compensation to another State Party 
that has been harmed by corruption offences.62 Citizens of corrupted governments 
are the principal victims of corruption, hence, priority must be given to their 
compensation when it is time to determine the disposal of forfeited property. 
However, citizens do not have to receive compensation individually, in cases such 
as embezzlement of public funds. Instead, the victim state receives compensation 
on behalf of the general populace, because the government is considered as the 
legitimate representative of the citizen victims.63 
In addition, the Palermo Convention’s Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children requires States Parties to 
ensure that victims of trafficking are given the opportunity to seek compensation.64 
Thus, the international legal framework provides a framework for the 
compensation of victims. Nevertheless, it is imperative to find out if indeed the 
obligations on asset forfeiture that the international legal instruments establish, are 
effective enough to achieve deterrent and reparative objectives. 
                                                          
60   FAFT Best Practices Paper (2010: 3). 
61  Article 57(3)(c) of UNCAC. 
62  Article 53(b) of UNCAC. 
63  Stephenson (2014). 
64  Article 6(6) of the Trafficking Protocol. 
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3.4 Forfeitable property 
An effective asset forfeiture regime that is deterrent and reparative in aims, but 
guided by the retributive principle of proportionate punishment, demands the 
forfeiture of all criminal gains and instruments of crime. There is, therefore, need 
for the international framework to set standards and obligations that cast the net of 
forfeitable property as wide as possible, to make sure that criminals do not hold on 
to any of their illicit gains. 
3.4.1. Proceeds of crime: value-based and object-based models  
The forfeiture of proceeds of crimes falls into two categories, i.e. object-based 
and value-based forfeiture. The distinction between the two models of 
forfeiture lies in the manner in which property rights are affected, as 
discussed below. 
3.4.1.1 Object-based forfeiture 
Object-based forfeiture targets property which can be traced directly to a 
crime. It constitutes a transfer of direct proceeds of crime from an offender to 
the state.65 All of the legal instruments provide for the forfeiture of criminal 
proceeds.66 Proceeds of crime comprise both direct (primary) and indirect 
(secondary) proceeds. Direct proceeds constitute property that has been 
generated immediately by an offence.67 This includes money which a person 
                                                          
65  UNCAC Legislative Guidance (2006: 93). 
66  Article 5 (1) (a) of the Vienna Convention; Article 12(1)(a) of the Palermo Convention;  
Article 31(1)(a) of UNCAC; Article 16 (1)(b) of the AU Convention; Article 8 (1) (a) of the  
SADC Protocol; and FATF Recommendation 4. 
67  Stessens (2000: 48). 
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receives as bribery, money earned through the sale of drugs or a car that one 
has stolen.  
Indirect or secondary proceeds constitute income or benefits that derive from 
the direct proceeds of crime. The Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention 
and the UNCAC provide for secondary proceeds of crime.68 Such proceeds 
include bank interests69 or any appreciation in the value of the proceeds of 
crime that is generated from the investment of the proceeds.70  
But why must the state take away benefits that do not derive directly from 
the criminal activity but from a criminal’s investor skills? Is this not the labour 
that John Locke alluded to when he contended that a person can acquire 
property legitimately through their labour?71 The answer is no. Locke’s 
account justifies the forfeiture of benefits that derive from proceeds of crime. 
The reason is that they derive from property whose root is criminality, instead 
of labour. 
Additionally, the state must confiscate such benefits because the acquisition 
of the proceeds from which they derive, constitutes an injustice, according to 
Robert Nozick’s justice in acquisition principle.72 Nozick’s principle of 
rectification of injustice calls on states to take action that will correct the 
                                                          
68  Article 5 (6)(c) of the Vienna Convention; Article 12(5) of Palermo Convention and 
Article 31(6) of the Palermo Convention. 
69  UNCAC Technical Guide (2009: 96). 
70  Stessens (2000: 49). 
71  Locke (1990: 130) V.27. 
72  Nozick (1974: 150). 
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injustice, and such action must include the forfeiture of any benefit that 
originates from an injustice in acquisition.73 Forfeiture rectifies this injustice. 
If the state confiscates only the direct proceeds and leaves any surplus that a 
criminal makes through the investment of the proceeds, criminal behaviour 
would still be profitable. The forfeiture of only direct proceeds would not be 
deterrent enough because the benefits or income from proceeds would 
remain an incentive for engaging in economic crimes. Furthermore, the 
proportionality principle would demand that a criminal should forfeit 
everything he has gained from the commission of a crime. This includes both 
the proceeds and the benefits from the proceeds.  
3.4.1.2 Value–based Forfeiture 
Value-based forfeiture concerns the deprivation of property of a value which 
corresponds to criminal proceeds.74 This requires an assessment and 
quantification of criminal benefits.75 It constitutes an order for the offender to 
pay a certain amount of money, usually equivalent to the value of the undue 
advantage or benefit from an offence.76 If the offender fails to pay, the state 
can confiscate any of his property, regardless of whether it was acquired 
legally or not.77 
In a bid to ensure that offenders do not benefit from crime at all, the Palermo 
Convention, FATF, UNCAC, AU Convention and the SADC Protocol obligate 
                                                          
73  Nozick (1974: 152). 
74  UNCAC Legislative Guidance (2006: 93). 
75  OECD/The World Bank (2012: 18). 
76  Zagaris (1991: 500). UNCAC Legislative Guidance (2006: 93). 
77  Zagaris (1991: 500).  
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their States Parties to confiscate property whose value corresponds to the 
value of criminal gains,78 known as property of corresponding value. This 
reflects a global aspiration to ensure that even when the direct proceeds of 
crime have dissipated, the state should still be able to disgorge the value of 
criminal gains by targeting any property of the offender that is available. One 
might ask if taking an offender’s legitimate property to recover the value of 
criminal gains is fair and justifiable. The answer is yes.  
If the state stops at targeting direct or traceable proceeds of crime, criminals 
would just have to stash criminal proceeds out of the reach of law enforcers, 
and remain with legally acquired property. Criminals could still be enjoying 
these proceeds elsewhere, and criminal enterprise would remain a profitable 
lifestyle. In order to diminish the incentive for engaging in criminal lifestyles, 
the state must be empowered to target any property that belongs to the 
offender. With respect to the proportionality principle, the state must target 
only property whose value corresponds with the value of criminal gains.  
The Vienna Convention, Palermo Convention as well as UNCAC provide for the 
forfeiture of proceeds that have been transformed or converted into other 
property.79 The forfeiture of such property is necessary because often times, 
criminals get rid of primary proceeds of crime in order to obscure their illicit 
origin.80 They dispose of it, convert or transform it into another form of 
                                                          
78  See Article 12(1) of the Palermo Convention; Article 31(1)(a) of UNCAC; Article 16 (1)(b) of  
the AU Convention and Article 8 (1) (a) of the SADC Protocol. 
79  Article 5(6) of the Vienna Convention; Article 12(3) of the Palermo Convention; and Article  
31(4) of UNCAC. 
80  Stessens (2000: 48). 
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property.81 Deterrence will not be achieved if the state halts its forfeiture 
plans just because it cannot trace the direct proceeds of crime. The reason is 
that criminals will just make sure they transform the property and then 
continue enjoying the proceeds of crime in another form. Thus, every legal 
system that is keen on reducing economic crime must expand its scope of 
proceeds of crime to include proceeds that have been transformed or 
converted into other property.  
Furthermore, it may happen that an offender could mix his criminal gains with 
property which he acquired legally,82 referred to as intermingled property. This 
happens often at the placement stage of money laundering. Owing to this mingling 
of property, it may become difficult to separate the illicit property from the 
legitimate property. What must the state do in such situations? Must it give up the 
forfeiture plans because it cannot separate illicit property from the licit? The Vienna 
Convention, the Palermo Convention and the UNCAC, state that any property that 
has been mixed with criminal proceeds must be forfeited.83 
In accordance with retribution’s proportionality principle, the intermingled property 
should be liable to forfeiture only up to the assessed value of the intermingled 
proceeds.84 Forfeiting property whose value is beyond the value of criminal gains 
and benefits would be harsh, unfair and arbitrary. 
                                                          
81  Greenberg  et al (2009: 39). 
82  Greenberg  et al (2009: 42). 
83  Article 12 (1) (a) of the Palermo Convention, Art 5(6) of Vienna Convention and Article 31(5) 
of UNCAC. 
84  Art 5(6) of Vienna Convention; Article 12(4) of the Palermo Convention; Article 31 of  
UNCAC. 
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3.4.1.3 Value-based forfeiture vs object-based forfeiture 
Pursuing a purely object-based forfeiture model may lead to unjust 
consequences if property that is supposed to be liable to forfeiture has 
dissipated; has been spent or consumed by the time a forfeiture order is 
made.85 Further, object-based forfeiture model would be challenging in cases 
where an offender conceals proceeds of crime in a corporate vehicle.86 This 
would demand having laws in place that allow for the piercing of the 
corporate veil to facilitate investigations. This is why states must make 
companies and other corporate entities liable to money laundering if they are 
being used to hide criminal proceeds.  
Given the challenges that the object-based forfeiture model poses in the recovery 
of criminal proceeds, value-based forfeiture seems to offer a better route to justice. 
The value-based forfeiture’s convenience lies in the fact that it does not concern 
the transfer of direct proceeds to the state, but requires an offender to pay to the 
state an amount that is equivalent to his criminal proceeds.87 An offender may thus 
be ordered to pay an amount equivalent to the criminal proceeds or to forfeit any 
of his property. Ultimately, it is not necessary to link the available property to an 
offence.88 It is forfeitable, as long as it belongs to the offender and it can assist in 
realising the value of the actual proceeds of crime.89 The prosecution has to simply 
prove the link between an offender’s benefit to specific offence.90 Thus, it is easier 
                                                          
85  UNCAC Legislative Guidance (2006: 94). 
86  UNCAC Legislative Guidance (2006: 94). 
87  UNCAC Legislative Guidance (2006: 94). 
88  OECD/The World Bank (2012: 18). 
89  UNCAC Legislative Guidance (2006: 94). 
90  OECE/The World Bank (2012: 18). 
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to obtain a forfeiture judgment in a value-based system as opposed to an object-
based system.91 
3.4.2 Instrumentalities of crime 
Quite apart from the confiscation of the proceeds of crime, the international legal 
instruments provide for the forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime. This refers to 
property used, as well as property that is intended to be used in the commission of 
a crime. The aim is to remove the means to commit future crimes.92 The theory 
behind the confiscation of instrumentalities of crime is that the objects have been 
misused in a way harmful way to society, and therefore the state must stop this 
from happening again.93 This kind of forfeiture is punitive in nature, as it leads to 
the deprivation of misused property. The forfeiture links the property to the 
harmful results it produced.94  
Furthermore, after the confiscation of certain instrumentalities of crime, the 
objects are usually destroyed. This shows that the theory underlying the forfeiture 
of such objects is of a preventive nature. Such objects are considered vulnerable to 
misuse and this raises a specific interest in destroying them.95 However, the 
forfeiture of contraband such as drugs is said to have wider protective benefits and 
is not a punitive matter; thus, such objects are not forfeited to punish the 
defendant but to protect the society.96 
                                                          
91  OECD/The World Bank (2012: 18). 
92  Zagaris (1991: 482). 
93  UNCAC Technical Guide (2009: 93). 
94  UNCAC Technical Guide (2009: 93). 
95  UNCAC Technical Guide (2009: 93). 
96  UNCAC Legislative Guide (2009: 93). 
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3.4.2.1 Property used in the commission of crime 
The Vienna Convention, Palermo Convention, UNCAC, the FATF and the SADC 
Protocol provide for the confiscation of instrumentalities used in the commission 
crimes.97 Even though the AU Convention’s definition of confiscation includes the 
permanent deprivation of instrumentalities, the Convention does not make any 
reference to instrumentalities when it comes to the actual forfeiture obligations 
under Article 16. All in all, the international legal framework is adequate to meet 
the crime reduction objective by removing things that facilitate the commission of 
crime. 
3.4.2.2 Property intended or destined for use in the commission of a crime 
The Vienna Convention and the FATF Recommendations provide also for the 
forfeiture of property intended for use in the commission of crime.98 Why is the 
focus on property intended to be used, in addition to property that is really used in 
the commission of an offence? The most plausible reason is that the state seeks to 
discourage the use of property in the commission of crimes in the future. Thus, the 
forfeiture is ordered not just for punishment’s sake but in the spirit of crime 
prevention, hence enforcing the deterrent aim of punishment. 
The Palermo Convention99 and UNCAC make reference to such instrumentalities as 
objects destined for use in the commission of a crime.100 There was a debate during 
the negotiations of the Palermo Convention on whether the phrase should be 
“property destined for use” or “property intended to be used” in the commission of 
                                                          
97  Article 5(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention; Article 12 (1)(b) of the Palermo Convention; Article  
31 (1)(b) of UNCAC. FATF Recommendation 4 and Article 8 (1) (a) of the SADC Protocol. 
98   Article 5 of the Vienna Convention. Recommendation 4 of FATF Recommendations. 
99  Article 12 (1)(b) of the Palermo Convention. 
100  Article 31(1)(b) of UNCAC. 
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a crime. At the fifth session of the Ad Hoc Committee, several delegates expressed 
some hesitation with regard to the phrase “or intended for use”, while several 
other delegates supported the retention of this phrase, just as it appeared in the 
Vienna Convention.101  
The phrase, “intended for use”, is meant to signify an intention that is tantamount 
to an attempt to commit a crime.102 The basis for the forfeiture of such property 
lies in an offender’s intention to use the property to commit a crime. In criminal 
law, intent is a general prerequisite for punishment, and in particular, punishment 
of attempted crimes.103 Is the state justified to punish a person for manifesting an 
intention to use property in the commission of a crime? Yes, it is justified, in the 
same way that the state justifies punishment of an attempted theft, for example. 
The argument is that “If a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, 
then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately 
criminalized.”104  
The state punishes attempted offences because people who attempt to commit 
offences increase the probability of a result which the law seeks to prevent.105 A 
person intends that a prohibited harm or wrong must occur.106 It must be true, 
therefore, that those who attempt to cause a harmful or wrongful result increase 
                                                          
101  Travaux Preparatoires for the Palermo Convention (2006: 111). The support to retain the  
phrase as it appeared in the Vienna Convention, attests to the influence which the Vienna  
Convention had on the negotiation and drafting of the Palermo Convention. 
102  Travaux Preparatoires for the Palermo Convention (2006: 111). 
103  Shavell (1990: 449). 
104  Yaffe (2011: 21). 
105   Husak (2012: 5). 
106   Cahill (2012: 754). 
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the probability of its occurrence.107 However, the issue does not stop at intent 
alone, but at the resolve of the offender to carry out the intended offence.108 The 
resolve may be in the form of substantial steps towards the completion of a crime, 
which corroborate a criminal purpose.109 In the same way, it is not enough to prove 
a person’s intent to use vehicle X in the trafficking of drugs, for example. The state 
must prove also that the person carried out some activity to show a commitment to 
perform the intended act and to use the vehicle for such purposes. 
Further, according to John Locke’s reasoning, a state of war arises when one man 
uses or declares his intention to use force against another man.110 In a bid to 
maintain order, the society has the power to restrain attempts by any person to 
break the law of nature. This thesis submits that such restraint, therefore, may 
include the forfeiture of instruments which an offender intends to use in breaking 
the law. This justifies the punishment of attempted crimes, as well as the forfeiture 
of property intended to be used in the commission of a crime. The punishment of 
attempted offences augments deterrence of proscribed behaviour.111 It does so “by 
increasing the probability of imposing sanctions”.112 It should be noted, however, 
that deterrence is augmented if there is high likelihood of being apprehended and 
punished for committing an attempt.113 The increase of such likelihood depends on 
the vigilance of law enforcement authorities in making sure they investigate and 
apprehend as many offenders as possible.  
                                                          
107  Husak (2012: 5). 
108  Cahill (2012: 755). See also Alexander (1997: 1168). 
109  Alexander (1997: 1169). 
110  Locke (1990: 126) IV.19. 
111  Shavell (1990: 446). 
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3.5 Pre-forfeiture actions 
There is a lot of work that must be done before arriving at the forfeiture stage. This 
work includes the identification and preservation of forfeitable property. 
3.5.1 Identification, tracing and evaluation of forfeitable property 
The starting point for forfeiture proceedings is the identification, tracing and 
evaluation of forfeitable property. This is why the international legal instruments 
urge countries to put in place measures that will assist law enforcement authorities 
to identify, trace and evaluate property that is liable to forfeiture.114  
The argument is that there would be no forfeiture if there were no forfeitable 
property available. Similarly, a legal system cannot achieve deterrence, reduction of 
economic crimes and compensation of victims if its law enforcement authorities fail 
to identify and trace criminal proceeds. Furthermore, the question of proportionate 
forfeitures would not arise if the state and the courts fail to ascertain the value of 
criminal proceeds, in order to know how much to order in pursuit of a value-based 
confiscation. Failure to ascertain the value of forfeitable property may lead to the 
injustice of under-punishing an offender by forfeiting only the little that has been 
traced. This failure may lead also to the injustice of under-compensating victims, 
since the amount of compensation will depend on the traced property.  
                                                          
114  Article 31(2) of  UNCAC; Article 5(2) of the Vienna Convention; Article 12(2) of the Palermo 
Convention; Article 8(1)(b) of the SADC Protocol;  Article 16(1)(a) of the AU Convention and 
FATF Recommendation 3. 
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3.5.2 Provisional measures: freezing and seizure of forfeitable property 
The ability to seize and freeze forfeitable assets is very fundamental to the overall 
asset forfeiture exercise.115 Freezing and seizure serve to preserve forfeitable 
property until the conclusion of forfeiture proceedings. This is why the international 
legal instruments obligate their States Parties to implement measures for the 
freezing and seizure of suspect assets.116 These measures are preliminary in nature, 
and they aim to bar the disposal and dissipation of property that is liable to 
forfeiture.117  
However, since property is seized or frozen before the final determination of 
forfeiture proceedings, property owners ought to be given an opportunity to 
challenge provisional orders.118 There ought to be provision also for their basic 
subsistence from the seized or frozen property.119 This is one way of ensuring that 
property owners are not rendered destitute before the court determines the 
criminality of their property.  
3.6 International co-operation 
Given that criminals move their illicit gains across borders, the international 
community has made sure that criminals should not find a safe haven for their illicit 
property. Others have attributed the movement of proceeds of crime across 
borders to globalisation. The argument is that globalisation has generally 
                                                          
115  Pieth (2008: 11). 
116  Article 31(2) of  UNCAC; Article 5(2) of the Vienna Convention; Article 12(2) of the Palermo 
Convention; Article 8(1)(b) of the SADC Protocol,  Article 16(1)(a) of the AU Convention and  
FATF Recommendation 3. 
117  Nikolov (2011: 24). 
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contributed to money movement because the liberalised global financial system 
has taken on characteristics that are as conducive to money laundering, as to any 
other form of money movement.120  
Furthermore, the globalisation of trade, technology, transportation, 
communications, information, and financial systems provides new opportunities for 
criminal enterprises to operate across national borders.121 The free trade system 
has made it easy to embed illicit products in the vast amounts of imports and 
exports that now characterise international trade.122 Thus, both clean and dirty 
money can be moved easily across the globe in the liberalised economy. In this 
manner, proceeds of crime are often moved across several jurisdictions, making it 
difficult for law enforcement to follow the money trail.123  
Following the money across multiple jurisdictions is a daunting task for law 
enforcement authorities. Even if criminal money is identified, obtaining it from 
foreign countries is a formidable task.124 This challenge, therefore, demands 
international co-operation by the international community in order to stop the 
cross-border movement of illicit money. The same is needed for the forfeiture and 
repatriation of illicit property to the victim country. For this reason, as will be 
discussed in the subsequent paragraphs, the international legal instruments 
obligate States Parties to cooperate with one another on asset forfeiture, asset 
sharing, legal assistance, and compensation of victims.125 The Vienna Convention, 
                                                          
120  Aldridge (2009: 93).  
121  Williams (2003: 109).  
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125  See for example Article 5(4) of the Vienna Convention, Article 54 of UNCAC.. 
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for examples, obligates also the States Parties to conclude bilateral and multilateral 
treaties, agreements, or arrangements to enhance smooth co-operation.126  
3.6.1 Co-operation in asset forfeiture 
Due to the cross-border movement of illicit property, the international legal 
framework obligates states to give each other assistance in the confiscation of illicit 
property that is in their territory.127 
The emergence of the conventions helped to alleviate the way the divergence of 
legal systems affected co-operation in asset forfeiture issues. The specific inclusion 
of civil forfeiture in UNCAC, for example, was an effort to address the problem 
encountered in the past, where states could provide legal assistance and co-
operation in criminal matters only, but not in civil cases.128 Requests from countries 
that have civil forfeiture, such as the USA, could face co-operation problems from 
countries whose legal systems do not recognise civil forfeiture because they would 
lack the legal basis to make or enforce civil forfeiture orders.129 This explains why 
civil forfeiture was included under the provision on international co-operation in 
UNCAC.130 
If all States Parties to UNCAC have civil forfeiture provisions in their laws as 
anticipated by the Convention, co-operation on forfeiture would not be limited to 
criminal forfeiture orders alone. However, as stated earlier, the shortcoming of 
UNCAC in this regard is that it does not make the adoption of civil forfeiture 
                                                          
126  Article 5(4)(g) of the Vienna Convention.  
127  Article 5(4) of the Vienna Convention. 
128  Greenberg  et al (2009: 19) referring to Legislative Guide for UNCAC (2006) Para 522. 
129  Zagaris (1991: 449). 
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mandatory for its signatories. 131 The casual approach of UNCAC in this respect is 
costly, bearing in mind the possible obstacles the exclusion of civil forfeiture in any 
country’s legal system may have on international co-operation, as explained earlier. 
UNCAC failed to seize the opportunity to deal with divergences of legal traditions 
that hamper cooperation, by not making the adoption of civil forfeiture mandatory.  
3.6.2 Investigative co-operation 
Due process requirements such as service of ex parte orders on defendants usually 
make investigative information available to the public.132 This alerts defendants 
that forfeiture proceedings have been instituted, and causes them to move 
forfeitable assets to other countries.133 This necessitates that the investigating state 
should rely on the assistance of other countries to locate the moved assets.134 Thus, 
requested states ought to render a requesting state some investigative assistance in 
the identification, tracing, freezing, or seizing of forfeitable property. For this 
reason, the FATF encourages international co-operative investigations among 
competent and relevant authorities.135 Furthermore, the conventions such as the 
Vienna Convention, obligate their States Parties to authorise their courts or other 
competent authorities to order the seizure and production of bank, financial, or 
commercial records.136 When requested, each State Party is precluded from 
declining to render any assistance on account of bank secrecy laws. 
                                                          
131  Article 54(1)(c) of UNCAC. 
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3.6.3 Co-operation in the return of forfeited property 
The vulnerability of the international financial systems is an avenue through which 
corrupt officials, for example, seek to insulate themselves and their assets from 
detection and recovery.137 The UNCAC recognises the importance of international 
co-operation in the return of assets to victim states.138 UNCAC emphasises further 
in its Preamble that States Parties are “determined to prevent, detect, and deter in 
a more effective manner international transfers of illicitly acquired assets and to 
strengthen international co-operation in asset recovery”. This statement reflects an 
understanding that the abuse of international financial systems and jurisdictional 
boundaries between states is a particular danger to the combating of crimes whose 
proceeds are usually transferred and invested in foreign countries.139 Victim states 
will therefore rely on the cooperation of foreign jurisdiction in the return of 
forfeited property. 
3.6.4 State as a claimant or plaintiff in forfeiture proceedings 
Another novelty seen in UNCAC is its provision that a state may participate as a 
private litigant in the courts of another state in order to recover proceeds of 
corruption. It may do so in its capacity as a plaintiff in its own action, as a claimant 
in a forfeiture proceeding, or as a victim for purposes of court-ordered 
restitution.140 These are referred to as measures for direct recovery of property.141 
These remedies and mechanisms comprise the second core principle of UNCAC, 
whose emphasis is on self-help. Under the self-help principle, UNCAC seeks to 
                                                          
137  Claman (2008: 334). 
138  Article 51 of UNCAC. 
139  Claman (2008: 334). 
140  Article 53 of UNCAC. 
141  See the heading of Article 53 of UNCAC. 
 
 
 
 
105 
 
empower States Parties to take action on their own to protect themselves from 
high-level official corruption and recover the proceeds of crime.142 This becomes 
useful and convenient in cases where mutual legal assistance would be hampered 
by the complexity of a case; or due to divergences in the legal traditions for 
different countries, which would result into denial, delays or complications in the 
traditional mutual legal assistance.143  
The self-help asset recovery is done in the three ways. First, in order to allow a state 
to be involved as a plaintiff, each State Party is obliged to permit another state to 
establish title to, or ownership of property acquired through the commission of an 
offence established in the Convention.144  
Secondly, in order to make it possible for another state to make a claim as a victim, 
each State Party is obliged to permit its courts to order those who have committed 
offences established in the Convention to either pay damages or compensation to 
another State that has been harmed by such offences.145  
Lastly, when having to decide upon the forfeiture of stolen property, each State 
Party is obliged to permit its courts or competent authorities, to recognise another 
State Party’s claim as a legitimate owner of property acquired through the 
commission of an offence established in the Convention.146 This provision resonates 
with Nozick’s rectification of injustice principle. The legitimate owner must get back 
their property. It has an upper claim in the confiscated property than any other 
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state. It would be unfair and unjust if the confiscating country ignores the interests 
of the legitimate owner.  
In essence, Article 53 is calling upon States to open up their courts and systems to 
allow foreign governments to come and act as private litigants, a thing that could 
not always happen in the past before UNCAC came into force. This Article is 
therefore unique among property-related provisions in criminal law conventions 
because it provides civil remedies and other mechanisms for asset recovery that are 
outside the traditional mutual legal assistance and forfeiture.147 However, Claman is 
sceptical about the practicality of this provision. He argues that it may fail if states 
sense that pursuing their claims and litigating them in foreign tribunals would open 
their governments to potential civil discovery, or may constitute a waiver of 
sovereign immunity.148  
3.7 Management and disposal of confiscated assets  
An effective and just asset forfeiture system requires not only the enactment of the 
necessary law, or the making of forfeiture and provisional orders. It requires also 
the setting up of organisational infrastructure to handle practical issues that arise 
when handling seized, frozen and forfeited property.149 These practical issues 
include the custody, safe storage, management and disposition of forfeited 
property. Asset management ensures the preservation of the value of forfeitable 
assets.150 The realisation of the deterrent and reparative aims of assets forfeiture is 
dependent on the preservation and proper management of property until its 
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disposal. Victims can only be compensated if there is property to give them by the 
time their compensation is determined. The state must make the aims of asset 
forfeiture paramount, and consequently, seize and manage forfeitable assets, in all 
cases.151 
Apart from UNCAC and the AU Convention, none of the other conventions provide 
expressly for the administration of seized and frozen assets. UNCAC is the first 
Convention to obligate States Parties to adopt, in accordance with their domestic 
law, legislative and other measures that may be necessary to regulate the 
administration by competent authorities of frozen, seized or confiscated 
property.152 This is a novel obligation, which recognises that if property is not 
managed well after it is seized or frozen, that would affect the value of property 
that is liable to forfeiture. 
After UNCAC, the AU Convention also included a provision on the administration of 
frozen or seized instrumentalities and proceeds of corruption, pending a final 
judgment.153 However, unlike UNCAC, the obligation in the AU Convention does not 
apply to confiscated assets. This is a weakness, because it ignores the need for 
further management of assets pending their final disposition, after the making of a 
confiscation order. 
3.7.1 Disposal of assets confiscated domestically 
So what must the state do with confiscated assets? The Vienna Convention 
obligates States Parties to dispose of confiscated assets according to its domestic 
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law and administrative procedures.154 The Palermo Convention155 and the SADC 
Protocol bear similar provisions.156 When exercising their discretion on how to 
dispose of confiscated property, states must remember the tenets of the social 
contract. They ought to determine the disposition of confiscated assets for the 
public good.  
The FATF encourages states to consider establishing an asset forfeiture fund in 
which all or part of confiscated assets will be deposited for law enforcement, 
health, education, or other appropriate purposes.157 It goes further to recommend 
that even in the absence of an asset forfeiture fund; states should endeavour to use 
confiscated assets transparently to fund projects that further the public good.158 
Another aspect worthy examining is the issue of sharing confiscated funds with law 
enforcement agencies. Countries such as the USA share confiscated property with 
law enforcement agencies as an incentive for them to pursue asset forfeiture 
vigilantly.159 However, this practice has been criticised for adding another rationale 
for asset forfeiture, i.e. money-making mechanism for law enforcement agencies.160 
It may compromise the legitimacy of asset forfeiture to a certain extent, as one 
could question whether law enforcers are pursuing the proceeds of crime in pursuit 
of deterrence or reparation of victims, or for their own private interests.   
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The best way is for the confiscated assets go to the general public fund, which 
ensures the people that individual law enforcement departments would no longer 
use asset forfeiture as a way of supplementing their budgets.161 Can asset sharing 
with the law enforcement be justified with John Locke’s framework? Does it not 
make law enforcers judges in their own cases? Zalman suggests that we must ask 
first if such asset sharing is for the public good. If the answer is no, he adds, then it 
becomes an arbitrary invasion of citizens’ rights.162 Perhaps, one could argue, that 
there is no need to worry about sharing forfeited assets with law enforcement 
agencies because in any case, the punitive goals of asset forfeiture are achieved 
upon the making of a forfeiture order regardless, of how the assets are used in the 
end. 
Notably, asset sharing is problematic in that it has the potential of clouding the 
public good of the practice of asset forfeiture.163 In addition, does the natural law 
principle that no one should be a judge in their own case provide a basis for the 
constitutional challenge of asset sharing? Zalman answers that there is no 
constitutional objection to asset sharing.164 Nevertheless, it flaws a natural law 
principle which prohibits one from being both a party and a judge in one case.  
The allocation of government departments’ budgets is decided by parliament, 
hence, asset sharing that bypasses this process is wrong, as it gives the police 
power beyond what it has. On this understanding, a principled legislature ought to 
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reject asset sharing with law enforcement authorities.165 The parliamentary budget 
process and the lack of direct incentive to forfeit would help to limit asset 
forfeiture’s aims at crime reduction and reparation, and would avoid objections 
from John Locke’s point of view.166 
Be that as it may, asset-sharing seems to have its own advantage to the success of 
international cooperation. In the reality of law enforcement authorities being 
bribed by offenders not to touch their illicit property, giving the authorities an 
incentive through asset sharing may help in achieving smooth cooperation.167  
3.7.2 Disposal and return of property confiscated in a foreign country 
The exportation of criminal assets has serious or even devastating consequences for 
the state of origin.168  As a result, the confiscation and return of criminal assets has 
become a pressing concern for many states.169 This, then, calls for an effective and 
deterrent global response that would address the issue of asset return to victimized 
states or other parties.170  
What does the international legal framework say about the return of confiscated 
assets to victim states? The Vienna Convention does not provide specifically for the 
return of confiscated assets to victim states.  Instead, it states that countries may 
consider entering into ad hoc agreements on contributing confiscated assets to 
intergovernmental bodies that specialise in the fight against drug offences, or 
                                                          
165  Zalman (1996: 221). 
166  Zalman (1996: 221). 
167  Zagaris (1991: 506). 
168  UNCAC Legislative Guide (2006: 229). The effects include; It undermines foreign aid, drains 
currency reserves, reduces the tax base, increases poverty levels, harms competition and  
undercuts free trade. 
169  UNCAC Legislative Guide (2006: 229). 
170  UNCAC Legislative Guide (2006: 229). 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
sharing them with other states.171 Perhaps the Convention does not make the 
return of confiscated proceeds of drug-trade mandatory because the victim state 
cannot claim legitimate ownership of such proceeds, as it would in cases such as 
embezzlement of public funds. However, its victim status ought to be recognised, 
taking into account the negative effects of drugs on its people. Thus, the return of 
the proceeds of drug-dealing to the victim state ought to be prioritised over the 
suggestion to contribute confiscated proceeds to inter-governmental organisations. 
Furthermore, the Palermo Convention stipulates that a requested state must 
give priority to returning the confiscated property or proceeds of crime to the 
requesting state, so that it can pay compensation to victims or return them to 
their legitimate owners.172 However, the requested State can do this only to 
the extent permitted by its domestic law, and if it is so requested. This means 
that if there is no request for the return of the proceeds or property, by the 
State that sent the confiscation request, then the requested party can keep 
them or dispose of them domestically, as it deems fit.  
Given that the Palermo Convention prioritises the return of confiscated proceeds so 
as to compensate victims, this priority is weakened by the fact that the Convention 
does not make the return of confiscated proceeds mandatory. There ought to be a 
pro-active return of confiscated assets on the part of the confiscating state, without 
an option of holding on to them just because there is no request for their return. 
Failure to repatriate proceeds of crime to victims, defeats the compensatory 
purpose of the confiscation in the first place.The restoration of property to victims 
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must be prioritised when it comes to the disposal of forfeited property.173 
Nevertheless, one could argue that victim states ought to be vigilant in making 
requests for the return of confiscated property, for the sake of doing justice to 
victims of crime through compensation. Any government that is keen on 
compensation of victims of crime among its people should be pro-active in making 
requests for the repatriation of criminal proceeds.  
In addition, the Palermo Convention states that if the requested state does not 
return confiscated property to a victim state, it may contribute them to a Special 
Fund, which is a designated UN account.174 The requested state may also make a 
contribution from the confiscated assets to intergovernmental bodies specialised in 
the fight against organised crime.175 The arguments made earlier in relation to a 
similar provision under the Vienna Convention, apply here also. There may be no 
state to claim legitimate ownership in proceeds of certain crimes unlike 
embezzlement, and it may be difficult to assess its victim status. Going further, the 
AU Convention obliges States Parties to adopt legislative measures as may be 
necessary to enable repatriation of proceeds of corruption.176 This is commendable. 
Notably, UNCAC makes a distinction when it comes to the return of forfeited 
property that relates to embezzlement and the laundering of embezzled public 
funds on one hand, and the return of proceeds of any other offence covered by the 
Convention. It obligates the requested state to return confiscated proceeds of 
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embezzlement to the requesting state.177 In this, UNCAC recognises that 
embezzlement proceeds must be returned to the rightful owner, which is the victim 
state.178 The forfeiture and return of embezzlement proceeds would “contribute 
greatly to the reparation of harm and reconstruction efforts in victim States”.179 It 
will also contribute to the prevention of grand corruption by conveying the 
message that dishonest public officials can no longer hide their illegal gains 
anywhere across the globe because the arms of the law will catch their criminal 
assets anywhere.180  
In addition, UNCAC states that in all other cases, priority consideration should be 
given to returning confiscated property to the requesting state for purposes of 
returning such property to its prior legitimate owners or compensating the victims 
of crime.181 However, a requested state can return the property to a requesting 
State on two conditions. First, the requesting state must establish reasonably its 
prior ownership of the confiscated property.182 Second, confiscated property can be 
returned if the requested state recognises the damage the crime has occasioned to 
the requesting state. In this regard, UNCAC recognises that a state may suffer 
damage, and that such damage must be recognised by the requested state if its 
laws permit.183 
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In reference to the totality of its Article 57, UNCAC has brought a new approach to 
the return of confiscated property. It is a break-away from the tradition reflected in 
the Vienna and Palermo Conventions, where the requested state has the ultimate 
control and discretion over forfeited property, regardless of whether the forfeiture 
judgment was issued by its own authorities or by a foreign tribunal.184  
However, returning confiscated assets becomes tricky in cases where the assets 
must be returned to a state that is controlled by corrupt public officials.185 In such 
cases, there is likelihood that upon their return, the assets will be misused or stolen 
by corrupt government officials.186 Can such a return be said to be in the interests 
of the people? No, it is not. So what must confiscated assets be used for in such 
cases? Others have suggested that before the return of assets in such situations, 
states should enter into agreements that the assets should be used to settle state 
debts with international institutions, or to use them for specific expenditure that 
addresses the plight of poor and vulnerable people.187 Nevertheless, this attracts 
considerable criticism such as “the legitimacy of the debts being reimbursed, good 
governance imposed from afar or the financing of development programs with 
criminal money”.188 
3.7.3 Asset sharing 
The international legal framework introduced an asset-sharing scheme, where 
the requested state shares the confiscated assets with the requesting state. In 
this regard, the UNCAC, Vienna and Palermo Conventions encourage the 
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sharing of confiscated assets on a case by case basis.189 Similarly, the SADC 
Protocol provides for asset sharing. It states that once a state has confiscated 
property or proceeds, it may transfer all or part of that property to another 
State Party that helped with the underlying investigation or proceeding.190 
Similarly, the FATF recommends that states should consider taking measures 
that will enable them to share the recovered assets.191 
Sharing assets with a country which helped with investigation is a reasonable thing 
to do. It would encourage investigative cooperation, because the assisting states 
will have the incentive that their investigative expenses will be reimbursed. 
3.7.4 Deduction of expenses from forfeited property 
Apart from asset sharing, UNCAC recognises further the expenses that a requested 
state would incur ordinarily when executing a confiscation order of foreign assets 
placed in its jurisdiction. The Convention permits the requested state to deduct 
from the confiscated assets, the value of expenses it incurred during the process.192 
This refers to expenses that are incurred during investigation, prosecution or any 
judicial proceedings that lead to the confiscation of assets. 
In as much as the recognition of expenses is commendable, it raises questions 
regarding the competing interests that arise at the asset disposal stage. These are 
the interests of the requested state to recover its expenses on the one hand, and 
interests of the requesting state to recover the illicit property in whole, on the 
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other hand. In relation to the need to compensate victims of crime, it becomes 
questionable whether the deduction of expenses from the forfeited property would 
not have a negative impact on the reparative purpose of asset forfeiture, since the 
deduction would affect the value of the property, thereby affecting the amount 
that victims receive in compensation. 
The same argument can be raised in cases where the requesting state itself is a 
victim of embezzlement. UNCAC obligates its states parties to return property 
recovered on account of embezzlement, because the victim state is the legitimate 
owner of embezzled funds. This is a mandatory obligation. However, when it comes 
to the provisions on the return of forfeited property, UNCAC does not make an 
exception that requested states must not deduct expenses from property that 
constitutes the proceeds of embezzlement. This waters down the reparative spirit 
expressed in UNCAC’s provision on the mandatory return of proceeds of 
embezzlement.  
3.7.5 A proposed asset management framework 
Even though the conventions suggest a general framework for asset management, 
they do not provide a detailed outline on how states must implement the asset 
management obligation. The development of a detailed framework is left to the 
discretion of each state, according to their legal systems. Nevertheless, the FATF, 
the G8 countries and the World Bank have proposed models for an asset 
management framework which complements the aims of asset recovery. Such a 
framework ought to have the characteristics outlined below. 
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3.7.5.1 Establishing an asset management authority 
The FATF proposes that states should develop a framework for managing or 
overseeing the management of frozen, seized and confiscated property.193 The 
purpose for such a framework is to preserve “the economic value of assets in an 
efficient, transparent, and flexible manner”.194 The starting point for setting up such 
a framework is the enactment of the relevant law and regulations.195 There should 
be measures in place to care for and preserve as far as practicable assets such as 
vehicles, livestock, or real estate which may require ongoing maintenance, control, 
and management.196 The framework should, therefore, include legal authority to 
preserve and manage such property.197  
In addition, states must appoint designated authorities responsible for managing or 
overseeing the management of assets.198 The appointed authorities should have 
the capacity to provide immediate support and advice to law enforcement 
authorities, and subsequently handle all practical issues in relation to freezing and 
seizure of property.199 Ideally, they should have sufficient skills and expertise to 
manage any type of property.200 
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3.7.5.2 Resources 
The asset management process attracts significant costs that arise through actions 
such as tracing, restraining, and management of assets.201 Thus, states must put 
aside sufficient resources in place to cover all aspects of asset management.202  
3.7.5.3 Planning 
Law enforcement authorities must not freeze or seize property without a clear 
purpose for doing so. They must plan for such actions.203 Planning helps relevant 
authorities to identify specific actions they need to take in order to secure the 
custody of targeted property.204 The planning would also assist in determining 
whether the property should be seized in the first instance.205 This would help the 
state to avoid spending money on legal actions that may emanate from 
unnecessary freezing or seizure of property, for example.  
3.7.5.4 Legal powers 
There should be statutory authority to permit a court to order a sale of seized and 
frozen property, with the consent of the owner, in cases where the property is 
perishable or rapidly depreciating.206 The authority must be able to sell property 
that is too burdensome to manage.207 However, the power to put such property up 
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for sale must be accompanied with the possibility to compensate property owners 
should the court refuse to make a forfeiture order.208 
Further, asset managers must be permitted to destroy property that is not suitable 
for public sale.209 They must also be allowed to run businesses that are subject to 
confiscation, and this should include the power to hire and fire employees for the 
business.210  
3.7.5.5 Transparency 
Transparency is an important aspect of the asset management framework.211 In 
order to enhance transparency, accountability and the effectiveness of the asset 
management system, the relevant authorities must keep appropriate records (an 
inventory) of frozen, seized and confiscated property.212 The inventory should 
contain information such as the whereabouts, value, condition and status of 
litigation.213 Further, the inventory must contain records of the ultimate disposition 
of property.214 In the case of a sale, the records must indicate the value of the 
money that has been realised.  
The assessment of seized or frozen property is important in making sure that its 
value is preserved until the forfeiture proceedings are completed.215 This can guard 
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against subsequent claims that assets were damaged in the hands of the asset 
management authority.216 
Ultimately, there must be an authority responsible for the inspection of the 
inventory, and the results of the inspection must be made public.217 
3.7.5.6 Management of foreign assets 
In order to enhance international co-operation in cases where assets are frozen or 
seized in a foreign country, asset managers in both countries ought to cooperate so 
as to maintain the value of the targeted property.218 The authority in the requested 
state ought to be empowered to enforce foreign court orders, such as restraint or 
confiscation orders. One challenge with such co-operation is that the requested 
state may not have the legal basis for the restraint or seizure of certain assets. This 
may mean that the asset management object would collapse. Further, the 
requested state might not have the resources for asset management.219 This may 
be resolved by entering into ad hoc agreements with the requesting state. 
3.7.5.7 Disposal of property 
Countries must also develop clear procedures for the disposal of confiscated 
property.220 In order to secure the preservation of property interests of the people, 
states ought to take responsibility for any damages that need to be paid, following 
legal action by an individual in respect of loss or damage to property.221  
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3.7.5.8 Convenience of civil forfeiture in asset management 
Given the possibility that certain property is perishable and therefore demands 
immediate disposal and that asset management is costly, this thesis submits that 
the state can circumvent these challenges through the use of civil forfeiture.  The 
argument is that since civil forfeiture is not based on a conviction, the state would 
not have to manage property until the conclusion of a criminal trial. In contrast with 
criminal forfeiture, therefore, civil forfeiture ‘’allows for the management of seized 
property after dispossessing the owner, including the possibility for the property to 
be sold by the government before ﬁnal judgement is passed’’.222 
3.8 Third party rights 
In addition, the international legal framework on asset forfeiture recognises the 
need to achieve the purposes of forfeiture without trampling upon the rights of 
innocent people. This is evident in the Palermo Convention, for example, where it 
stipulates that the provisions on asset forfeiture shall not be construed to prejudice 
the rights of bona fide third parties.223 The same principle was emphasised in the 
Vienna Convention,224 the FATF Recommendations,225 and UNCAC.226  
3.8.1 Third party rights in proceeds of crime 
Asset forfeiture results often in the interference with economic rights of the 
people. Therefore, States Parties to the different conventions are urged to ensure 
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that their asset forfeiture systems should respect the rights of bona fide parties 
who have interests in the property that is liable to forfeiture.227 
Object-based confiscation, for instance, targets illicit property regardless of 
who has it in their possession. By the time a forfeiture order is made, the 
property might be in possession of an innocent third party or a bona fide 
owner.228 This then calls for the protection of third party rights, to make sure 
that the innocent do not lose their property rights.  
Furthermore, the fact that value-based forfeiture is made only against an 
offender who must pay the value of the evaluated proceeds of crime either 
from his funds or through the sale of his assets means that the forfeiture 
order cannot apply to property which has been acquired by bona fide third 
parties. But what happens if an offender transfers his property to a third party 
deliberately as a way of concealing it from law enforcement, to the extent 
that there is no more property in his name to satisfy a forfeiture order? 
Robert Nozick’s justice in transfer principle provides guidance on how the law 
must approach such transfers. According to Nozick, a transfer of proceeds of 
crime would be unjust because its acquisition was unjust, i.e. through 
criminality.229 Thus, property rights cannot pass to a third party, if the person 
making the transfer has no title in the property in the first place, because he 
earned the property through criminal acts and not a legitimate source or 
activity. But what if the third party is a bona fide purchaser? Is it not unjust to 
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rectify the injustice in acquisition or transfer, when the rectification will lead 
to the injustice of depriving an innocent third party who had no knowledge of 
the criminal nature of the property? Yes, it is unjust.230 The key word here is 
‘bona fide’. The third party must be bona fide.  
In order to avoid occasioning more injustice through asset forfeiture, the 
international legal framework offers protection for the interests of innocent 
third parties who had no knowledge of the illicit nature of property, at the 
time of its transfer or acquisition.231 Requiring proof of a third party’s 
knowledge of the illicit nature of property serves to balance the interests of 
the third parties to retain the property, with interests of the public to 
disgorge illicit proceeds.  
On one hand, the requirement makes sure that innocent third parties are not 
deprived of their property. This is an enforcement of the retributive principle 
which ensures that punishment must be imposed on offenders only and not 
innocent people. On the other hand, the requirement serves to ensure that 
third parties do not co-operate with criminals so as to keep criminal proceeds 
out of reach of the law on asset forfeiture. The public’s notion of justice 
would not be offended if such a third party is punished through asset 
forfeiture for receiving illicit property knowingly.232 
Additionally, third parties may be liable for money laundering if the state 
proves that at the time of its transfer, they knew or had reason to suspect 
                                                          
230  Zagaris (1991: 502). 
231  Article 31(9) of the UNCAC, Article 12(8) of Palermo Convention, Article 5(8) of Vienna 
Convention, FATF Recommendation 4. 
232  Zagaris (1991: 502). 
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that the property in question was tainted. That way, the transferred property 
may still be liable to forfeiture as laundered property.233 Further, the state 
must have laws that permit it to void the transfer or sale contract between 
the offender and the third party, if it proves that the third party knew that it 
was tainted at the time of the transfer.234 
All in all, it would be ideal for a country to adopt both value-based and object-based 
models, and to use them as situations demand, as long as property of the innocent 
is spared. 
3.8.2 Third party rights in instrumentalities of crime 
It may so happen that an offender uses another person’s property as an 
instrumentality in a crime. This is why the international legal framework obligates 
states to ensure that the interests of such third parties are safeguarded during asset 
forfeiture proceedings.235 
One must remember, nonetheless, that in criminal forfeiture, the state can only 
target property which belongs to an offender.236 This is because criminal 
proceedings are limited to the interests of a defendant, and do not concern the 
interests of people who are not party to the proceedings. In civil forfeiture, 
however, the proceedings are made against anyone’s property, as long as the state 
can prove that it was used or intended to be used as an instrumentality of crime. 
                                                          
233  UNCAC Legislative Guidance (2006: 94). FATF Recommendation 4. 
234  Cassella (1996: 5). 
235  Article 31(9) of the UNCAC, Article 12(8) of Palermo Convention, Article 5(8) of Vienna 
Convention and FATF Recommendation 4. 
236  Cassella (1996: 4). 
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This gives civil forfeiture a wider scope, and renders it advantageous over criminal 
forfeiture, as far as the scope of forfeitable property is concerned. 
But then again, in a bid to avoid forfeiture, offenders may transfer instrumentalities 
to third parties soon after committing a crime. Such property may be forfeitable, if 
the state proves that the transfer was a sham and that the offender is still the true 
owner.237 In addition, the state must be able to void the transfer contract between 
the offender and the third party, if it proves that the third party knew that it was 
tainted at the time of the transfer.238 Further, they may use other people’s property 
deliberately, knowing that the property will not be liable to forfeiture because it 
does not belong to them. Again, the innocence of the third party is crucial. The 
protection of third party interests must not apply to those who had knowledge of 
the property’s criminal use.  
In case of co-owned property which has been used as an instrumentality, the state 
can confiscate the property but allow the co-owner party to claim their interest.239 
This will ensure that the innocent co-owner is not deprived of their property 
arbitrarily. However, the innocent co-owners must establish their innocence first  
before their interests are spared from forfeiture. 
3.8.3 Third party rights in international co-operation 
In addition, the international legal instruments recognise the need to protect the 
interests of third parties when enforcing asset forfeiture orders across borders. 
They state that the facilitation of smooth international co-operation in asset 
                                                          
237  Cassella (1996: 5). 
238  Cassella (1996: 5). 
239  Cassella (1996: 5). 
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forfeiture must not be construed to prejudice the rights of bona fide third 
parties.240  
In addition, UNCAC emphasises that States Parties must put in place legislative and 
other measures that will facilitate the return of forfeited property to a requesting 
state, while taking into account rights of bona fide third parties.241  
These legal instruments, do not, however, specify to what extent third parties 
should be provided with effective legal remedies in order to preserve their rights, 
and this is a task left for each country to determine. 
3.8.4 Third party rights in asset management 
Countries must have measures to address the individual’s and third party rights 
throughout the asset management process.242 The law should allow third parties 
with interests in seized or frozen property to carry on with the exercise of their 
rights pending confiscation. This may include allowing a third party to continue 
conducting a business, or allowing a tenant to continue occupying a house that is 
subject to provisional orders.243 
3.9 Conclusion 
The international legal framework provides an adequate basis for a just and fair 
asset forfeiture framework. It is human rights-centric, as it implores states to 
uphold the rights of innocent people throughout the asset forfeiture process, so as 
to avoid the arbitrary deprivation of their property rights.  
                                                          
240  Article 13 (8) of the Palermo Convention. 
241  Article 57 (2) of UNCAC. 
242  FATF Best Practices Paper on Confiscation (2012: 10). 
243  G8 Best Practices Paper (2005: 4). 
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The international framework recognises the importance of international co-
operation in asset recovery. It also emphasises the need to return confiscated 
assets as compensation to individual victims and victim states, and it acknowledges 
the need to adopt measures that are sufficient to deter criminals from engaging in 
economic crimes. To this extent, the framework advances the mixed theory of 
punishment, whose aim of punishment is twofold: deterrence and reparation of 
victims. The protection of innocent people’s rights constitutes the role of 
retribution in the achievement of a just asset forfeiture framework. The wide scope 
of forfeitable property as well as the management of forfeitable property is 
relevant for the determination of proportionate forfeiture orders.  
However, the international legal framework is weak, for it does not obligate every 
country to adopt civil forfeiture. This oversight excludes the recovery of illicit 
property that is in the names of people who cannot be prosecuted. This thesis 
argues that the international community cannot fight economic crimes successfully 
without civil forfeiture, given the advantages and convenience it offers.  
Another pitfall in the international legal framework is that it does not devote much 
attention to the administration of seized, frozen and confiscated property. The 
objectives of asset recovery, such as compensation of victims, would not be 
achieved if the condition or value of restrained property is compromised due to 
mismanagement. Further, the mismanagement of restrained or confiscated assets 
has the effect of raising public doubt whether asset forfeiture laws are indeed being 
implemented in the interests of the public.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS  ON MONEY LAUNDERING AND ASSET 
FORFEITURE IN MALAWI 
4.1 Introduction 
A good anti-money laundering system demands a good and robust asset 
confiscation regime.1 This is because asset confiscation ensures that illicit property, 
which is often laundered, is taken away from criminals. The international legal 
framework for asset forfeiture and money laundering discussed in the previous 
chapter, forms the basis on which Malawi should build its anti-money laundering 
and asset forfeiture regime. Malawi is a State Party to the international legal 
instruments discussed in Chapter Three.2 These are: 
a. The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988 Vienna Convention),3  
b. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
(Palermo Convention),4 
c.  The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC),5 
                                                          
1   FATF Best Practices Paper on Confiscation (Recommendation 4 and 38) and On-going Work 
for Asset Recovery (2012). 
2  Malawi being a dualist system, these international legal instruments become binding law 
only upon being domesticated through an enabling Act of Parliament. See Section 211(1) of 
 the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
3  Adopted on 20 December 1988 in Vienna. Entered into force on 11 November 1990. 
Ratified on 12 October 1995. 
4   Adopted on 15 November 2000. Entered into force on 29 September 2003. Ratified by 
Malawi on 17 March 2005. 
5   Adopted on 31 October 2003. Entered into force on 14 December 2005. Ratified by Malawi 
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d. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations,6  
e. The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AU 
Convention);7 and 
f. The Southern African Development Community Protocol against Corruption 
(SADC Protocol).8 
These instruments obligate their States Parties to criminalise money laundering as 
well as all economic crimes that constitute predicate offences for money 
laundering. They also obligate States Parties to ensure the establishment of 
specialised institutions and systems for the combating of crime and for the recovery 
of illicit property. The success of Malawi’s anti-money laundering efforts requires 
the establishment of money laundering as an offence. It requires also a proper 
system for the recovery of laundered and other illicit property property, among 
other efforts.  
This chapter discusses the legal and institutional frameworks for asset forfeiture 
and the combating of money laundering in Malawi. It will examine the what extent 
to which they meet the standards set by the international legal framework.  
Further, the discussion will assess if the current legal framework sticks to the 
boundaries of the social contract, so as to avoid occasioning injustice on the people 
of Malawi. This thesis continues to emphasise that asset forfeiture must aim at 
                                                                                                                                                                    
on 4  December  2007. 
6  Revised version published in February, 2012. 
7   Adopted on 11 July 2003. Entered into force on 5 August 2006. Ratified by Malawi on 
26 November, 2007. 
8   Adopted on 14 August, 2001. Entered into force on 6 July, 2005.  Ratified by Malawi on 27 
September, 2002. 
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achieving deterrence and victim compensation, while applying retributive 
constraints in order to avoid disproportionate forfeitures, or the forfeiture of 
innocent people’s property. It should be noted, from the onset, that the laws of 
Malawi use the concepts of forfeiture and confiscation interchangeably.  
4.2 Anti-money laundering legal framework 
Does Malawi really need a vibrant anti-money laundering framework or is it 
supposed to have one just because it is a State Party to conventions that make the 
criminalisation of money laundering mandatory? The answer is yes, Malawi needs 
this framework because money laundering is a big problem it must deal with. A 
recent Typologies Study conducted by the Malawi Financial Intelligence Unit 
revealed that, currently, there is significant laundering of proceeds of four major 
predicate offences. These are fraud, corruption, tax evasion and trade-based 
money laundering.9 Trade-based money laundering involves manipulation of the 
stated price, quantity, quality, or type of goods shipped, in order to distort the 
value of the shipment.10 This enables importers and exporters to move large 
amounts of money internationally without a transaction record.11  
Generally, the government of Malawi loses public funds due to these offences. The 
Typologies Study revealed that fraud and corrupt acts such as embezzlement and 
bribery of public officials, occasion the government huge losses of public funds 
                                                          
9  Money Laundering Typologies in Malawi (2011: 3). Trade-based money laundering is an 
Alternative remittance system that allows illegal organizations the opportunity to earn,  
move and store proceeds disguised as legitimate trade. Value can be moved through this 
process by false-invoicing, over- invoicing and under-invoicing commodities that are  
imported or exported around the world.  
10   Liao (2011: 81). 
11  Liao (2011: 81). 
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through schemes such as the awarding of undeserving tenders and payment of 
money for fictitious transactions.12 Recently, there has been a revelation of massive 
fraud and corruption by junior government officials so far, followed by revelations 
of inexplicable millions of Malawi Kwachas (tens of thousands  of US Dollars) 
beyond their monthly earnings being found in the suspects’ houses and cars.13 
Another arrest of a junior public official concerns the approval of an award of $3m 
to a ghost firm.14 So far, donors such as the Norwegian government have frozen 
monetary aid in terms of budgetary support to Malawi following suspicion of 
embezzlement of about 4 million dollars of aid funds.15  
Further, the government loses revenue through tax evasion, because the Malawi 
Revenue Authority, a body tasked with the collection of revenue, fails to collect 
enough revenue due to under-invoicing on imports by traders, or under-declared 
profits for some corporate bodies.16 In addition, the government of Malawi suffers 
from the adverse effects of capital flight that is occasioned by trade-based money 
laundering, through schemes such as payments for fictitious and over-inflated 
invoices on imports.17 These are just a few of the many examples of how the 
government loses money. In view of these losses and risks posed by the mentioned 
criminal activities, it is necessary for Malawi to put in place a strong anti-money 
laundering framework. 
                                                          
12  Malawi Typologies Report (2011: 7). 
13  See Nyasa times (14 October 2013).  One such case is The Republic v Sithole Criminal Case  
No 908 of 2013, where the convict, a junior public officer, was found with huge sums of  
money hidden in his wife’s car. He was charged and convicted of theft and money  
laundering. 
14  See News 24 (10 October 2013). 
15  Daily Times (15 October 2013). See an announcement by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs on 11 October, 2013. 
16  Malawi Typologies Report (2011: 8). 
17  Malawi Typologies Report (2011: 8). 
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4.2.1 Criminalisation of money laundering 
The criminalisation of money laundering is a mandatory obligation under the 
international legal instruments. The Vienna Convention obliges States Parties to 
criminalise the laundering of proceeds of drug related offences.18 The Palermo 
Convention obliges States Parties to criminalise the laundering of proceeds of all 
seious crimes.19 The all-crimes approach is also adopted by the FATF and UNCAC.20 
Finally, the AU Convention and SADC Protocol obligate State Parties to criminalise 
the laundering of proceeds of corruption.21  
In accordance with the mandatory obligations imposed by the international 
framework, Malawi has criminalised money laundering under Section 35 of the 
Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act 
(hereafter referred to as the Money Laundering Act).22 Section 35 covers all forms 
of money laundering comprehensively. They include the conversion or transfer of 
property while knowing or having reason to believe that it constitutes proceeds of 
crime, with the aim of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of that property.23  
Furthermore, the Act criminalises the concealment or disguising of the true nature, 
origin, location, disposition, movement or ownership of property, while knowing or 
having reason to believe that the property is the proceeds of crime.24 The Act also 
                                                          
18  Article 3 of the Vienna Convention. 
19  Article 6 of the Palermo Convention. 
20  Article 23 of UNCAC. 
21  Article 6 of the AU Convention. 
22  Chapter 8.07 of the Laws of Malawi. Came into force on 15th August, 2006. 
23  Section 35 (1)(a) of the Money Laundering Act. Cf Article 3 (b)(i) of the Vienna Convention; 
Article 6(1)(a)(i) of the Palermo Convention; Article 23(a)(i) of UNCAC; and Article 6(a) of  
the AU Convention. 
24  Section 35 (1)(b) of the Money Laundering Act. Cf Article 3 (b)(ii) of the Vienna Convention; 
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makes criminal the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing or having 
reason to believe that it is derived, directly or indirectly, from proceeds of crime.25 
Finally, the Act establishes as offences the participation, conspiracy, attempt, 
aiding, abetting and facilitation in the commission of any of the acts referred to 
above.26 On the basis of this Act, Malawi has criminalised money laundering 
adequately, and meets the international standards in this regard. 
4.2.1.1 Penal Code: Duplication of the criminalisation of money laundering 
Even though the AML Act has criminalised money laundering, the same offence has 
been established under Section 331A of the Malawian Penal Code also.27 There is 
duplication, therefore, because at the moment, there are two pieces of legislation 
that establish the same offence. The Penal Code provision stems from an 
amendment that was drafted and proposed in the year 2000, before the AML Act 
was enacted in 2006.28 The Commission responsible for the review of the Penal 
Code considered that at that time, it was important and timely to criminalise money 
laundering; and that a general offence in this regard should be codified in the Penal 
Code.29 However, the Penal Code amendment came into force only in 2011, five 
years after the coming into force of the AML Act. By the time the Penal Code 
amendments came into force, the proposed money laundering provision was 
maintained, even though it was not necessary since the offence had already been 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Article 6(1)(a)(ii) of the Palermo Convention; Article 23(a)(ii) of UNCAC and Article 6(b) of  
the AU Convention. 
25  Section 35 (1)(c) of the Money Laundering Act. Cf Article 3 (c)(i) of the Vienna Convention;  
Article 6(1)(b)(i) of the Palermo Convention; Article 23(b)(i) of UNCAC and Article 6(c) of the  
AU Convention. 
26  Section 35 (d) of the Money Laundering Act. Cf Article 3 (c)(iv) of the Vienna Convention;  
Article 6(1)(b)(ii) of the Palermo Convention and Article 23(b)(ii) of UNCAC. 
27  Chapter 7.02 of the Laws of Malawi. Came into force on 1 April, 1930. 
28  Report on the Review of the Penal Code (2000: 71).  
29  Report on the Review of the Penal Code (2000: 71). 
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criminalised under AML Act. Be that as it may, the state charges suspects under the 
AML  Act.30  
4.2.2 Scope of predicate offences for money laundering 
The offence of money laundering exists on the basis of underlying offences, 
referred to as predicate offences, from which tainted property derives. In order to 
combat profit crimes and the laundering of tainted property, Malawi ought to 
classify as many offences as possible, as predicate offences. In this respect, the 
FATF urges countries to apply the offence of money laundering to all serious 
offences in order to include the widest range of predicate offences.31 The Palermo 
Convention, too, has a similar obligation for its States Parties,32 and it defines a 
serious offence as any offence punishable by not less than four years’ 
imprisonment.33 The Vienna Convention requires that money laundering should 
apply to all drug-related offences established by the Convention. UNCAC also 
obliges its States Parties to apply money laundering to the widest range of 
predicate offences, and to include, at a minimum, a comprehensive range of 
criminal offences established by the Convention.34  
In the case of Malawi, the AML Act defines serious crime as an offence against a 
provision of any written law in Malawi, for which the maximum penalty is not less 
than 12 months’ imprisonment.35 Serious crime refers also to an offence against a 
                                                          
30  See R v Maxwell Namata & Luke Kasamba High Court of Malawi, Criminal Case No 45 of  
2013. The two were charged and convicted of laundering the proceeds of theft of public  
funds, under Section 35(1) of the AML Act. 
31  FATF Recommendation 3. 
32  Article 6(2)(a) of the Palermo Convention. 
33   Article 2(b) of the Palermo Convention. 
34  Article 23(2)(a)&(b) of UNCAC. 
35  Section 2 of the AML Act. 
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provision of a foreign state in relation to acts or omissions which, had they occurred 
in Malawi, would have constituted an offence whose maximum sentence is not less 
than 12 months’ imprisonment.36 In view of these provisions, every offence with a 
maximum sentence of not less than 12 months’ imprisonment is a predicate 
offence for money laundering.  
The 12 months imprisonment threshold is wide enough to capture all income-
generating offences. The offences which the Typologies Study established as 
offences that are rampant in Malawi, i.e.  fraud, coruption, tax evasion and trade-
based money laundering, also fall under the category of serious offences because 
their maximum penalty is more than 12 months imprisonment. All corruption-
related offences under the Corrupt Practices Act (CPA),37 such as  active and passive 
bribery,38 trading in influence,39 and misuse of public office,40 attract a maximum 
sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment.41 All tax-related offences under the Customs 
and Excise Act42 fall also into the category of serious offences in Malawi, because 
the least maximum sentence under the Act is two years imprisonment.43 The law is, 
therefore, wide enough to cover the laundering of the proceeds of all significant 
predicate offences.  
In order to combat crimes that generate illicit assets and subsequently give rise to 
money laundering, the legal framework in Malawi calls for the forfeiture of both 
                                                          
36  Section 2 of the AML Act. 
37  Chapter 7:04 of the Laws of Malawi. Came into force on 15 February 1996. 
38  Section 24(1)&(2) of the CPA. 
39  Section 25(1)&(2) of the CPA. 
40  Section 25B(1) of the CPA. 
41  Section 34 of the CPA. 
42  Chapter 42:01 of the Laws of Malawi. 
43  Section 143 of the Customs and Excise Act. 
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proceeds and instrumentalities of crime, and in some instances, the confiscation of 
contraband. Contraband refers to any property that is illegal to produce, possess, 
import or export.44 However, this discussion focuses on proceeds and 
instrumentalities of crime. 
4.3 Legal framework for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime 
The international legal framework on asset recovery obliges countries to adopt 
measures for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime. Following these standards, 
Malawi has put in place a legal framework for asset forfeiture in the Penal Code, 
the AML Act, CPA, the Dangerous Drugs Act (DDA)45 and the Customs and Excise 
Act.46 The DDA is a law aimed at controlling the importation, exportation, 
production, possession, sale, distribution, and use of dangerous drugs and for 
matters incidental to such activities. The Customs and Excise Act regulates inter 
alia, the administration, management and control of customs and excise, the 
imposition and collection of customs and excise. It establishes offences such as 
smuggling,47 tax evasion through false declaration of value of exports and imports48 
and falsification of invoices on imports.49  
As stated earlier, the laws of Malawi refer to confiscation and forfeiture 
interchangeably. The Penal Code, CPA and DDA use the word forfeiture, while the 
AML Act refers to confiscation. But the Penal Code, CPA and DDA do not define 
                                                          
44  See Online Black’s Law Dictionary. 
45   Chapter 35:02 of the Laws of Malawi.  
46  Chapter 42:01 of the Laws of Malawi. 
47   Section 134(a) of the Customs and Excise Act. 
48   Section 134(b) of the Customs and Excise Act. 
49   Section 135(e) of the Customs and Excise Act. 
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forfeiture. However, the AML Act defines it as the permanent deprivation of 
property by order of a court or other competent authority.50 
4.3.1 Proceeds of which crimes? 
Asset forfeiture does not operate in a vacuum. The proceeds of crime are forfeited 
on the basis that they derive from the commission of an offence. Thus, the fight 
against money laundering is predicated on the state’s ability to confiscate as many 
criminal proceeds as possible. This is because proceeds of crime are the main 
incentive for criminals’ engagement in profit crime, and criminals launder the 
proceeds so as to keep them out of reach of the law. Just as money laundering must 
apply to the widest range or predicate offences, the law must also provide for the 
forfeiture of the proceeds of the widest range of offences, in order to enhance 
deterrence. 
Under the Penal Code, forfeiture applies to few specific offences, and not to each 
and every serious crime which constitutes a predicate offence for money 
laundering. It applies forfeiture to official corruption;51 extortion by public 
officers;52 public officers receiving property to show favour;53 compounding 
felonies;54 compounding penal actions;55 money laundering;56 and corrupt 
practices.57 As far as the Penal Code is concerned, it has a limited range of predicate 
offences since it leaves out other income-generating offences contained in the 
                                                          
50  Section 2 of the AML Act. 
51  Section 90 of the Penal Code. 
52  Section 91 of the Penal Code. 
53  Section 92 of the Penal Code. 
54  Section 110 of the Penal Code. 
55  Section 111 of the Penal Code. 
56  Section 331A of the Penal Code. 
57  Section 396 of the Penal Code. 
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Penal Code, such as general theft, theft by public servant, fraud or robbery. 
Therefore, the list-based approach taken by the Penal Code is not helpful in the 
implementation of a succesful anti-money laundering regime because it leaves out 
the forfeiture of proceeds of profit crimes.  
The Penal Code’s inadequacy regarding offences whose proceeds must be subject 
to forfeiture is cured by the AML Act which takes a threshold approach, allowing 
the forfeiture of the proceeds of all serious crimes.58 This means that the 
application of forfeiture under the AML Act is much wider than that of the Penal 
Code. This ensures that the state can get hold of all criminal proceeds through 
forfeiture, leaving nothing for the criminal to enjoy or launder. This, in turn, assists 
in enhancing deterrence. 
With regard to the CPA, forfeiture applies to all offences established under the 
Act.59 This ensures that all advantages gained from corruption are subject to 
forfeiture. In relation to tax-related offences, the Customs and Excise Act provides 
for forfeiture of property that is connected to any of the offences established under 
the Act.60 This, arguably, may apply to proceeds of tax-related offences. In view of 
the above, the laws in Malawi apply forfeiture to proceeds of a wide range of 
offences. 
4.3.2 Forfeiture of proceeds of crime: object-based model 
As established in Chapter Three, the best approach to asset forfeiture is to put in 
place both object-based and value-based forfeiture. Object-based allows the state 
                                                          
58  Section 42 of the AML Act. 
59  Section 37 of the CPA. 
60  Section 45 of the Customs and Excise Act. 
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to confiscate objects that can be traced directly to a crime.61 Forfeiture, under this 
model, is limited to tainted proceeds.62 The laws of Malawi cover the forfeiture of 
direct proceeds of crime adequately through the Penal Code, AML Act,63 and the 
CPA.  
The Penal Code empowers courts to order the forfeiture of any property which has 
been   passed to a person in connection with the commission of an offence.64 The 
Report on the Review of the Penal Code65 says the provision relates to the 
forfeiture of the proceeds of crime.66 Further, the AML Act states that upon 
conviction of a serious crime, a competent authority may apply to a court for a 
confiscation order against tainted property.67 According to the Act, tainted property 
includes proceeds of crime,68 and it defines proceeds of crime as any property 
derived or realised directly or indirectly from a serious crime.69 Under the CPA, 
forfeiture applies to any money, wealth, property, asset that is ascertained by the 
court to have been acquired through the commission of an offence.70 This scope 
covers direct proceeds of crime.  
In addition, the law calls for the forfeiture of benefits or income that derive from 
criminal  proceeds. Under the AML Act, these include income, capital or other 
                                                          
61  UNCAC Legislative Guidance (2006: 93). 
62  OECD/The World Bank (2012: 110). 
63  Section 48 (1)(a) of the AML Act.  
64  Section 30 of the Penal Code. 
65  Report of the Law Commission on Criminal Justice Reform on the Review of the  
Penal Code (Cap.7:01) (2000) (Hereafter, Report on the review of the Penal Code). 
66  Report on the Review of the Penal Code (2000:24. The Report simply proposed one  
Amendment to Section 30, which is the inclusion of money laundering to the list of offences  
to which forfeiture should apply. 
67   Section 48 (1)(a) of the AML Act. 
68   Section 2 of the AML Act. 
69   Section 2 of the AML Act. 
70  Section 37(a) of the CPA. 
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economic gains derived or realised from property that is derived or realised from a 
serious crime.71 Under the CPA, forfeiture applies to income, capital or other 
economic gains derived or realised from such pecuniary resources or property at 
any time since the commission of the crime.72 
The DDA does not provide for proceeds of crime as there is no mention of property 
derived from the production, sale, distribution, use, export or importation of 
prohibited drugs and plants. Be that as it may, section 42 of the AML Act would be 
the basis for the confiscation of proceeds of drug dealing since it applies to 
proceeds of any serious crime, which include drug dealing offences under the DDA. 
The Customes and Excise Act provides for the confiscation of goods in respect of 
which an offence has been committed under the Act.73 It is not clear whether this 
refers to proceeds or instrumentalities of crime. All in all, Malawi has a 
comprehensive framework for object-based forfeiture of proceeds of crime. 
4.3.3 Forfeiture of proceeds of crime: value-based model 
In order to disgorge as many criminal proceeds as possible, courts must be 
empowered to order the forfeiture of other property, or the payment of money to 
the corresponding value of proceeds of crime, through a value-based approach. The 
value-based model allows the state to get the value of illicit property from an 
offender.74 It allows for the forfeiture of the value of the offender’s benefit from 
                                                          
71  Section 2 of the AML Act. 
72  Section 3 of the CPA. 
73   Section 145(1) of the Customs and Excise Act. 
74   UNCAC Legislative Guidance (2006: 93). 
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crime, without proving any connection between the property and the crime.75 The 
state just has to prove that an offender gained some benefit from an offence.76  
In Malawi, the law allows also for the forfeiture of the value of proceeds of crime by 
requiring the forfeiture of property of corresponding value to criminal proceeds, 
through the Penal Code, the CPA and the AML Act.77 In addition, the law provides 
for the forfeiture of property into which any direct proceeds of crime were 
converted, transformed or intermingled.78 
Further, in pursuit of recovering the value of criminal proceeds, a court can make a 
pecuniary order. A pecuniary order is a financial penalty against a convict, in 
respect of benefits that derive from the commission of the offence of which he or 
she has been convicted.79 A pecuniary penalty entails that a person must pay to the 
Government an amount equal to the value of his or her benefit from the offence.80 
This happens in cases where there is no tangible property against which to make a 
confiscation order. 
4.3.4 Establishing ownership proceeds of crime 
Since value-based forfeiture is limited to assets owned by an offender,81 in order to 
enhance deterrence and compensation of victims, the prosecution needs to target 
as many criminal proceeds as possible, by establishing to whom they belong. 
However, doing so demands the ability to identify property and ascertain if an 
                                                          
75   Greenberg  et al (2009: 13). 
76   OECD/The World Bank (2012: 18). 
77   Section 30 of the Penal Code; Section 38 of the CPA and S2 of the AML Act. 
78   AML Act, CPA Act, Penal Code; and Section 149(4) of the CP&EC. 
79   Section 48(1)(2) of the AML Act. 
80   Section 61(1) of the AML Act. 
81   OECD/The World Bank (2012: 18). 
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offender is in possession or control of forfeitable property. The AML Act allows 
relevant authorities to obtain, through court orders, any documents that are 
relevant for identifying, locating and quantifying property which belongs to, is in 
possession of, or is in control of an offender.82  
The ascertainment of the beneficial owner is necessary because property has four 
incidents; namely nominal title, control benefit and management, which can be 
owned separately or jointly.83 Thus, while title to property may be in the name of 
one person, its control or benefit may be attributed to another, who in this case 
may be an offender who merely transfers title to a third party while he enjoys its 
benefit and control. In addition, the authorities can obtain orders that are relevant 
for identifying or locating documents that show the transfer of the property.84 
Further, the court can order a financial institution to produce information about 
any transaction conducted for or on behalf of an offender during any specified 
period.85 
4.3.5 Lifting the corporate veil 
In order to track and confiscate as many criminal proceeds as possible, relevant 
authorities ought to be aware of the different modes through which criminals 
disguise their ownership of property. One such mode is the creation of corporate 
entities and using them as vehicles for laundering proceeds of crime.86 The title 
documents may show that the property belongs to the corporate vehicle, making it 
                                                          
82   Section 42(a)(i) of the AML Act. 
83   Kamchedzera (1992: 188-190). 
84   Section 42(a)(ii) of the AML Act. 
85   Section 42(2) of the AML Act. 
86   FATF (2006: 1). 
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impossible to order its forfeiture because legally, it does not belong to the offender. 
There is, therefore, need to determine who the beneficial owner of such business 
arrangements is, in order to maximise the recovery of illicit property. A beneficial 
owner, according to the AML Act, is a person who ultimately owns or controls an 
asset or a business; a person on whose behalf a transaction is conducted; or a 
person who exercises effective control over a legal person or arrangement.87 In this 
vein, the AML Act empowers courts to treat as criminal proceeds, any property that 
is under an offender’s effective control.88 This is regardless of whether the offender 
has any legal or equitable interest in the property; or any right, power or privilege 
in connection with the property.89  
In determining beneficial ownership of forfeitable property, courts should have 
regard to an offender’s shareholding in, debentures over or directorship in any 
company that has an interest, whether direct or indirect, in the property.90 In order 
to make a thorough assessment, the court may order the investigation and 
inspection of the books of a named company91 and of any trust that has any 
relationship to the property. Courts may also assess any relationship between the 
persons that have an interest in the property, companies or trusts.92 
Once a court determines that an offender is in effective control of property, it may 
order that the property be made available to satisfy a pecuniary order.93 Thus, the 
court may make a pecuniary penalty order or a restraining order against the 
                                                          
87   Section 2 of the AML Act. 
88  Section 66(1) of the AML Act. 
89   Section 66(1)(a)&(b) of the AML Act. 
90   Section 66(2) of the AML Act. 
91   Section 66(2)(a) of the AML Act. 
92   Section 66(2)(b) of the AML Act. 
93   Section 66(4) of the AML Act. 
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property, as if the property belongs to the person against whom the orders were 
made.94  
Having established that criminals use corporate entities to hide criminal proceeds, 
there is further need to deter this practice. One way to curb this practice, as the 
AML Act stipulates, is to hold the entities liable for money laundering, and for 
participating in the concealment or disguise of illicit property.95 The AML Act 
establishes that corporations may be liable for money laundering, and their 
punishment may be a fine and loss of a business licence.96 In addition, the 
corporation must suffer forfeiture of its assets, which represent criminal proceeds 
or gains.97 Forfeiture of the assets of such a corporate is essential, in the spirit of 
deterrence through forfeiture, because it ensures the removal or mitigation of the 
economic incentive for committing crimes. If the courts stop at imposing a fine and 
revoking a business licence only, it would be the same as imposing an imprisonment 
sentence for a natural person, but leaving them with the proceeds of crime. Crime 
would pay, in such circumstances. 
4.3.6 Failure to honour a forfeiture or pecuniary order 
One might wonder as to what should happen if an offender fails to satisfy a 
confiscation or pecuniary order. Should the state give up and endorse in their 
records that a forfeiture order was made but there was no property to pursue? No. 
Justice would demand otherwise. The AML Act recognises that property that should 
be subject to a forfeiture order may not always be available , either because it is 
                                                          
94   Section 66(3) of the AML Act. 
95  Section 35(1) (b) of the AML Act. 
96  Section 35(1)(b) of the AML Act. 
97  Madinger (2012: 126). 
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outside the country, has been substantially diminished in value, or has been 
commingled with other property, such that it is difficult to separate.98 In such cases, 
the court may order the person to pay an amount equivalent to the value of the 
property.99 The amount payable in lieu of a confiscation order must be treated as a 
fine. If a person fails to pay the ordered amount of money, the court may impose a 
sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine.100 Similarly, if a person 
fails to pay an amount under a pecuniary order, the court may impose a team of 
imprisonment instead.101  
Importantly, the AML Act states that the term of imprisonment must run 
consecutively with another form of punisment imposed on the person.102 This 
answers the question raised in Chapter Two, that even though asset forfeiture is 
punitive, a forfeiture order made in addition to an imprisonment sentense does not 
constitute double jeopardy. Thus, it may be imposed in addition to another form of 
punishment. Making the period of imprisonment to run consecutively to another 
form of punishment, stresses the point that an offender must serve the 
punishments separately, the way one would do by losing illicit property through a 
forfeiture order in addition to serving a period of imprisonment term for theft or 
drug trafficking, for example.  
4.4 Legal Framework for the forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime 
The law in Malawi provides for the forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime. The 
Penal Code provides for the forfeiture of instrumentalities of crimes such as house 
                                                          
98  Section 58 of the AML Act. 
99  Section 58 of the AML Act. 
100  Section 59 of the AML Act. 
101  Section 67 of the AML Act. 
102  Section 59 (b) of the AML Act. 
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housebreaking and burglary and similar offences.103 The AML Act provides for the 
forfeiture of property intended for use in, or used in or in connection with the 
commission of a serious crime.104  
The Penal Code provides for the forfeiture of any dangerous or offensive weapon or 
instruments used in the commission of burgrary, house breaking and similar 
offences.105 In addition, the Penal Code provides for the forfeiture of property such 
as aircraft, vessel or vehicle used to facilitate the commission of theft, burglary, 
housebreaking, offences allied to stealing, as well receiving stolen property or 
property that was obtained unlawfully.106 Further, the Criminal Prosecure and 
Evidence Code (CP&EC) stipulates that courts can order the forfeiture of 
instrumentalities of the same offences.107 
Further, the DDA empowers courts to order the confiscation of dangerous drugs, 
pipe, receptacle, appliance, or plant that was produced, possessed, used, sold, kept, 
distributed or cultivated in contravention of the Act.108 A reading of this provision 
shows that the confiscation relates to both instrumentalities and contraband. In 
this case, instrumentalities would be a pipe, receptacle or any appliance used in the 
consumption through smoking or use of the prohibited drugs or plants. Prohibited 
drugs and plants would be confiscated as contraband, because they are tainted for 
being prohibited items whose use, distribution, export and import constitutes a 
                                                          
103  Section 315 of the Penal Code. 
104  Section 2 of the AML Act. There is no actual reference to instrumentalities of crime, but 
tainted property or property connected with the commission of an offence refers to both  
proceeds and instrumentalities of crime.  
105  Section 315 of the Penal Code. 
106  Section 317 of the Penal Code. 
107  Section 149(1) of the CP&EC. 
108  Section 17(6) of the DDA. 
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violation of the law. In this regard, it is clear that the DDA allows for the 
confiscation of contraband, as well as instrumentalities of crime,  
Finally, there is the Customs and Excise Act.109 This Act provides for the confiscation 
of goods in respect of which an offence has been committed under the Act.110 It 
further provides for confiscation of conveyances (referring to aircrafts, vessels and 
vehicles) used without authority for the transportation of goods that are liable to 
forfeiture.111 In addition, the Act provides for the confiscation of all packages, 
utensils and things of that nature in which all goods subject to confiscation are 
contained.112 The Act, therefore, covers instrumentalities. 
In view of the laws discussed above, Malawi meets the international standard of 
applying confiscation to instrumentalities of crime. The inadequacies of the other 
pieces of legislation are covered by the AML Act, which applies to a broader 
spectrum of instrumentalities of crime, by referring to instrumentalities of all 
serious crimes. The AML Act is also comprehensive as it provides for the forfeiture 
of instrumentalities intended for use in the commission of crimes, as required by 
the international legal framework. 
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, in order to avoid punishing innocent 
people through asset forfeiture, forfeiture orders must be made only against the 
property of people who are at criminal fault, and not the innocent. This is what the 
retributive aspect of punishment within the social contract demands. In Malawi, 
under the Penal Code, the court is permitted to order the forfeiture of a vessel, 
                                                          
109  Chapter 42:01 of the Laws of Malawi. 
110  Section 145(1) of the Customs and Excise Act. 
111  Section 145(2) of the Customs and Excise Act. 
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aircraft or vehicle only if it finds that the owner or any of his agents or servants 
consented to, or were aware of the use or employment of the property to the 
commission of a crime.113 This is to make sure that the property of innocent people 
is spared from forfeiture, thus avoiding arbitrary forfeiture orders.  
4.5 Conviction-based vs non-conviction based forfeiture 
As discussed in Chapter Two, a comprehensive asset forfeiture regime must 
recognise two types of forfeiture. It must recognise conviction-based forfeiture, 
which is based on the conviction of an offender,114 and non-conviction-based 
forfeiture which does not depend on the conviction of an offender.115  
4.5.1 Conviction-based forfeiture 
Malawi has made provision for conviction-based forfeiture under the Penal Code 
which states that when any person is convicted of specified offences, courts may 
order confiscation in addition to or in lieu of any penalty which may be imposed.116 
Forfeiture in this case falls under penalties, but courts are not obliged to make such 
an order because the provision does not make the ordering of forfeiture 
mandatory. The CPA also provides for conviction-based forfeiture as an additional 
penalty, but unlike the Penal Code, courts are obligated to make such an order.117 
In addition, the AML Act provides for conviction-based forfeiture, based on the 
conviction of a serious crime.118  
                                                          
113  Section 317 (2) of the Penal Code. 
114  Greenberg  et al (2009: 13). 
115  Greenberg  et al (2009: 13).  
116  Section 30 of the Penal Code. 
117  Section 37 of the CPA. 
118  Section 48(1) of the AML Act. 
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The AML Act sets time limits for the commencement of conviction-based forfeiture 
proceedings. It states that the relevant authorities can apply for forfeiture 12 
months after conviction.119 Once a forfeiture order has been made, the state can 
only apply for another forfeiture order in respect of the offence for which the 
person was convicted, with the leave of the court.120 The court is permitted to grant 
such leave if it is satisfied that the property or benefit which is sought after in the 
subsequent forfeiture application was identified after the previous application was 
determined; or that the necessary evidence became available after the 
determination of the previous application; or that it is in the interest of justice to 
hear the new application.121 The state can avoid the inconvenience of having to 
apply for subsequent forfeiture orders if it does a thorough job in identifying, 
tracing and seizure of forfeitable property at the earliest stages of investigations. 
All in all, because confiscation under the AML Act applies to all serious crimes 
established under any law in Malawi, this thesis argues that Malawi has adequately 
put in place a legal basis for convicion-based forfeiture. But where does Malawi 
stand with regard to non-conviction-based forfeiture? 
4.5.2 Non-conviction based forfeiture 
While all of the international legal instruments make the adoption of conviction-
based forfeiture mandatory, UNCAC and the FATF Recommendations urge 
countries to consider adopting non-conviction based forfeiture also. As aforesaid, 
non-conviction based forfeiture helps the state to recover proceeds or 
                                                          
119  Section 48(1) of the AML Act. 
120  Section 48(3) of the AML Act. 
121  Section 48(3) of the AML Act. 
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instrumentalities of crime without having to obtain the conviction of an offender 
first.122 However, it should be noted that the adoption of a non-conviction-based 
forfeiture pursuant to UNCAC and FATF standards is not mandatory, since countries 
are merely urged to consider adopting the same.123 Each country therefore, needs 
to make an assessment of whether it can do without it or not.  
One may then wonder if Malawi really needs non-conviction based forfeiture. This 
question can be answered best upon considering the reasons and benefits of having 
in place a non-conviction-based forfeiture legal framework. The benefits are that it 
can be used to confiscate property where an offender cannot be prosecuted 
because he or she is dead, sick, has fled or absconded, is immune from prosecution 
or cannot be prosecuted for political reasons.124 The adoption of non-conviction-
based forfeiture can help Malawi considerably in its efforts to combat money 
laundering. This is because the state would not have to prosecute individuals first, 
obtain a conviction and then apply for the forfeiture of their tainted property.  
Notably, the AML Act provides for some sort of non-conviction based forfeiture, 
which it refers to as in rem proceedings under section 52. However, unlike the ideal 
in rem proceedings that should apply to all scenarios where it is not possible to 
bring a suspect to court for prosecution, the provision in the AML Act is to a certain 
degree inadequate. The inadequacy lies in the fact that under this provision, in rem 
proceedings apply only in cases where a person has been charged with a serious 
                                                          
122  Daniel Et al (2008: 243). 
123  FATF Recommendation 4 and Article 54(1)(C) of the UNCAC. 
124  Greenberg  et al (2009: 1). 
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crime and a warrant for arrest for the person has been issued in relation to that 
charge, but the person has died or absconded.125  
For the sake of clarity, the Act provides that “charging a person” refers to a 
procedure described in Malawi or elsewhere, by which criminal proceedings may be 
commenced.126 In Malawi, criminal proceedings are commenced by way of lodging 
a complaint with a magistrate; or by bringing before a magistrate a person who has 
been arrested without warrant; or by a public prosecutor or a police officer signing 
and presenting a formal charge to a magistrate.127 The implication of section 52 of 
the AML Act is that in rem proceedings arise only in cases where a suspect has died 
or absconded. This, therefore, leaves out the possibility of the state applying for 
confiscation in cases where a suspect is alive and is within the jurisdiction but 
cannot stand trial due to sickness, or where the evidence is enough to prove tainted 
property, but it is not strong enough to secure the conviction of an offender.  
Furthermore, the provision states that the state may apply for forfeiture where two 
pre-conditions have been satisfied, i.e. a suspect has been charged within the 
meaning provided above, and a warrant of arrest has been issued in relation to the 
charge.  This is not clear how the provision will apply to cases where a suspect has 
died before they are charged, because ordinarily, the state cannot institute criminal 
proceedings or obtain a warrant of arrest against the dead. Thus, as the law is, no 
civil corfeiture proceedings can be commenced in relation to property of someone 
                                                          
125  Section 52(1)(a)&(b) of the AML Act. 
126  Section 3 of AML Act. 
127  Section 81(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code and Chapter 8:02 of the Laws of 
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who dies before the state began or concluded its investigations, because it cannot 
obtain a warrant of arrest or commence criminal proceedings.  
In view of this limitation, this thesis argues that there is need to amend this 
provision in order to accomodate a wider application of in rem confiscation. This 
amendment should be done, if Malawi is serious about disgorging tainted property 
and curbing money laundering by criminals who are alive and are within the 
jurisdiction, but cannot be procesuted for some reason. 
In addition, the CPA provides for what seems to be administrative forfeiture , 
otherwise knows as uncontested forfeiture. Administrative forfeitures are 
processed by law enforcement agencies, not courts, as it is the case with civil and 
criminal forfeiutures.128 Courts are not involved because no one steps in to 
challenge the forfeiture.129 The CPA states that recovered, seized or frozen property 
shall vest in the state in any of the following situations: (i)the owner has fled the 
country in a bid to evade investigation or prosecution; (ii) the owner cannot be 
identified or ascertained; (iii) the owner has absconded; and (iv) the owner admits 
their involvement in any offence under the CPA and has agreed  to return the 
property to the state.130 The ACB Director should issue a notice, published in a 
Gazette, newspaper, served on the concerned person or left at the property 
                                                          
128   Dery (2012: 2). 
129   Dery (2012: 2). 
130   Regulation 3 of the Corrupt Practices (Disposal of Recovered, Seized or Frozen Property)  
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owner’s last known address. The property vests in the state if no one brings a claim 
within three months.131 
Unlike the non-conviction based forfeiture provided under the AML Act as 
discussed above, this forfeiture under the CPA is not complicated because it does 
not require the arrest or the charging of the property owner first. This is 
commendable, since it takes care of cases where the state has in its possession 
illicit property but it cannot commence a criminal trial for the eventual criminal 
forfeiture proceedings. However, the CPA being an Act of limited application, the 
AML Act should have had a similar provision because it applies to a broader 
spectrum of offences.  
However, this kind of forfeiture can be distinguished from the American model, 
which only applies to property whose value is not more that $500,000.132 Further, it 
does not apply to real property, regardless of its value.133 This is because houses 
cannot be seized administratively.134 The Malawian administrative forfeiture does 
not have any restrictions on the type and value of property which be subject to 
forfeiture. Further, the CPA does not guide on what should happen in case 
someone comes forth with a claim. In the USA, , if someone contests the forfeiture, 
the state commences either criminal forfeiture after a succesful prosecution, or civil 
forfeiture. 
                                                          
131   Regulation 3(2)(a)&(b) of the Corrupt Practices (Disposal of Recovered, Seized or Frozen  
Property) Regulations. 
132  Worral (2008: 3). 
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In the Malawian context, since the law does not provide for civil forfeiture, it seems 
that the state’s only option would be to try the person first, and proceed with 
forfeiture proceedings if the person was convicted. If there the state fails to secure 
a conviction, the absence of the law on civil forfeiture means that the ACB would be 
forced to give the property back to the claimant. Owing to this implication, the 
importance of having civil forfeiture regime cannot be over-emphasised. The 
success of administrative forfeiture regime depends significantly on the presence of 
both criminal and civil forfeiture as options, when the administrative forfeiture has 
been contested. Thus, this thesis argues that the state must include both 
administrative forfeiture and civil forfeiture in its laws. 
4.5.3 Notice of a forfeiture application: avoiding arbitrary orders 
In order for the state to avoid issuing arbitrary asset forfeiture orders, property 
owners ought to be given notice of an intended forfeiture. Thus, the AML Act 
requires a competent authority to give a written notice of not less than 14 days, of 
an application for a conviction-based forfeiture, to any person who may have an 
interest in the targeted property.135 In addition, the court may on its own motion 
direct the relevant authority to publish a notice of the forfeiture application in the 
Gazette or newspaper, to any person who in the opinion of the court, might have 
an interest in the property.136  
The state bears a similar obligation in relation to an application for a pecuniary 
penalty in respect of benefits derived from an offence.137 These notices are a 
                                                          
135  Section 49(1) of the AML Act. 
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commendable way of ensuring that the people understand the basis of state action, 
which is to avoid arbitrary deprivation of the people’s property. The social contract 
disapproves of arbitrary state actions, hence, this is one way of making the state 
explain and justify its actions to the people. 
4.5.4 Salient factors to consider when making a forfeiture order 
The imposition of punishment, such as asset forfeiture, must not result in avoidable 
injustice. Thus, the court must take into consideration factors that may prevent 
occasioning injustice. In this light, the AML Act suggests that when determining 
whether a forfeiture order should be made, courts must consider the interests of 
third parties in the forfeitable property; the gravity of the serious crime concerned; 
any hardship that may reasonably be caused to any person by the operation of the 
order; and the use that is ordinarily made of the property, or the use to which the 
property was intended to be put.138 
4.5.4.1 Proceeds of crime 
It is prudent for the courts to consider the interests of third parties in forfeitable 
property, before ordering its forfeiture. Further, the consideration of the gravity of 
the serious crime concerned is relevant because forfeiture in Malawi applies to 
property related to serious crimes. However, once it is established that the offence 
is a serious crime, the consideration of the gravity of the offence should end there. 
The court should not bother determining whether it should make a forfeiture order 
at all. The focus should be on disgorging every gain or benefit that emanates from 
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the commission of a serious crime, without thinking about the gravity of the 
offence, be it a simple theft or a complex fraud.  
The injustice in proceeds of crime lies in their illicit acquisition through the 
commission of a serious crime, regardless of its gravity, and a forfeiture order 
serves to rectify the injustice. Thus, courts must not worry about the gravity of a 
serious crime. The court must not have an option or ordering forfeiture in one case 
of serious crime, and not another, when in both cases there is evidence that there 
is an illicit gain involved. Courts must order the forfeiture of any illicit property, as 
long as it derives from a serious crime.  
In addition, it begs to question why the AML Act suggests that the court must 
consider the possible hardships of a forfeiture order on other people. The principle 
of proportionality would demand that courts should order the forfeiture of all 
criminal proceeds, without thinking about any hardship that may be caused on 
other people, such as an offender’s family members, whose subsistence relies on 
the same criminal proceeds. 
As Nozick contends in his rectification of justice principle, any injustice in 
acquisition or injustice in transfer must be rectified. However, Nozick’s principle has 
limited application, and would occasion some injustice if the state applies it strictly 
in all cases and ends up confiscating property of bona fide purchasers. Thus, this 
thesis submits that the court must consider only interests of bona fide purchasers 
who pay some sufficient consideration for the property, and had no knowledge of 
the property’s illicit nature. The state should forgo pursuing what the purchaser 
bought. Instead, it should pursue other property of an offender, which can be the 
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property he bought using the money paid by the bona fide purchaser, or any of his 
property, to the corresponding value of the criminal proceeds. If not, the court can 
order a pecuniary order or the imposition of a prison sentence in default. 
Therefore, courts must order forfeiture of criminal proceeds regardless of who else 
might have interests in them, such as an offender’s family members or anyone who 
merely receives criminal proceeds as a gift.  
4.5.4.2 Instrumentalities of crime 
All of the factors suggested by the AML Act, however, should apply to the 
confiscation of instrumentalities of crime. Third party interests must be taken into 
account because of the possibility that a criminal can use another person’s property 
to commit an offence, without the owner’s knowledge. Further, the gravity of the 
serious crime involved is a relevant factor to consider because the offence may not 
be so grave to warrant the forfeiture of instrumentalities. For instance, it would be 
disproportionate to order the forfeiture of a car as an instrumentality of crime just 
because it was used to transport of 100 grams of marijuana. Such a forfeiture order 
would violate the principle of proportionality, as suggested by Locke, Bentham and 
retributive proponents, that punishment should fit the crime. 
In addition, the court must consider any hardship that may reasonably be expected 
to be caused to any person by a forfeiture order. For instance, the court must 
consider if ordering the forfeiture of a house may render an offender’s family 
homeless and destitute, just because the offender was using one room of the house 
to produce and package marijuana. Finally, it makes sense for the court to consider 
what the property was used for or what it was intended to be used for, when 
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determining whether to order its forfeiture as an instrumentality of crime. For 
instance, it would not be fair to forfeit a school block which benefits a whole village, 
just because a criminal gang uses it at night for packaging or receiving illicit drugs. 
The court must consider what immediate socio-economic impact the order would 
have in such a case when it is executed. 
4.6 Provisional orders 
The ability to confiscate illicit property depends heavily on the state’s ability to 
trace, seize and preserve forfeitable property until the conclusion of forfeiture 
proceedings.139 Even though Malawi’s law on asset forfeiture is adequate, it is 
imperative to assess the extent to which it provides for provisional orders such as 
seizure and freezing orders. 
4.6.1 Search and seizure orders 
The AML Act provides for search and seizure of tainted property. The Act mandates 
any competent authority to conduct a search under warrant and eventually to seize 
any property that the authority believes, on reasonable grounds, to be tainted 
property.140  
In addition, the Corrupt Practices Act (CPA) authorises the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s 
Director or Deputy Director or a senior police officer, to seize or freeze any 
document or other records or evidence or any asset, account, money or other 
pecuniary resource, wealth, property, or business or other interest.141 Furthermore, 
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159 
 
the CP&EC empowers the police to stop, search and detain any aircraft, vehicle and 
vessel if they have reason to suspect that it is carrying stolen goods, or anything 
that has been obtained unlawfully.142 Further, the police can also stop, search and 
detain any vehicle, aircraft or vessel if there is reason to suspect that it is an 
instrumentality of offences such as robbery, extortion, burglary, house breaking, or 
receiving stolen property.143 In addition, the police can search any person whom 
they reasonably suspect of having in his or her possession or conveying any 
property that is stolen or obtained unlawfully.144 Consequently, the police can seize 
any property they can find through the seizure.145 
The provisions discussed above indicate that there is adequate legal basis for the 
state to get hold of tainted property and to keep it until the determination of 
forfeiture proceedings. The ability to obtain custody of such property has a bearing 
on deterrence and compensation of victims, which depends heavily on how much 
property has managed to subject to forfeiture. 
4.6.2 Restraining orders 
The law in Malawi recognises the need to restrain the use or disposal of property 
that may be subject to forfeiture, and thus permits courts to issue restraining 
orders. Under the AML Act, competent authorities are allowed to apply to court for 
a restraining order against any realisable property held by a defendant or any other 
person other than the defendant.146 Such orders may be obtained in respect to 
                                                          
142  Section 25(1)(a) of the CP&EC. 
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cases where the defendant has been convicted, or has been charged but not yet 
convicted of a serious crime.147  
In cases where a defendant has not yet been convicted, a competent authority that 
seeks a restraining order ought to state grounds in an affidavit its grounds for 
believing that (a) the defendant committed an offence;148 (b) the property is tainted 
property in relation to the offence in question;149 (c) the defendant derived a 
benefit, directly or indirectly, for the commission of the offence;150 and finally, (d) 
that a forfeiture order or a pecuniary penalty order may be or is likely to be made in 
respect to the property.151 
In case of property that is owned by a person other than the defendant, a 
competent authority ought to state grounds for the belief that the property is 
tainted property and that it is subject to the effective control of the defendant.152 
This means a restraint order can be obtained in respect of property that belongs to 
a defendant, as well as property belonging to another person, as long as the two 
conditions are satisfied. This ensures that the law targets as much property as 
possible. It is also one way of defeating property-concealing tactics by offenders, 
who may transfer property to other people in a bid to avoid restraining orders 
being attached to their criminal proceeds. 
Further, the CPA provides for restraint orders, specifically referred to as restriction 
notices. These notices restrain any person from dealing or disposing of any property 
                                                          
147   Section 79(2) (a)&(b) of the AML Act. 
148   Section 79(2)(b) of the AML Act. 
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151  Section 79(2)(h) of the AML Act. 
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without the consent of the Director of the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB).153 The 
notices apply to property that is subject to, or is somehow implicated in the 
investigation or prosecution of any offence under the Act. Apart from property, a 
person may also be restricted from entering into any contract, transaction, 
agreement or other arrangement. Unlike a restraining order under the AML Act, 
which is ordered by a court, a restriction notice under the CPA is made by the 
Director of the ACB.154 
The law sets time limits for the operation of a restraining order. The AML Act sets 
the limit at six months from the date on which it is made, or any period as may be 
set by the court.155 The state may apply for the extension of the period, and the 
court may grant the extension if it is satisfied that a confiscation order may be 
made against the property, or a pecuniary order may be made against the 
person.156 Such limits are a good way of recognising the property owner’s right to 
use their property which may be infringed by the perpetual existence of a 
restraining order. 
In order to ensure compliance, the CPA and AML Act provide for the punishment of 
those who contravene any directive in a restraining order or restriction notice.157 
This is an effective way of ensuring that no one affects the availability or condition 
of property until the determination of forfeiture proceedings. 
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4.7 Asset management 
The success of Malawi’s asset forfeiture regime rests on the ability of its competent 
authorities to manage both forfeitable and forfeited assets. 
4.7.1 Management of seized and restrained assets 
Upon seizure of property, the CP&EC stipulates that the property must be brought 
before a court, where it may be detained until the conclusion of the case or the 
investigation. This means that the court itself will be the manager or administrator 
for the property. The property is to be maintained until the conclusion of a trial, or 
until the determination of an appeal, in case an appeal has been lodged.158 In cases 
where there are no court proceedings instituted, either trial or an appeal, the court 
must restore the seized property to the person from whom it was taken.159 The 
possibility of returning seized property to the owner necessitates that that the 
property should be managed well so as to preserve its value and condition.160  
The AML Act, however, rests the administration or management of seized assets on 
the competent authority that executes a seizure order, to ensure its care and 
preservation.161 The same applies to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, under the CPA.162 
Pursuant to an application for a restraining order, the AML Act stipulates that a 
court may appoint a person to take custody of the restrained property, as well as 
require him or her to deal and manage such property as the court may direct.163 In 
                                                          
158  Section 116(2) of the CP&EC. 
159  Section 116(3) of the CP&EC. 
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addition, the court may require any person having possession of the property to 
give possession of the property to the appointed person for him or her to take 
custody and control of that property.164   
4.7.2. Planning 
The law in Malawi recognises that sometimes, relevant authorities abuse due 
process by applying for needless restraint orders. Thus, the AML Act gives people 
whose property is affected by such restraining orders, the right to seek payment of 
damages, in cases where it is alleged that the action of the relevant authorities 
involved an abuse of process.165 In addition, the CP&EC provides that no one shall 
be entitled to damages or compensation for any loss or damage suffered due to the 
search, detention and seizure of their property, except where the police acted 
without reasonable cause.166 Thus, the state must avoid wasting public funds 
through payment for damages in matters where legal suits could be avoided.  
The answer to avoiding such situations lies in planning. The FATF suggests that state 
authorities must plan properly before they apply for any provisional orders.167 
Planning helps relevant authorities to identify specific actions they need to take in 
order to secure the custody or preservation of relevant property.168 Further, 
planning would assist to determine whether the property needs to be seized or 
frozen in the first place.169 Thus, actions must not be spontaneous or frivolous. This 
                                                          
164  Section 80(2)(b)(ii) of the AML Act. 
165  Section 47 of the AML Act. 
166  Section 25 (2) of the CP&EC. 
167  FATF Best Practices Paper on Confiscation (2012: 9). 
168  Greenberg  et al (2009: 86). 
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will help the state to avoid legal suits that might arise if the state abuses the 
process by applying for provisional orders, needlessly.  
4.7.3 Management of confiscated property 
Once the court makes a forfeiture order, there is need to preserve the nature and 
value of property until its disposal. This ensures that meaningful assets are realised 
and given to the right people either as restitution, compensation or are allocated to 
meaningful public projects. This is one grey area where the law does not state who 
should administer confiscated property. Should it be with the courts or with the 
prosecution? Or should it go back to investigative agencies? The law in Malawi 
ought to regulate how relevant authorities should handle such property until it its 
final disposal. 
4.7.4 Sale of perishable property 
The asset management framework discussed in Chapter Three, recommends that a 
country should permit the sale of perishable property, before it loses its value.170 In 
Malawi, the CPA’s Regulations on the Disposal of Recovered, Seized or frozen 
Property provide for the sale of fast decaying property that has been recovered, 
seized or frozen.171 This requires ACB officials to act proactively, to discern the 
delicate nature of the property and to push for its sale. This provision is laudable, 
for the reason that it ensures that the value of the property is maintained until the 
end of a prosecution, forfeiture proceedings or disposal stage. Should there be 
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victims to be compensated the provision ensures that there is money available for 
their compensation. 
Notably, the Regulations state that the sale should be done only with leave of the 
court. Thus, the court must sanction the sale. This is one way of counter-checking if 
the decision to put the property on sale is indeed in the interests of justice. Further, 
the Regulations provide that anyone who has a claim in the property is allowed to 
pursue their claim in the proceeds of the sale instead.172 This provision ensures that 
the state’s action through the sale does not infringe on interested parties’ rights to 
seek legal recourse against state actions that affect their interests. This is, 
therefore, a commendable provision. 
Unfortunately, the other pieces of legislation do not have a similar provision. This is 
a significant oversight, especially on the part of the AML Act, particularly because it 
has a wider application to all serious crimes than the CPA. Hence, much as the 
provision for the sale of perishable property is a commendable initiative, the 
inadequacy posed by the AML Act is regrettable. 
4.7.5 Disposal of confiscated property 
Once a confiscation order is made, the next thing to determine is where the 
confiscated property should go. Generally, property law abhors a void in title, and 
forfeiture ensures that there is no lacuna in the ownership of property, by passing 
title to the state.173 This principle applies in Malawi also.  
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All property that is confiscated under the CPA and the Customs and Excise Act, 
vests in the state.174 Similarly, all property confiscated under the AML Act vests 
absolutely in the state.175 The CPA suggests that the confiscated money, or 
proceeds from the sale of confiscated property must be given to the state, through 
the Consolidated Fund, which is the main bank account for the Malawi 
Government.176 The other laws do not mention specifically whether vesting in the 
state means depositing proceeds of the sale of confiscated property into the 
Consolidated Fund as well. The CP&EC is not clear about the disposal of property. It 
says merely that the court may make orders regarding disposal of property, either 
by forfeiture or return of property to its owner.177  
All in all, this is how the law in Malawi has determined the disposal of confiscated 
property, in pursuit of the standards set by the international conventions, that 
individual states should dispose confiscated property according to their domestic 
laws and procedures. However, nothing is said about what the property should be 
used for, once it vests in the state. The AML Act merely suggests that the 
confiscated property may be disposed of and its proceeds be applied or dealt with 
in accordance with the directions of the Attorney General.178 Since the social 
contract dictates that the state should conduct its business in the interests of the 
people, it is imperative that confiscated property should be used for the benefit the 
                                                          
174  Section 3 of the Corrupt Practices (Disposal of Recovered, Seized or Frozen Property)  
Regulations(Issued under Section 54 of the CPA) and Section 148 of the  
Customs and Excise Act. 
175  Section 54 of the AML Act. The AML Act under Section 54(3)(a) of the AML Act however, 
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people. The FATF suggests the establishment of an asset forfeiture fund in which all 
or part of confiscated assets will be deposited for law enforcement, health, 
education, or other appropriate purposes.179 In the absence of an asset forfeiture 
fund, the FATF encourages states to endeavour to use confiscated assets 
transparently to fund projects that further the public good.180 
4.7.5.1 Compensation of victims of crime 
Given that one aim of punishment within the social contract is victim reparation, 
the Malawi government must ensure that victims of crime are compensated as 
much as possible. The Penal Code states that the court may order any person 
convicted of an offence to make compensation to any person who has suffered loss 
of property by such offence.181 The compensation may be either in addition to or in 
substitution for any other punishment.  
The other laws do not mention anything about victim compensation, but instead, 
they talk about restitution as discussed below. Suffice to say that the guiding 
principle on compensation is that a victim must not be over-compensated or under-
compensated.182 
4.7.5.2 Restitution 
In the advancement of the reparative aim of asset forfeiture, the CPA requires 
courts to order a convict to pay to the rightful owner an amount or value of any 
                                                          
179  See best Practices on Confiscation (2012: 7). See also Interpretive Notes to the Forty  
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advantage he obtained or received.183 However, in the event that the rightful 
owner cannot be traced, or is himself implicated in the giving of the advantage, the 
court shall order that the advantage should be forfeited to the government.184 This 
thesis argues that this is an extension of the principle that no one should benefit 
from the commission of a crime. No money or assets should be returned to a 
person who became a victim in the process of taking part in the commission of a 
crime. The operation of the law should not be in favour of offenders, nor should it 
result in the rewarding of offenders. 
In addition, the CP&EC provides that in cases where a person is convicted of 
property-related offences, the court should order the restoration of property to 
legitimate owners. These offences include theft and theft-related offences such as 
stealing, taking, obtaining, extorting, converting, or disposing of, or in knowingly 
receiving any property.185 Thus, the courts have the power to award, from time to 
time, writs of restitution in a summary manner.186 However, the CP&EC stresses 
that in cases where an offender obtained property by fraud or other wrongful 
means that do not amount to stealing, the property in such goods shall not vest in 
the original owner by reason only of the conviction of the offender.187 
In cases like these, prosecutors and courts ought to remember, at all times, to 
consider the interests of victims. Court cases should not end at imposing 
imprisonment sentences, but at making sure that victims are given back what was 
stolen from them. The definition of justice in such cases must be comprehensive, 
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that is, it must constitute punishing an offender and undoing the harm they 
occasioned on victims.  
This restitution principle is quite significant since it can guide courts and 
prosecutors on how to dispose of stolen property. It must be given back to 
legitimate owners. It should be noted, however, that in order for legitimate owners 
to receive their lost property in its full value, the relevant authorities have the task 
of tracing, preserving and managing the property until the disposal stage. 
Restitution cannot be possible if that which must be given back to its legitimate 
owner has dissipated or lost its value, as that would be tantamount to failure of 
justice.  
4.7.6 Transparency 
Since the social contract demands a government that is accountable to its people in 
all its actions, there is need for transparent administration of restrained or seized 
property, as recommended by the international legal framework on asset 
forfeiture. In Malawi, the AML Act obliges competent authorities that seize 
property suspected to be tainted property, to report to the FIU on a monthly basis 
on the status of all seized property.188 Such competent authorities include all 
relevant law enforcement agencies that have the mandate to search and seize 
suspicious property. These monthly reports could enhance transparency in the 
management of seized property, with the FIU acting on a supervisory role. It should 
be noted, however, thatthe other laws do not contain a similar provision on the 
monthly return of reports of seized property. Nevertheless, since the AML Act 
                                                          
188  Section 72(2) of the AML Act. 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
applies to all serious crimes whose investigation falls under the mandate of 
different law enforcement agencies, one can argue that  this transparency provision 
under the AML Act effectively covers all law enforcement authorities.  
4.8 Third party interests 
Malawi’s asset forfeiture regime can be deemed to be just and fair if the relevant 
laws are centred on the retributive principle which prohibits punishment of the 
innocent. The law on asset forfeiture must punish law breakers only, by targeting 
property of those who have broken the law. Usually, punishment of the innocent in 
asset forfeiture proceedings arises when the seized or confiscated property belongs 
to third parties who had nothing to do with any offence which tainted the property. 
To avoid the injustice of depriving innocent people of their property through 
forfeiture, the law in Malawi protects the interests of innocent third parties and 
bona fide purchasers in forfeitable property. 
4.8.1 Third party interests in seized property 
The AML Act allows any person who claims an interest in seized property to apply 
to court to have the property returned to him or her.189 The court will order the 
return of such seized property only if is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the 
possession of the property, and that the property is not tainted.190 However, as 
discussed in Chapter Three, third party claims ought to be approached with caution, 
knowing the possibility that offenders may hide tainted property by transferring it 
to third parties. Thus, the AML Act requires that before returning seized property to 
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a third party, the court must be satisfied that the person, whose conviction, 
charging or proposed charging formed basis for the seizure of the property, has no 
interest in the property.191 This law is aimed at stopping criminals from benefiting 
from sham contracts or agreements, where they transfer property to a third person 
as a way of distancing themselves and avoiding the forfeiture of their property. 
4.8.2 Third party interests in restrained property 
In relation to an application for restraining orders, the law has given the courts the 
discretion to require that a notice should be given to any person who, in the court’s 
opinion, might have an interest in the property.192 The AML Act, however, 
recognises that property owners may conceal or manipulate the targeted property 
once they become aware of an intended restraint through the service of a notice of 
the state’s intention to restrain property. As a result, the Act provides that notice 
should not be given to third parties if the court is of the opinion that giving such a 
notice before making the order would result in the disappearance, dissipation or 
reduction in value of the property.193 
In cases where a restraining order has already been made, a third party who has an 
interest in the property may apply to court for the review of the order.194 The court 
can either vary or revoke the restraining order, or it can subject the order to certain 
conditions as the court may deem fit.195 Before making its decision regarding the 
application for review, the court may require that notice be given to any person 
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who in the court’s opinion may have an interest in the same property.196 Similarly, 
the CPA allows people who are aggrieved by a directive in a restriction notice 
(referring to a restraining order) to apply to court for the reversal or variation of the 
order.197 Consequently, the court can confirm, reverse or vary any directive in the 
restriction notice. Further, the court can consent to the disposal or dealing of any 
property, subject to any terms and conditions it may set. 
However, the law envisages that property owners may collude with third parties to 
frustrate the ends of justice by selling or transferring targeted property to third 
parties. Thus, the AML ACT stipulates that any person who contravenes a 
restraining order by disposing of the restrained property is guilty of an offence and 
is liable to punishment upon conviction.198 Criminalising the contravention of a 
restraining order is, therefore, the best way of ensuring that targeted property is 
available for an eventual forfeiture order. Due to the possibility of a collusion 
between a property owner and a third party to contravene a restraining order, the 
law allows for the setting aside of any disposition deal between the two. The 
disposition can be set aside if there is proof that the buyer or recipient did not pay 
sufficient consideration for it, or had knowledge of the existence of the restraining 
order and the controversy around the property.199 Thus the law protects bona fide 
third parties only. 
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4.8.3 Third party interests in property liable to forfeiture 
Under the AML Act, third party interests are protected before and after the making 
of a confiscation order. Thus, where a person claims an interest in property before 
a forfeiture order is made, the court will make an order declaring the nature, extent 
and value of that person’s interest in the property.200 Examples of such property 
would be a house or vehicle co-owned by spouses, and only one of them has 
committed an offence and used the property as an instrumentality of crime. Before 
determining the extent and nature of a third party’s interest in the property, the 
court must be satisfied first, on the balance of probabilities, that the person was 
not in any way involved in the commission of the offence in question.201 The Penal 
Code also bars claims from people who knew or consented to have their property 
used in the commission of a crime.202 
Further, where the person acquired the interest during or after the commission of 
the offence, the court must be satisfied that he or she acquired the interest for 
sufficient consideration and without knowing that the property was not, at the time 
of its acquisition, property that was tainted property.203 This provision is 
commendable as it makes sure that only those who buy tainted property without 
knowing about its tainted nature are spared. It could have been a mistake to simply 
spare those who purchase property by paying sufficient consideration, since some 
can pay sufficient consideration while they are fully aware that the property they 
are purchasing is tainted. 
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4.8.4 Third party interests in forfeited property 
Under the AML Act, once a forfeiture order has been made, third parties are 
allowed to claim their interests in the forfeited property within twelve months from 
the date the order was made.204 A person is barred from making make such a claim, 
however, if he had knowledge of the state’s application for forfeiture before the 
order was made, or if they ever appeared at the hearing of a forfeiture 
application.205  
4.8.5 Third party interests in property subject to restitution 
Before ordering restitution, if evidence shows that an offender stole property and 
sold it to another person, and that money from the sale was found on him during 
his arrest, the court may, on the application of a purchaser, order that the 
purchaser be given back what he or she paid for the purchase.206 The court should 
order the return of the money only if evidence shows that at the time of the 
purchase, the purchaser had no knowledge that it was stolen.207 The amount of the 
returned money, however, should not exceed the amount of the proceeds of the 
sale. This provision ensures that there is no injustice occasioned on innocent 
purchasers, by helping them recover what they spent on the purchase of stolen 
property. 
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4.9 Institutional framework for money laundering and asset forfeiture 
The law would be of no effect if it is not coupled with enforcement. On top of 
setting up laws relating to money laundering and asset forfeiture, Malawi has 
designated relevant authorities to assist in the enforcement of these laws. These 
authorities collectively comprise Malawi’s institutional framework for the 
investigation and prosecution of offences, and for the recovery of illicit property. 
This is in line with the requirements set by the international anti-money laundering 
and asset recovery framework. Specifically, the FATF requires countries to put in 
place a strong law enforcement, prosecution and other competent authories 
pursuant to the FATF’s Recommendations 27, 28, 30 and 32. In Malawi such 
institutions include Financial Intelligents Units,208 as well as law enforcement and 
investigative authorities209 such as the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, the 
Malawi Police Service, the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Malawi Revenue 
Authority.  
4.9.1 Prosecutorial and investigative authorities 
The supreme authority to prosecute crimes vests in the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP). The DPP is responsible for the prosecution of all crimes against 
the laws of Malawi, pursuant to section 99 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Malawi (The Constitution)210 and section 76 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence 
Code (CP&EC).211 These provisions imply that the DPP is responsible for the 
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prosecution of all criminal cases in Malawi, including money laundering and all 
predicate offences that form the basis for the forfeiture of tainted property.  
The DPP can delegate his or her prosecutorial duties to any person working in the 
public service acting as the DPP’s subordinate, or other legally qualified persons on 
instructions from the DPP.212 The persons in the public service include lawyers and 
paralegals working in the DPP’s office, or officers working in specialised law 
enforcenemt institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Bureau and the Malawi 
Revenue Authority. Furthermore, persons in public service include prosecutors in 
the Malawi Police Service.213 The DPP appoints prosecutors or delegates 
prosecutorial power in writing, either generally or on a case by case basis.214 When 
the DPP appoints public officials or legal officers as prosecuters generally, it means 
that the appointees may, from the time of their appointment, prosecute any case at 
any time without specifically seeking consent from the DPP in each case they 
handle. However, when the DPP specifically appoints a prosecutor, it means the 
appointee has to seek consent to prosecute on a case by case basis.  
The second law enforcement authority under discussion is the Malawi Police 
Service (MPS), established under section 3 of the Police Act.215 It is headed by an 
Inspector General who is subject to the general directions of a Minister of Internal 
Affairs.216 The MPS is responsible for  the prevention, investigation and detection of 
crime, as well as the apprehension and prosecution of offenders, among other 
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functions.217 This means the MPS can investigate any crime against the laws of 
Malawi. Further, the MPS can prosecute offenders who violate the laws of Malawi, 
except for very serious cases which are prosecuted by officers of the DPP’s office.  
Even though the MPS is tasked generally with the prosecution of offenders, police 
prosecuters conduct prosecutions based on the general consent of the DPP, as 
stated earlier. It should be noted, however, that Malawi has not established a 
specific law enforcement agency for the investigation of money laundering. Given 
its general investigative powers, the MPS has the primary responsibility of 
investigating money laundering, fraud and other financial crimes such as theft by 
public officials, through its Fraud and Fiscal Unit.218  
Additionally, there is the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB). This is a specialised 
government department established under section 4 of the Corrupt Practices 
Act.219 It is headed by a Director, whose appointment and removal from office is 
done by the State President, subject  to the confirmation of Parliamentary 
Appointments Committee.220 The ACB is charged with the prevention, investigation 
and prosecution of corruption offences.221 Even though it is tasked with corruption 
offences, the ACB can investigate any offence under any written law of Malawi that 
is disclosed in the course of investigating any corruption offence under section 
10(e) of the CPA. The implication of this provision is that the ACB can also prosecute 
money laundering if its commission is disclosed during a bribery investigation. In 
agreeing with this implication, ACB authorities indicated that they intended to use 
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the AML Act to broaden their investigations in corruption cases by including the 
laundering of the proceeds of corruption.222  
Notably, prosecutors employed at the ACB are required to obtain consent from the 
DPP before they can institute prosecution proceedings for offences under the CPA, 
or any offence under any written law that is disclosed during a corruption 
investigation.223 Unlike the general consent given to police prosecutors, the ACB 
must seek consent from the DPP on a case by case basis. The DPP can either grant 
or refuse to grant such consent, but he or she must furnish the ACB Director with 
reasons for any such refusal.224 In addition, the DPP is mandated to inform the Legal 
Affairs Committee of his decision to refuse to grant prosecutorian consent.225 Thus, 
the ACB only exercises delegated prosecutorial powers over offences it is specially 
assigned to investigate, and whose commission it is specifically mandated to 
prevent.226  
Lastly, some prosecutorial and investigative authority vests in the Malawi Revenue 
Authority (MRA), established under section 3 of the Malawi Revenue Authority Act 
(MRA Act).227 This is a government agency responsible for the assessment, 
collection and receipt of specified revenue in Malawi.228 It is headed by a 
Commissioner General whose appointment and removal from office is done by a 
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Board of Directors, subject to the approval of the Minister of  Finance.229 Among 
other functions, the MRA is tasked with the administration and enforcement of 
certain laws such as the Customs and Excise Act, Taxation Act and the Value Added 
Tax Act.230 It is also mandated to counteract fraud and other forms of fiscal 
evasion.231 The investigation of tax fraud, tax evasion and other tax-related offences 
is done by MRA’s Tax Investigation Division (TID). 
In view of these foregoing, Malawi has put in place a comprehensive institutional 
framework to help with the prosecution and investigation of all crimes established 
under its laws. These institutions are tasked with the enforcement of the anti-
money laundering and asset forfeiture legal framework discussed earlier. However, 
establishing an institution is one thing, but ensuring the smooth operation of the 
institution is another. Therefore, thesis will proceed to assess the independence of 
these institutions, especially since the appointment of the heads of most of these 
institutions is done by a political figure, the State President. 
4.9.2 Financial Intelligence Unit 
Apart from the law enforcement institutions discussed above, Malawi has also put 
in place the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), an institution that is crucial in  the 
overall fight against money laundering. The FIU was established under Section 11 of 
the AML Act, and it became operational in July 2007. It is an autonomous central 
national agency, responsible for receiving, requesting, analysing and disseminating 
reports to competent authorities, in order to counter money laundering and 
                                                          
229  Section 17(1)&(5) of the MRA Act. 
230  Section 4(2)(a) of the MRA Act. 
231  Section 4(2)(d) of the MRA Act. 
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financing of terrorism.232 The FIU receives, analyses and assesses reports of 
suspicious transactions issued by financial institutions.233 If, upon the analysis and 
assessment of such reports,  the FIU determines that there is an element of money 
laundering or financing of terrorism in the case at hand, it is mandated to send a 
report in that regard to an appropriate law enforcement or supervisory authority.234 
In view of the nature of these functions, Malawi’s FIU is administrative in nature, 
since it neither investigates nor prosecutes money laundering or any related 
cases.235 
The FIU is supposed to be headed by a Director who is appointed by the President 
of the Republic of Malawi.236 The appointment, however, is subject to the approval 
of the Public Affairs Committee (PAC).237 The Director may be removed from office 
by the President on grounds of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence, but the 
removal is subject to the approval of the PAC.238 Unlike the independence issue 
raised in relation to the appointment and removal of the DPP, the independence of 
the Director of the FIU cannot be questioned in the same regard because the 
President is not left with the autonomous power to hire and fire. It should be 
noted, however, that since its establishment in 2007, the FIU has had only its first 
Director who was appointed in 2013. The first Director appointed by President 
Bingu wa Mutharika was not confirmed by the PAC.239 The rejection was on the 
                                                          
232  Section 11(1) of the AML Act. 
233  Section 11(2)(a) of the AML Act. 
234  Section 11(2)(b) of the AML Act. The authorities include the Fiscal and Fraud Unit of the 
Malawi Police, the ACB, MRA and Immigration Department. 
235  Section 11(2)(i) of the AML Act. 
236  Section 13(1) of the AML Act. 
237  Section 13(1) of the AML Act. 
238  Section 15(1) of the AML Act. 
239  Mutual Evaluation Report for Malawi (2008) Para 186. 
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ground that the appointee was not fit for the job, but the PAC did not give valid 
reasons in this respect.240 Until 2013, the FIU has been headed by an acting 
Director, who assumed all the powers of the Director. 
The FIU is percieved as the main driver behind the implementation of the anti-
money laundering regime in Malawi.241 Its central role can be appreciated from its 
multi-dimensional functions, which cut across the different participants in the anti-
money laundering field, such as financial institutions and law enforcement. An 
example of the relevance of the FIU in the anti-money laundering discourse is its 
involvement in the investigation of the recent embezzelement cases discussed 
earlier. In this respect, the FIU is not investigating per se since it is not mandated to 
do so.  Rather, the FIU is working in collaboration with the Reserve Bank in the 
analysis of various bank accounts in order to find out how the Government paid out 
huge sums of money to various companies that have been implicated in the 
embezzlement.242  
4.9.3 Operational independence of prosecuting authorities 
Based on the supreme prosecutorial powers which the DPP holds, the prosecution 
of money laundering and serious crimes and the subsequent confiscation of tainted 
property largely depends on the DPP’s smooth and unhindered exercise of his 
powers. One important aspect in this regard is the DPP’s independence to exercise 
his powers, which can be affected by his appointment into and removal from office.  
                                                          
240  Millennium Challenge Corporation (2008).  
241  Mutual Evaluation Report for Malawi (2008) Para 160. 
242  Matonga (2013). 
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The DPP is appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Public 
Appointments Committee (PAC), a committee which comprises members of 
parliament.243 Furthermore, the President has the power to remove the DPP from 
office, on grounds of incompetence; questionable impartiality in the exercise of his 
or her duties; incapacitation; or attainment of the prescribed retirement age.244 
Unlike the appointing powers, the President’s power to remove the DPP is not 
subject to the approval of PAC. This raises serious concerns about the DPP’s 
independence, as he may be subjected to political pressure or influence in fear of 
the President’s absolute power to remove him. One may argue, perhaps, that there 
is no need to be concerned because the Constitution stipulates grounds on which 
the President can remove the DPP from office, as stated earlier. However, the mere 
listing of grounds for dismissal in the Constitution is no guarantee of the tenure of 
the DPP, nor does it guarantee non-interference with the DPP’s independence.  
A practical example is the dismissal of a former DPP, Mr Ishamel Wadi, by the 
former President of Malawi, Professor Bingu wa Mutharika on 10 August 2006. Mr 
Wadi was dismissed before the expiry of his term of office.245 Even though the 
Constitution obliges the President to fire a DPP only on the stated grounds, the 
dismissal was not justified on any of these grounds.246 The dismissal followed the 
DPP’s decision to discontinue the prosecution of a case against the preceding 
President of Malawi, Dr Bakili Muluzi, who was facing corruption charges and the 
case was being handled by the ACB. The DPP made the decision to discontinue the 
                                                          
243  Section 101 of the Constitution. 
244  Section 102(2) of the Constitution. 
245  Tenthani (2006).  
246  Kanyongolo (2006: 90). 
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case on the eve of Muluzi’s trial.  The basis for his decision was that since the State 
President had fired the then ACB Director, the ACB had no power to prosecute the 
matter because only an ACB Director could prosecute such cases, according to the 
law.247  
However, Mutharika contended that Wadi’s decision to drop the charges had done 
the country more harm than he realised and further argued: 
“This withdrawal has destroyed my credibility as president against 
corruption but also the credibility of this country globally.”248 
Clearly, the personal reference made by the president in this statement had 
nothing to do with the grounds laid down in the Constitution. This speaks volumes 
about the genuineness of the dismissal.  
The independence of the ACB is debatable also, because of the requirement that 
the ACB Director must obtain from the DPP consent to prosecute cases it is 
mandated to investigate. Ideally, the ACB is supposed to be an independent 
government department, exercising its functions and powers independent of any 
direction or interference by any other person or authority.249 However, as already 
noted above, the ACB can prosecute only with the direction of another authority, 
the DPP. One may argue that there is no problem with this because the DPP is 
mandated to give reasons for the refusal of consent, hence his refusal is not 
arbitrary.  
                                                          
247  Pantesco (2006). 
248  Tenthani (2006). 
249  Section 4(3) of the CPA Act. 
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However, this thesis argues that there is still a challenge stemming from the fact 
that even though the DPP ought to give reasons for refusal of consent to both the 
ACB Director and the Legal Affairs Committee, this is of no consequence since it all 
ends with the DPP’s furnishing reasons for such refusal. The law as it stands today, 
provides no basis for the Legal Affairs Committee to question the DPP’s decision; or 
for the ACB Director to appeal against or seek a review of such a decision. The 
Constitution provides that the DPP shall be accountable to the Legal Affairs 
Committee for the exercise of his powers,250 but it is not known how the 
Committee deals with consent refusals.  There have been situations whereby the 
ACB has investigated cases and recommended them for prosecution, but few are 
prosecuted because the DPP refused to grant the necessary consent.251  
Another safeguard against complications brought about by consent-seeking by the 
ACB, is the provision that the ACB Director is entitled to commence prosecution as 
if he  or she had been given consent, if the DPP does not respond to an application 
for consent to prosecute within thirty days.252 Much as this provision gives the ACB 
Director authority to prosecute if the DPP does not respond to an application within 
30 days, it is submitted that this is not enough in addressing the ACB’s 
independence. The argument is that this provision only addresses delays of the DPP 
to give consent but it does not address the ACB’s independence as long as the DPP 
responds to consent applications within thirty days. Given this situation, the ACB’s 
independence remains shaky, as long as the prosecution of the cases it investigates 
depends on the consent of another authority, the DPP, whose decisions the ACB 
                                                          
250  Section 100(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
251  Kamanga (2007: 154). 
252  Section 42(3) of the CPA. 
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cannot question, and whose independence from political interference by the 
Executive branch of government is questionable also. 
All in all, despite the operational independence issues affecting the law 
enforcement institutions, the institutional framework is adequate for the 
combating of money laundering and the recovery of illicit property. What remains is 
evidence that the state, through these institutions, is geared towards crime 
preevention through the combating of money laundering and the recover of 
criminal proceeds.  
4.10 Conclusion 
Generally, Malawi meets the minimum international standards on the combating of 
money laundering and forfeiture of illicit property. Malawi has put in place the 
basic structure for a comprehensive legal and institutional framework for the 
combating of money laundering and confiscation of tainted property. The legal 
framework is centred on achieving a forfeiture regime that is fair and just, by 
excluding interests of innocent people from forfeiture, and also by providing for 
proportionate forfeiture orders. The wide range of forfeitable property ensures the 
maximisation of deterrence, as well as victim-compensation. 
However, the absence of a comprehensive civil forfeiture scheme is a significant 
oversight which needs immediate attention. It will be difficult to enhance 
deterrence or to compensate victims adequately, if the state fails to recover 
criminal proceeds through civil forfeiture. This oversight must be addressed as soon 
as possible. 
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In addition, Malawi needs to address the questions of the operational 
independence of its law enforcement authorities. The executive branch of the 
government ought to stick to the tenets of the social contract, by refraining from 
unduly influencing the operations of the law enforcement authorities. These 
authorities must be allowed to execute their powers and duties in the best interests 
of the people, not in the best interests of a few top government officials.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROVISIONAL ORDERS 
5.1 Introduction 
The implementation of laws relating to asset forfeiture in Malawi has been shaped 
by the legacy of the 1966 Forfeiture Act,1 which failed the constitutionality test at 
the advent of democracy. This chapter will analyse the implementation of the 
current laws relating to provisional orders in Malawi, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, while highlighting the influence that the repealed Forfeiture Act has had 
and continues to have, on the implementation of these laws. The discussion will 
confront the courts’ approach to the law on asset forfeiture, as well as the 
evolution of the jurisprudence on this subject. The discussion will highlight 
ultimately the human rights issues that arise in the asset forfeiture discourse, 
particularly in relation to provisional orders, and analyse how courts in Malawi 
approach and interpret them. 
5.2 The constitutionality question  
As stated in Chapter Two, the republican constitution comprises a legal framework 
of a social contract among members of a society.2 The state’s adherence to the 
limits set by the constitution becomes the benchmark for assessing the goodness of 
any law or state policy for the people. In addition, the legitimacy of government 
policy and authority derives from the people, through the constitution.3 Thus, the 
                                                          
1  Act No 1 of 1966. 
2  Norrie ( 1991: 226). 
3  Okoth-Ogendo (1991: 7). 
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topic on the constitutionality of state laws, policies and actions keeps resurfacing in 
modern day, even in issues of crime prevention measures, such as asset forfeiture 
and provisional orders. In Malawi, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. 
Hence, state laws, policies and actions are constantly tested against the tenets of 
the Malawi Constitution. 
The constitutionality test on asset forfeiture began with the repealed Forfeiture Act 
which was challenged at the advent of democracy in Malawi in the early 1990s. The 
Act was criticised mainly for its gross violation of the fundamental human rights of 
the people it targeted, due to its lack of due process safeguards during and after 
the ordering of forfeiture. Ironically, the constitution which existed before Malawi’s 
democracy, the 1966 Constitution, guaranteed the recognition of the sanctity of the 
personal liberties that were enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR).4 These include the right to own property and the right 
against the arbitrary deprivation of property.5  
The Malawi Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed, in the case of Tom Chakufwa 
Chihana v The Republic,6 that the UDHR was part of the laws of Malawi, and that 
the Court must be the protector of the fundamental human rights contained in the 
Declaration. However, those liberties and rights were subject to limits under the 
Malawian Constitution. The Constitution stated that rights could be limited only by 
a law that was reasonably required, in the interests of defence, public safety, public 
                                                          
4   Section 2(1)(iii) of the 1966 Constitution. UDHR was proclaimed by the United Nations 
General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948. 
5  Article 17(1) & (2) of the UDHR. 
6   MSCA Criminal Appeal Number 9 of 1992. 
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order, or the national economy.7 Public safety, public order and national economy 
also constituted grounds for ordering forfeiture under the Forfeiture Act. This begs 
the question: How could anyone question the constitutionality of the Forfeiture Act 
when the grounds for ordering forfeiture fell squarely within the constitutional 
limitation of rights and liberties?                                                                                          
There are two schools of thought regarding this question. The first school argues 
that the Forfeiture Act was constitutional in so far as it justified forfeiture on the 
grounds that justified the limitation of rights, as set out in Section 2(2) of the 
Constitution, i.e. that a person acted in a manner that was prejudicial to the safety 
or the economy of the state, or was subversive to the authority of the lawfully 
established government. The considerations of public safety and the economy of 
the nation as justification for forfeiture, therefore, according to this school of 
thought, put the Act in harmony with the text on constitutional limitations. This was 
the understanding of the High Court judges, Tambala and Msosa (as they were 
then), in Aboobaker & Another v Attorney General8 and Chaponda v Attorney 
General,9 respectively.  
These judges determined the constitutionality of the Act by looking at how it fits 
within the constitutional limitations. They said that the Forfeiture Act was not 
unconstitutional in as far as the circumstances under which property could be 
forfeited, were compatible with the proviso to Section 2(2) of the Constitution. This 
approach can be attributed to legal positivism, which concerns itself with what the 
                                                          
7  Section 2(2) of the 1966 Constitution. 
8   [1995] 1 MLR 1 (HC). 
9   [1997] 1 MLR 273 (HC). 
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law is, not what it ought to be. To a positivist, a law is valid because it was created 
or promulgated through the right processes or by the right authority, and not 
because it is just or reasonable.10 A piece of legislation, therefore, could be a valid 
law simply because it came into being by way of an acceptable process, regardless 
of whether its implementation yields unreasonableness and injustice.  
Contrariwise, the second school of thought determined the constitutionality of the 
Forfeiture Act on the basis of how its implementation contravened fundamental 
human rights, and yielded unreasonableness and injustice. This approach was 
propounded by some Judges of the High Court (as they were then), such as Justice 
Mwaungulu and Justice Kumitsonyo. Unlike the first school of thought, these judges 
considered the manner in which the Forfeiture Act was enforced, as well as the 
injustice it occasioned those against whom it was enforced. The judges did not 
focus on how consistent its text was with the Constitution. Justice Mwaungulu in 
American Stores Limited v Attorney General11 found that the Act was 
unconstitutional for unreasonably compromising human rights. In the same vein, 
Justice Kumitsonyo in Mohamed Sidik Aboobaker v Attorney General12 held that the 
Forfeiture Act’s violation of the rules of natural justice rendered it unconstitutional. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that Justice Msosa in the Chaponda case, upon 
giving a positivist evaluation of the Forfeiture Act, proceeded to determine the 
constitutionality of the Act using the second school of thought. Thus, she held that 
                                                          
10   Simons (2009: 147). 
11  Civil Cause No 173 of 1994 (Unreported). 
12  Civil Cause No 964 of 1994 (Unreported). See also Waka v Attorney General Civil Case No 
1855 of 1993, (Unreported); Gombera v Attorney General Civil Case No 1558 of 1993  
(unreported); Banda v Attorney  General Civil Case No 1727 of 1993 (unreported) and  
Khansia v Attorney General Civil Case No 33 of 1994 (Unreported). 
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ultimately, the Act was unconstitutional because its forfeiture procedures 
contravened fundamental human rights.  
In view of the two schools of thought, then, one may wonder as to what makes a 
particular law a good law, and what should be the basis for determining the validity 
of a law. Is it the compatibility of its text with constitutional provisions, or should 
one consider the effect that such a law has on its subjects? When assessing the 
validity of a law, legal positivism does not consider questions of human rights, 
fairness or justice. The theory focuses mainly on the ways in which such a law was 
created. Following positivist thinking, the Forfeiture Act would be a valid law 
regardless of the injustice it created, and that is why Justices Tambala and Msosa 
arrived at their conclusion that it was valid. Such an approach is blind to the gross 
injustices this law created for the people whose property had been forfeited 
arbitrarily, pursuant to the Act, as will be discussed later in the chapter.  
Taking a positivist approach presupposes that a government would pass a good law 
in the first place and hence there would be no need to worry about its fairness. 
Contrary to this assumption, Justice Mwaungulu, in American Stores Limited v 
Attorney General,13 said: 
“Constitutional governments, upholding the rule of law, democratic values 
and fundamental rights can pass laws that undermine fundamental human 
rights. What matters is existence of legal arrangements, as both 
Constitutions provide, for challenging the validity of such laws.”14 
Mwaungulu’s statement expresses the fear that governments, albeit constitutional 
and professing to uphold human rights, may resort to passing laws that undermine 
                                                          
13  Civil Cause No 173 of 1994 (Unreported). 
14  Civil Cause No 173 of 1994 (Unreported).  
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human rights and the ends of justice. Thus, applying the law as it is, regardless of its 
unreasonable and unjust consequences, would occasion great injustice for the 
people it is supposed to serve. Even Locke in his account of the social contract 
states that people give parliament the power to make laws that are just and in their 
interests only.15 The legislature must not act against the trust of the people, by 
refraining from making laws that limit the rights of the people arbitrarily.16 This 
underscores the point that a law is not valid merely because it has been passed by 
parliament. It is valid because it is just. 
Furthermore, Justice Mwaungulu commented that even though the Forfeiture Act 
was intended for the protection of the economy, it flouted basic human rights, and 
was not reasonably necessary for the protection of the economy. Consistency with 
the constitutional limitation clause is not only a function of the similarity of the 
text, but mainly, of the justice of results. This thesis, therefore, agrees with the 
approach taken by the second school of thought. Courts ought to determine the 
validity of a law by assessing the injustice it creates, and not by merely looking at 
how its text aligns with the text in the Constitution. 
5.3 Limitation of human rights under the 1994 Constitution 
The current Constitution allows for the limitation of certain human rights also. It 
states as follows: 
“No restrictions or limitations may be placed on the exercise of any rights 
and freedoms provided for in this Constitution other than those prescribed 
                                                          
15  Locke (1990: 189) XI.142. 
16  Locke (1990: 228) XIX.221. 
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by law, which are reasonable, recognized by international human rights 
standards and necessary in an open and democratic society.”17 
In cases where the restriction or limitation of rights is permissible, the laws 
prescribing such restrictions or limitations should not negate the essential content 
of the right or freedom in question.18  
Similarly, in the Canadian case of R v Oakes19 the Court in this case said that the 
limitation of the rights enshrined in the Canadian Charter had to be directed to the 
achievement of an objective of sufficient importance and there had to be 
proportionality between the limitation and such an objective. Proportionality 
according to the court in this case necessitated that first, the measures adopted 
must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be 
arbitrary, unfair or based on rational considerations. 
The Supreme Court of Malawi, in The Attorney General v Hon. Friday Jumbe & 
Another,20 deliberated on the meaning of the word ‘’necessary’’ contained in the 
Constitution of Malawi’s limitation clause. It held that: 
‘‘necessary would be that which is beyond mere convenience and should 
lend itself to that which is indispensable in order to achieve certain 
results.”21 
In relation to provisional orders, therefore, the issuing and continued enforcement 
of such orders should not be a function of mere convenience, as bemoaned by the 
Supreme Court. It should be indispensable to achieving the objectives of the asset 
forfeiture laws. This should be the standard when determining whether a particular 
                                                          
17  Section 44(1) of the Constitution.  
 
18  Section 44(2) of the Constitution. 
19  1987 LRC (Const.) 447 500. 
20  MSCA Constitutional Appeal No 29 of 2005 (Unreported). 
21  MSCA Constitutional Appeal No 29 of 2005 (Unreported) 5. (My emphasis on ‘necessary’). 
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order constitutes an unjustifiable limitation the right to property. As stated in 
Chapter Four, the state must plan before seeking any provisional orders, so as to 
determine if it is really necessary to get such orders.22 
5.4 Human rights contentions in relation to provisional orders 
Often times, asset forfeiture comes into conflict with human rights. Locke stated 
that the chief end of a civil government is the protection of the right to property, 
which comprises the right to liberty, life and estates.23 Thus, the need to respect 
fundamental rights is a standard requirement for sound policy making, and a 
structural issue of any given legal system. The implementation of the existing asset 
forfeiture laws in Malawi, particularly concerning provisional orders, continues to 
trigger human rights debates. 
 5.4.1 Right to property 
The 1966 Forfeiture Act was declared unconstitutional for its violation of the right 
to property, among other rights. The 1966 Constitution also provided that no 
person should be deprived of his property without payment of fair compensation, 
unless public interest required or justified such deprivation.24 As mentioned earlier, 
the UDHR guarantees the right to property and the right against arbitrary 
deprivation of property. This international legal instrument forms part of the laws 
of Malawi, and offers an extra basis for the recognition of the right to property in 
Malawi. 
                                                          
22  FATF Best Practices Paper on Confiscation (2012: 9). See also Greenberg  et al (2009: 86). 
23  Locke (1990: 180) IX.124. 
24  Section 2(1)(iv) of the 1966 Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
195 
 
It should be noted, however, that the 1966 Constitution guaranteed only the right 
against deprivation of property by expropriation, and not necessarily deprivation by 
forfeiture, because it talks about payment of compensation to those whose 
property has been expropriated, which does not happen in asset forfeiture. The 
Constitution did not provide for the right to property generally, as provided by the 
UDHR. Nevertheless, according to the Tom Chakufwa Chihana v The Republic25 case, 
the UDHR was law in Malawi, and therefore, the Malawi Government was under an 
obligation to protect all rights and liberties under the UNDHR, including the right to 
property. 
As mentioned above, the 1966 Constitution stated that the limitation of rights could 
be permissible only if the law which brings about such a limitation was necessary in 
the interests of defence, public safety, public order or the national economy. Thus, 
it begs to question if the limitation of the right to property under the Forfeiture Act 
is justifiable. The Act allowed the Minister to make a forfeiture order without giving 
reasons or grounds for ordering the forfeiture. This ministerial freedom constituted 
an arbitrary deprivation of property, since no one could appreciate the basis for the 
orders. In the Chaponda case, Justice Msosa found that the Act violated the right 
against arbitrary deprivation of property. She commented that the Government 
should be able to justify its actions, failing which it would be difficult for one to 
justify the ordering of forfeiture by the Minister.26 
Given the history of the repealed Forfeiture Act and how it violated the right to 
property, the current forfeiture laws often attract criticism for their potential to do 
                                                          
25  MSCA Criminal Appeal No 9 of 1992 (Unreported). 
26  Civil Cause No 616 of 1994 (Unreported). 
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the same. Provisional orders affect property rights because they result in the 
temporary deprivation of property that is or is suspected to be connected to 
criminal activity, as the case may be.  
The good news is that the current Constitution protects the right to property. It 
provides specifically that every person has the right to acquire property as well as 
the right against arbitrary deprivation of property.27 It should be noted, though, 
that the Constitution merely protects the right to acquire property and not the 
express right to own property, as provided for under the UNDHR.28 This protection 
is wanting, because forfeiture interferes with ownership and possession of property 
and not only its acquisition. The law limits the right to property right from the 
implementation of provisional orders up to the confiscation stage. 
However, Section 28(2) of the Constitution mitigates the inadequacy created by the 
right to acquire property, by providing against arbitrary deprivation of property. 
This provision, therefore, establishes a minimum protection of the right to peaceful 
possession, use and enjoyment of property.29 One can argue, however, that 
possession, use and enjoyment may not always presuppose ownership. Be that as it 
may, the protection against arbitrary deprivation of property guards implicitly 
against any unjustified interference with the ownership of property. 
 
The Supreme Court of Malawi in Attorney General v. The Malawi Congress Party & 
Others held that ‘‘to act arbitrarily’’ means ‘‘to act without any reasonable 
                                                          
27  Section 28 of the Constitution. 
28  Compare Section 28 (1) of the Constitution and Article 17(1) of the UNDHR. 
29  Chirwa (2011: 288). 
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cause’’.30 Thus, ideally, provisional orders must not be obtained or executed 
arbitrarily, lest they interfere unjustifiably with a person’s right to acquire and own 
property. However, this thesis contends that the right to property does not extend 
to the proceeds of crime, because an offender has no right to keep them.31 They 
must be confiscated, in line with the rationale that crime should not pay. 
The High Court, in the case of Atupele Properties Limited v Director of Anti-
Corruption Bureau32 stated that inherent in the right to property, is the right to 
dispose of property by way of sale or otherwise.33 Provisional measures, therefore, 
should not be obtained or executed in a manner which interferes with one’s right to 
sell or dispose of property unjustifiably.  
5.4.1.1 Right to property vs provisional orders 
The interference with the enjoyment of the right to property begins at the 
investigation stage, when the state obtains provisional orders such as seizure and 
freezing orders against suspect property. As stated earlier, these orders help to 
avoid the dissipation of property pending the conclusion of investigations, 
prosecution and subsequent forfeiture proceedings. Once provisional orders are 
made, the property owner has limited or restricted use of or access to his property, 
thus, limiting his full realisation of the right to property. In relation to the right to 
dispose of property, the existence of a provisional order implies that the property 
owner is enjoined from disposing of such property as he would wish.34 The 
                                                          
30  MSCA Civil Appeal No 22 of 1996.  
31  Godinho (2008: 331). 
32  Miscellaneous Civil Cause No 286 of 2005 (Unreported). 
33  Miscellaneous Civil Cause No 286 of 2005 (Unreported) 30.  
34  Atupele Properties Limited v Director of Anti-Corruption Bureau. See Chirwa (2011: 288). 
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discussion will proceed to assess if such a limitation or restriction is justifiable under 
the current Constitution. 
5.4.1.2 Limitation of the right to property 
The current Constitution permits the limitation of the right to property.35 However, 
the limitation should be prescribed by law, reasonable, recognised by international 
human rights standards and necessary in an open and democratic society.36 The 
restriction or limitation should not negate the essential and explicit elements of the 
right to property,37 which are the right to acquire property, as well as the right 
against arbitrary deprivation of property.38  
Greselder Jeffrey v Anti-Corruption Bureau39 is the case in point. In this case, the 
ACB obtained a seizure order and a freezing order against money belonging to the 
appellants. This occurred pursuant to Section 32(5) of the Corrupt Practices Act 
(CPA) of 1995, (now Session 23 of the current CPA of 2004). This provision 
authorises the ACB to seize or freeze any document or other records or evidence, or 
any property including the property which is alleged to constitute bribery. 
The appellants applied to the High Court for the variation of the seizure and 
freezing orders, but the court denied the application. Consequently, they lodged an 
appeal in the Supreme Court of Malawi. Among other issues, the appellants argued 
that Section 32(5) of the CPA, especially as regards the manner in which it may be 
interpreted and applied in a particular case, is capable of violating the right against 
                                                          
35  Section 44 of the Constitution. 
36  Section 44(2) of the Constitution.  
37  Section 44(3) of the Constitution. 
38  Chirwa (2011: 288). 
39  MSCA Civil Appeal No 12 of 2002 (Unreported). 
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arbitrary deprivation of property that is guaranteed under Section 28 of the 
Constitution.40 They submitted that the application of section 32(5) of the CPA 
violated the right to property. 
In opposition to the appeal, the respondent (ACB) argued that the right to property 
is subject to limitation under Section 44(2) of the Constitution. The appellants 
conceded that the right to property is indeed subject to limitation and that Section 
32(5) of the CPA restricts this right, but they were concerned that the manner in 
which this section may be interpreted and applied, could violate the right.41 The 
respondent then submitted, and the court agreed, that Section 32(5) of the CPA 
contains the best safeguards against abuse because every time a seizure order is 
required, it must be obtained from a court of law.42 This underscores the 
expectation that courts are there to safeguard the rights of property as much as 
possible when an application for a provisional order is before them; hence, there is 
no cause for concern. 
It is argued also that the limitation of the right to property should not impose 
unreasonable restriction on the freedom of property owners to dispose of their 
property.43 Atupele Properties Limited v Director of Anti-Corruption Bureau44 is the 
case in point. In this case, the ACB had issued a restriction notice, restraining the 
Land Registrar of the Minister of Lands from authorising the sale of Keza Building 
which was owned by Atupele Properties Limited, or otherwise dealing with any 
other matter relating to the building, without the consent of the Director of the 
                                                          
40  MSCA Criminal Appeal No 12 of 2002 (Unreported) 10. 
41  MSCA Criminal Appeal No 12 of 2002 (Unreported) 11. 
42  MSCA Criminal Appeal No 12 of 2002 (Unreported) 11. 
43  Chirwa (2011: 288). 
44  Miscellaneous Civil Cause Number 286 of 2005 (Unreported). 
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ACB. The intervention was to pave the way for the conclusion of corruption 
investigations against Dr Bakili Muluzi, who was at that time the chairman of the 
appellant, Atupele Properties Limited. This notice was issued pursuant to Section 
23(5) of the Corrupt Practices Act and its granting was triggered by the intention of 
Atupele Properties Limited to sell the Keza building while investigations against its 
chairman, Dr Bakili Muluzi, were still in progress.  
Atupele Properties Limited filed an application in the High Court for the reversal or 
variation of the directives contained in the restriction notice. The High Court 
vacated the restriction notice mainly on the basis of the delay on the part of the 
ACB to conclude investigations and commence criminal proceedings against Dr 
Bakili Muluzi. The court stated that such a delay violated some rights and 
constitutional values, and that the restriction notice in this particular case violated 
the right to property.  
The court also held that the applicant made the decision to dispose of Keza Building 
long before the restriction notice was issued, that the decision to sell was based 
exclusively on commercial considerations, and that the respondent frustrated the 
applicant by issuing the restriction notice. Therefore, in view of the delay in 
concluding investigations which necessitated the extension of the period for 
restraining the sale of Keza Building, the court held that the continued operation of 
the restriction notice could not be justified.45  
It is clear at this point that delays in concluding investigations and prosecutions, 
which then result in the extension of provisional orders, constitute an unjustified 
                                                          
45  Atupele Properties Limited v Director of ACB (Unreported) 31. 
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limitation of the right to property, rendering these measures unconstitutional. This 
thesis agrees with this reasoning by emphasising that provisional orders are not 
unconstitutional per se, but their unconstitutionality arises when their operation 
prolongs because of inordinate delays in concluding investigations or commencing 
criminal trials. When the state takes too long to conclude an investigation or a 
prosecution, the continued operation of provisional orders becomes a mere 
convenience to the state, which convenience was disapproved by the court in the 
case of The Attorney General v Hon. Friday Jumbe & Another.46 
In the case of Anti-Corruption Bureau v Amos Chinkhadze & Joe Kantema,47 Justice 
Tambala condemned delays in concluding investigations also. He said: 
“Delay in commencing criminal proceedings or pursuing such proceedings 
after they are commenced, amounts to conduct on the part of the Bureau 
which is oppressive, unfair and unjust. Issuing restriction orders and 
obtaining seizure and freezing orders, and sitting back thereafter, may 
produce results worse and more oppressive than the notorious forfeiture 
orders of the old times.”48   
The notorious forfeiture orders of the old times mentioned here are those 
emanating from the repealed Forfeiture Act. The court made reference to the 
repealed Forfeiture Act in order to emphasise the undesirability of implementing 
forfeiture laws in a manner that yields the same unfairness and injustice as did the 
Forfeiture Act.  
Inordinate delays ought to be minimised in a bid to mitigate the unjustified 
existence of provisional orders. The AML Act has set six months as the maximum 
life of a restraining order, though the period may be extended subject to the court’s 
                                                          
46  MSCA Constitutional Appeal No 29 of 2005. 
47  MSCA Criminal Appeal No 1 of 2003. 
48  MSCA Criminal Appeal No 1 of 2003 (Unreported) 5. 
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discretion.49 This is a laudable approach, as it limits the state’s powers of restricting 
property rights beyond justified and reasonable periods. The Supreme Court, too, 
has resorted to limiting the time within which the state should conclude its 
investigations or prosecution, or risk having the existing provisional orders vacated. 
In the case of Anti-Corruption Bureau v Amos Chinkhadze & Joe Kantema,50 Justice 
Tambala directed the ACB to make sure that the appeal it had commenced was 
heard within 30 days, failing which the respondents would have the liberty to apply 
that the restriction notice against their money be set aside.51  
The approach taken by the courts in the cases discussed above shows clearly that 
courts are there to enforce the trust relationship which exists between the 
government and its people, within the social contract.52 They are aware of their 
task to make sure that the state pursues its crime prevention policies without 
occasioning any injustice on the people through the violation of their right to 
property. If courts continue to take this approach, cases where people suffer 
injustice through provisional orders would be few and far between. 
5.4.2 Right to be heard 
Natural justice recognises the importance of giving people an opportunity to be 
heard before making a decision that would affect them. Decisions that are made 
without giving the affected people an opportunity to be heard would be arbitrary, 
contrary to the tenets of the social contract which disapproves of arbitrary 
government actions.  
                                                          
49  Section 86 of the AML Act. 
50  MSCA Criminal Appeal No 1 of 2003 (Unreported). 
51  MSCA Criminal Appeal No 1 of 2003 (Unreported) 5. 
52  Henkin (1987: 266). 
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The repealed Forfeiture Act was criticised also for its violation of the right to be 
heard which was guaranteed by the UDHR.53 The UDHR states that everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the 
determination of his rights and obligations. Given that forfeiture affects one’s right 
to property, there was need to give every person likely to be affected by a 
forfeiture order, an opportunity to be heard before his right to property was limited 
or forfeited.  
The manner in which forfeiture orders were made pursuant to the Forfeiture Act, 
denied property owners an opportunity to be heard. For instance, the government 
confiscated property belonging to a company called American Stores Limited, 
without giving reasons for the action and without giving the company an 
opportunity to answer any allegations on which the government based forfeiture 
decision. Consequently, at the advent of democracy in Malawi, the company 
instituted recovery proceedings against the government, in the case of American 
Stores Limited v The Attorney General.54 Commenting on the right to be heard, High 
Court Judge Mwaungulu (as he was then) said: 
‘‘the Forfeiture Act denied the victims of the Act the right to be heard on 
government action that was, to all fair minded people, coercive and 
oppressive.’’  
The plaintiff in Mohamed Sidik Aboobaker v Attorney General55 also faced forfeiture 
without being given an opportunity to be heard. Justice Kumitsonyo condemned 
the Forfeiture Act for denying people whose property was subject to forfeiture, the 
right to be heard. He argued that the Act contravened the UDHR, by allowing the 
                                                          
53  Article 10 of the UDHR. 
54  Civil Cause No 713 of 1994 (Unreported). 
55  Civil Cause No 964 of 1994 (Unreported). 
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state to deprive people of their property, using a procedure which allowed the 
Minister to issue a forfeiture order without giving reasons. Similarly, the High Court 
in the Chaponda case held that the Act was unconstitutional for its violation of the 
right to be heard. 
These three cases point to the court’s unanimous stand regarding the right to be 
heard. The importance of safeguarding this right when the state seeks to obtain 
provisional orders is vital, since it guards against arbitrary actions by the 
government and its agents. Further, safeguarding this right gives people an 
opportunity to defend their interests in the targeted property, before the making of 
a provisional order. Therefore, denying people the opportunity to defend their 
property rights during provisional order proceedings is as good as depriving them 
their right to property arbitrarily. 
Stressing the significance of the right to be heard, the court, in the case of Mbewe v 
Registered Trustees of Blantyre Adventist Hospital, said that: 
“the right to be heard carries with it a right of the accused person to know 
the case which is made against him. The accused must, thus, know what 
evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting 
him. He must then be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict them. 
The judge, or whoever has to adjudicate, must not hear or receive 
representations from one side behind the back of the other.”56 
Arguments pertaining to this right have arisen also in the recent cases in Malawi. In 
the case of Greselder Jeffrey v Anti-Corruption Bureau,57 the appellants claimed that 
the High Court dealt with the application for a seizure order as if it were a criminal 
matter instead of hearing it as a civil matter. They argued further that due to this 
                                                          
56  [1997]1 MLR 403 (Unreported) 415. 
57  MSCA Civil Appeal No 12 of 2012 (Unreported). 
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mistake by the High Court, they and certain third parties, who were affected by the 
seizure and freezing orders, were denied an opportunity to be heard before the 
orders were made.58 The court held that, contrary to the appellants’ contention, 
the application for a seizure order was civil in nature, even though it relates to a 
criminal investigation. Regarding the significance of the right to be heard, the court 
said: 
“The usual rule of natural justice is that where a decision will impose a 
penalty or will adversely affect another person’s right or freedom, the 
affected person must be given an opportunity to be heard before the 
decision is reached. It is immaterial whether the decision arises out of a 
criminal or civil matter.”59 
This was the court’s acknowledgment of the necessity of the right to be heard, both 
in criminal and civil matters. In emphasis, the court said that there is no rule of 
procedure which requires that when a matter is of a criminal nature, then the right 
to be heard, before a penalty is imposed, is forfeited.60 The recognition of this right 
becomes tricky, however, in ex parte applications for provisional orders, owing to 
the fact that such orders are obtained in order to prevent the dissipation of 
property, in anticipation of an eventual forfeiture order.61 Thus, it may not be 
feasible to give property owners an opportunity to be heard before the orders are 
made, owing to the urgency of the need to obtain the orders in a bid to prevent the 
dissipation or disposition of the property. 
The manner in which the state obtains provisional orders from courts has the 
potential of infringing on the property owner’s right to be heard. The court in 
                                                          
58  MSCA Civil Appeal No 12 of 2012 (Unreported) 3. 
59  Gresselder Jeffrey v Anti-Corruption Bureau MSCA Civil Appeal No 12 of 2002 
(Unreported) 4. 
60  Greselder Jeffrey v Anti-Corruption Bureau MSCA Civil Appeal No 12 of 2002 (Unreported) 4. 
61  Brun (2011: 76). 
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Greselder Jeffrey v Anti-Corruption Bureau62 acknowledged that in the first place, ex 
parte applications are made speedily so as to ensure that the suspect is not given 
an opportunity to remove, conceal or otherwise dissipate the assets before the 
chance for an inter partes hearing arises.63 The Court further said that often times, 
ex parte orders are obtained while investigations are in progress, and even before 
the investigators have obtained full knowledge of the assets that belong to a 
suspect.   
However, the interests of the people affected by an ex parte order are not ignored 
completely. Even though they are not heard during the ex parte application, their 
opportunity to be heard arises when they file an inter partes application to set aside 
or vary the order that was obtained ex parte.64 The court, in the same Greselder 
Jeffrey v Anti-Corruption Bureau65 case, stated that during such inter partes 
applications, both parties are heard and the opportunity to be heard for people 
that are affected by an ex parte order arises at this stage.66 The court held that the 
appellants in this case had been heard sufficiently when they presented a variety of 
arguments in support of their application to have the seizure and freezing orders 
set aside.67 The court added that, given that the appellants applied for the setting 
aside of the ex parte order two days after it was made, their opportunity to be 
heard had been interfered with only briefly.68  
                                                          
62  MSCA Civil Appeal No 12 of 2012 (Unreported). 
63  MSCA Civil Appeal No 12 of 2002 (Unreported) 5. 
64  Section 73 of the AML Act. 
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Some commentators have made similar arguments, to the effect that the 
deprivation of property occasioned by ex parte orders is only a temporary 
inconvenience that falls within the bounds of due process, and that this 
inconvenience can be remedied by subsequent inter partes proceedings where both 
parties are heard.69 These arguments are compelling, given that this is but a 
temporary limitation of the right to be heard, which is justified by the need to 
preserve the property which may be subject to forfeiture later. Thus, the time 
factor is of the essence in relation to the limitation of this right, as was established 
in the discussion on the limitation of the right to property. The longer the limitation 
lasts, the more unjust and arbitrary it becomes. The preservation of property which 
may be subject to forfeiture is of paramount importance in the implementation of 
anti-money laundering and asset forfeiture laws. The preservation is in the interests 
of justice, but only if provisional orders do not exist perpetually due to delays on 
the part of the state.  
It is commendable to notice that courts are vigilant in ensuring that the state does 
not limit the property rights of the people through provisional orders by denying 
them the right to be heard. In the case of Republic v Caroline Savala,70 the state had 
obtained one search and seizure warrant pursuant to the Criminal Procedure and 
Evidence Code71 and another one under the AML Act. However, the state did not 
serve the order obtained under the AML Act on the applicant, but chose to rely on 
it when the applicant applied to court for the return of the vehicle. The court 
condemned the state for its failure to serve the second ex parte seizure order on 
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the applicant. The court said that such failure denied the appellant an opportunity 
to apply for the variation or discharge of the order in an inter partes hearing, which 
is a point where affected people are accorded the chance to exercise one’s right to 
be heard after ex parte proceedings.  
The state argued that the order was valid, as long as it was granted properly by a 
magistrate, and that it was obtained according to the law. The court dismissed this 
argument, saying that whether the order was obtained properly or not was not the 
issue, because even a properly obtained order can be set aside, if rules of 
procedure were violated.72 The court’s approach in this respect is commendable, 
because it emphasises the point that courts should look beyond the legality of the 
process and basis for obtaining a provisional order. Instead, they should look also at 
the conduct of the state in relation to the issuing and execution of the order, and 
examine the fairness of such conduct on people who have interests in the property.  
5.4.3 Right to an effective remedy by a competent tribunal 
The UNDHR provides for the right to an effective remedy by competent national 
tribunals when there is a violation of fundamental human rights.73 This implies that 
a person whose rights have been violated should be able to seek recourse in a court 
or national tribunal. The Forfeiture Act was criticised for its violation of this right. 
This violation stemmed from section 7 of the Act, which read as follows:  
“No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie or be instituted, 
against any person or against the Government in respect of anything done 
or purported to be done under this Act.”74 
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In essence, section 7 implied that the Minister’s forfeiture order was final and could 
not be challenged at any forum. This was quite drastic given that the Minister was 
not obliged to furnish reasons for the forfeiture, leaving the subject of the order to 
speculate on the reasons that might have led to the making of the order. This is why 
the people who had been affected by the Forfeiture Act challenged it only at the 
advent of democracy in Malawi, when the democratic dispensation gave them a 
platform to seek redress for any injustice suffered due to government actions. 
In this respect, Justice Kumitsonyo, in the Mohammed Sidik case, criticised the 
Forfeiture Act because it denied its targets the opportunity to challenge forfeiture 
orders.75 The same conclusion was reached in the American Stores Limited case, as 
well as the Chaponda case. All these cases point to the undesirability of having a 
law which, in its application, limits the rights of people without giving them an 
opportunity to challenge it. The situation was even made worse by the fact that the 
affected people were denied an opportunity to be heard before the making of the 
order. 
Under the current democratic dispensation, the Constitution states that those 
whose rights and freedoms are violated by acts such as provisional orders, have a 
right to seek a legal remedy before the courts.76 In addition, the legal framework on 
asset forfeiture gives those who have been affected by provisional orders, an 
opportunity to seek before the courts of law, the reversal or variation of the 
orders.77  
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5.4.4 Right to engage in economic activity  
The right to engage in economic activity is guaranteed under Section 29 the Malawi 
Constitution, which also includes the right to work and to pursue a livelihood.78 
Economic activity is a broad concept which covers work, business ventures and 
enterprises, among others.79 The state has a duty not to interfere with people’s 
economic activities and the means by which they undertake those activities.80 
The right to economic activity becomes an issue when the right to use or deal with 
one’s property for business purposes, for example, is limited through provisional 
orders. Oftentimes, property owners argue that seizure and freezing orders infringe 
on their right to engage in economic activity, especially when the property in 
question is crucial to their business enterprises. For instance, in the case of 
Greselder Jeffrey v Anti-Corruption Bureau,81 the appellants argued that the seizure 
and freezing of their assets violated their right to economic activity because the 
orders affected their transportation business. The transportation business had 
nothing to do with the construction business which was at the centre of the fraud 
investigation against the appellants.82 
It should be noted that the AML Act guards against the destitution of people whose 
property is subject to restraining orders. Hence, it empowers courts to make a 
restraining order with a condition that part of the property should be made 
available to help a person to meet his reasonable living expenses, including 
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expenses of his dependants, as well as his business.83 This is one way of making 
sure that the pursuit of justice through provisional orders should not yield injustice 
on the part of those who are affected by the orders. 
In the same case of Greselder Jeffrey v Anti-Corruption Bureau,84 the appellants 
submitted that the provisional orders that were obtained by the ACB were limiting 
their means for meeting their general living expenses. In response to these 
arguments, the Supreme Court held that the CPA’s omission to allow for the release 
of funds out of the seized and frozen assets to meet general living expenses of a 
person against whom a seizure and freezing order has been made, infringes on the 
basic rights of that person.85 In this regard, the court stated that it would be 
acceptable for one to apply for the variation of a seizure and freezing order so as to 
enable him to meet his general living expenses. In this case, again, the issue of 
delays arose. The court noted particularly that criminal proceedings arising out of 
the CPA take an unduly long time before they are concluded. In disapproval, the 
court asked and stated as follows: 
“Should a person be driven into utter destitution and remain in that state 
for a long time before his fate is known? We believe that that would be 
unacceptable under the current human rights norms. The court would, 
therefore, be entitled to order the release of funds from the seized and 
frozen assets sufficient to meet the reasonable general expenses of the 
person against whom a seizure and freezing order has been made.”86 
In view of this observation, the court suggested that the release of such funds 
should occur at the time the seizure and freezing order is made or, preferably, 
following an application for the variation of such an order. The court’s reference to 
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the delays occasioned by the state suggests that the court was not against the 
temporary limitation of the right to economic activity or livelihood per se. The main 
problem is the state’s inordinate delays to conclude an investigation, while there 
exists a restraining order against property which constitutes the primary source of 
income for its owner. This cannot be justified, because it yields injustice on 
property owners. 
5.4.5 Presumption of innocence 
The right to be presumed innocent is a fair trial right and it is guaranteed by the 
Constitution.87 This right collides with provisional orders because they are enforced 
against or in relation to property which is merely suspected to be connected to a 
criminal offence. This means that a property owner, who in most cases is the 
suspect under investigation, has his use or enjoyment of his property limited 
through provisional orders, way before his culpability or the tainted nature of his 
property is determined by a court of law. 
Justice Manyungwa, in the case of Atupele Properties Limited v Director of the Anti-
Corruption Bureau,88 also raised a pertinent argument in relation to the 
consequences and effects of provisional orders on a property owner. He said: 
“We must always bear in mind the possibility of an acquittal and thereby 
vindicating the applicant, or in the worst scenario, the criminal 
investigations may not always yield into criminal prosecutions. What then? 
Has the respondent undertaken to pay any damages? In fact, it is in 
evidence that interest is accruing daily on the property. Should the applicant 
be made to suffer these when in law he is presumed innocent?.”89 
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Eventually, Justice Manyungwa found that the effects of the restriction notice in 
this case offended the right to be presumed innocent, especially since the 
respondent had taken too long to conclude investigations or to prefer charges 
against Dr Bakili Muluzi, the chairman of the applicant company.  
The questions raised by the judge in this case are indeed crucial to the conflict 
between the state’s interests to preserve property through provisional orders and 
the interests of property owners. The applicant company had interest accruing daily 
on the loans it took for the construction of the Keza Building, and the inordinate 
delay by the ACB would result invariably in further accumulation of interest due by 
the applicant to its debtors. Indeed, as Justice Manyungwa had asked, would the 
ACB pay damages in the event that Dr Bakili Muluzi was acquitted on the 
contemplated charges?  
The CPA Act, which the ACB used to charge Dr Bakili Muluzi, does not make 
provision for an undertaking by the ACB to pay damages in the event that a suspect, 
whose property was subject to provisional orders is acquitted. Nonetheless, the 
AML Act which was enacted after the CPA, finally has brought a solution to the 
concerns raised by Justice Manyungwa in this respect. It provides that before 
making a restraining order, the court may require the government to undertake 
that it would make payments for damages or costs, in relation to the making and 
execution of the order.90 This requirement would motivate law enforcement 
authorities to act speedily and treat restrained property with utmost care, so as to 
minimise damages the state might have to pay, in the event of an acquittal or an 
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order that the property be returned to owner. This provision also serves as a 
guarantee for the restoration of the original value of property to a property owner, 
who, at the time of the making of the restraining order, is presumed innocent. 
5.4.6 Right to legal representation 
Applications for provisional orders involve significant court processes, which 
necessitate legal representation for those who may be affected by such 
applications. The Constitution protects the right to legal representation. 
Specifically, section 42(1)(c) the Constitution guarantees the right of a person to 
consult a legal practitioner of their choice, or one who is provided by the state. A 
person is entitled to choose any legal practitioner, if they are going to shoulder the 
legal expenses. However, one’s choice of a legal practitioner is limited when legal 
representation is provided by the state.91 It should be noted that this limitation 
relates only to the choice of a legal practitioner, in the sense that one’s choice is 
limited to legal practitioners employed in the public service, at the Legal Aid 
Department of the Ministry of Justice. 
Courts have stressed the significance of this right. In Nkhata v State92 High Court 
Judge Tambala (as he was then) stated that, in the present age, there is no 
justification for any law which has the effect of depriving a person, who desires 
legal representation, the right to such representation. How does this right become 
an issue in the application for provisional orders? The case in point is that of 
Atupele Properties Limited vs The Director of Anti-corruption Bureau.93 Among other 
                                                          
91  Section 44(5) of the Constitution. 
92  [1993] 16(1) MLR 391 (HC) 393. 
93  Miscellaneous Civil Application No.286 of 2005 (Unreported). 
 
 
 
 
215 
 
grounds, the applicant argued that the restriction notice which was issued by the 
ACB, restraining the sale of the Keza office complex, limited the generation of 
income which was expected to derive from the sale of the complex. As a result, the 
applicant could not raise money to meet the legal expenses of the court case due to 
the restraint against the sale of the Keza complex.  
This case foregrounds the complex situation that arises when the property that is 
subject to a seizure or restraining order, is the very same property that serves as a 
source of income from which the suspect meets his expenses, including legal 
expenses. Does it mean that the state would have to provide a legal practitioner at 
its expense? Or should part of the property be given back to the person in order for 
him to raise money for such expenses? 
In the case of Greselder Jeffrey v Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Supreme Court 
observed that Section 32(5) of the CPA (now Section 23 of the CPA), does not allow 
for the release of funds from seized and frozen assets to meet the legal expenses of 
the person against whom a seizure and freezing order has been made. This, 
according to the court, is a serious omission which can affect negatively the basic 
rights of a person before he is tried and convicted of a crime. Consequently, the 
court said that: 
“We would find it unacceptable that such person should fail to obtain legal 
representation because all his assets have been seized and frozen before 
trial. The court would, therefore, be entitled in a proper case to order 
release of sufficient funds from the seized and frozen assets to meet his 
legal expenses.”94 
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The court suggested that the appropriate time to make an order for the release of 
such funds would be when the seizure and freezing order is made or varied. The 
AML Act reflects the court’s suggestion, as it provides that when making a 
restraining order, the court may make provision for meeting out of the property in 
question, reasonable legal expenses related to defending criminal charges or any 
proceedings relating to restraining orders.95 This provision, however, is subject to 
the court’s discretion as the circumstances of each case may dictate. It is 
commendable that the law actually makes room for such a possibility, in a bid to 
ensure that the interests of the state in obtaining restraining orders do not 
prejudice unnecessarily one’s right to legal representation.  
However, this may affect the amount of property that may be available for 
forfeiture, eventually. If a suspect is allowed to use part of their property to meet 
legal expenses, and in the end the court finds that the property is in fact illicit in 
nature, this thesis finds that this could amount to a situation where the law permits 
a suspect to benefit from crime. The same applies to allowing a person to use part 
of restrained property to meet their living expenses. This is one of the areas of the 
law on asset forfeiture, where a criminal would, in retrospect, be allowed to benefit 
from criminal proceeds. But due to the need to presume every property owner 
innocent until the court’s determination of their criminal behaviour or criminal 
nature of their property, such situations must be permitted, because they are what 
the interests of justice would demand. 
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5.4.7 Third party rights 
Every robust forfeiture regime must contain mechanisms for determining how 
forfeiture will affect third party interests.96 Provisional orders affect not only the 
interests of the people connected to the commission of an offence. They can affect 
also the property interests of innocent or bona fide third parties, who have nothing 
to do with the commission of the offence in question. 
In the Malawian context, the law provides for the protection of third party interests 
before or after provisional orders are made. However, the protection is available 
only to people who are not connected in any way to the commission of the crime to 
which the property relates.  
In relation to seizure orders, a third party may apply for the return of property, 
upon satisfying the court that he or she is entitled to possession of the property; 
that the property is not tainted property; and that the person who is connected to 
the commission of the criminal offence that formed basis for the seizure order, has 
no interest in the property.97 In relation to restraining orders, the court needs to be 
satisfied that the applicant is the rightful owner of the property, is innocent of any 
complicity in the commission of a serious crime, and that the property no longer 
will be required for the purposes of any investigation or as evidence in any 
proceedings.98 
These provisions of the AML Act have clarified circumstances where and when a 
third party can register and claim his or her interests in property that is subject to 
                                                          
96  Davis (2003: 185). 
97  Section 73 of the AML Act. 
98  Section 87(5) of the AML Act. 
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provisional measures. Courts have tackled third party rights and interests also. In 
Mohamed Munif Abdallah Al Nadhi v Anti-Corruption Bureau,99 the applicant 
applied that the Keza office complex, which he had bought from Atupele Properties 
Limited, be struck out of a seizure order which the ACB had obtained. The ACB had 
obtained the seizure of Keza complex as property that was believed to belong to a 
corruption suspect, Dr Bakili Muluzi. 
The Supreme Court varied the seizure order and struck the Keza property out of the 
list of the seized property. The court said it would be absurd, unreasonable and 
unfair to allow the seizure of the complex and the freezing of the income 
therefrom, when the complex was by then in the hands of the applicant. It further 
said that the seizure order penalised the applicant, a bona fide purchaser, who was 
not in any way involved in the commission of the crimes of which Dr Bakili Muluzi 
was accused.100  
Third party claims, however, are prone to abuse. However, the conditions that one 
must satisfy before the court orders the return or release of property, serve as a 
guard against the abuse of third party claims, which some may use to frustrate the 
ends of justice, in a bid to get away with tainted property. In the case of Greselder 
Jeffrey v Anti-Corruption Bureau,101 the appellants argued that the seizure and 
freezing orders obtained by the ACB had affected the rights of third parties who 
had not been given an opportunity to be heard.102 They claimed that some of the 
                                                          
99  MSCA Civil Appeal No 7 of 2010 (Unreported). 
100  MSCA Civil Appeal No 7 of 2010 (Unreported). 
101  MSCA Civil Appeal No 12 of 2012 (Unreported). 
102  Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No 12 of 2002 (Unreported) 6. 
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seized property belonged to third parties. In response to this argument, the court 
noted that the appellants had failed to disclose the identity of those third parties.  
The evidence brought by the ACB, by contrast, pointed to the fact that the 
respondents were in the habit of acquiring various properties using different 
names. However, title documents showed that the property that had been acquired 
thus, in fact belonged to the first appellant. Consequently, the court dismissed the 
third party claim, arguing that due to the evidence that the appellant acquired and 
held property using different names, it would be difficult for the court to believe 
that she did so in good faith.103 
This case exposes the risk that is posed by third party claims. If there are no proper 
checks, there is a high risk that suspects or those served with provisional orders 
may falsify title to property, claiming that it belongs to third parties, as can be 
appreciated from this case. Thus, courts and the state ought to be awake to such 
risks and approach third party claims with caution. If these claims go unchecked, 
they may frustrate the interests that a forfeiture regime seeks to serve which is the 
deterrence of economic crimes through the disgorgement of illicit property. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The international legal framework on asset forfeiture continues to be the standard-
setter for the development of Malawian jurisprudence and laws on the subject. Be 
that as it may, Malawi’s jurisprudence relating to asset forfeiture has been shaped 
and influenced greatly by the legacy of the repealed Forfeiture Act. An analysis of 
                                                          
103  MSCA Appeal No 12 of 2012 (Unreported) 16. 
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the case law pertaining to the constitutionality of the Forfeiture Act bears 
testament to the fact that the state has the potential of bringing injustice on its 
own people, if state authorities do not stick to the limits of the social contract. 
Bearing in mind the potential injustices which the state can perpetrate against its 
own citizenry through provisional orders, courts in Malawi desist from interpreting 
the current asset forfeiture laws in a manner that will cause Malawians to relive the 
oppressive experience of the Forfeiture Act era.  
The analysis of the case law relating to provisional orders has highlighted the 
courts’ stance in ensuring that the state does not pursue crime prevention by 
obtaining or enforcing provisional orders at the expense of the basic rights of 
property owners. This approach is commendable as it helps to avoid a positivist 
approach to asset forfeiture laws, which often closes its eyes to what is just and 
fair. Interests of the state in combating economic crimes and preserving property 
for eventual forfeiture orders must be balanced against interests of property 
owners. Only then can the state obtain provisional orders that are valid 
constitutionally, and exude justice.
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CHAPTER SIX 
IMPLEMENTING ASSET FORFEITURE IN MALAWI: EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 
6.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter has exposed how unwilling Malawian courts are to allow the 
state to implement the law on provisional orders in a manner that is oppressive and 
arbitrary, as was the case with the implementation of the Forfeiture Act of 1966. 
This chapter aims at deliberating on what would constitute a civil asset forfeiture 
regime that is just and acceptable within the current constitutional dispensation in 
Malawi and within John Locke’s idea of the social contract. The discussion dwells on 
the legal and philosophical principles that should guide the courts when making 
forfeiture orders. This will be achieved by drawing lessons from the English and 
South African jurisprudence on asset forfeiture, and by looking also at how their 
courts have analysed certain pertinent issues on the subject. The South African legal 
arrangements resemble those of other jurisdictions in Europe, such as the UK, in 
that both countries have civil forfeiture and criminal forfeiture.  
6.2 Asset forfeiture in South Africa 
The South African constitution, just like the Malawi Constitution, aims at creating a 
fair and just society, in which crime does not pay.1 South Africa, aims at the 
realisation of such a society thorough means of controlling and preventing criminal 
behaviour, such as asset forfeiture.  
                                                          
1   Basdeo (2013: 322). 
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Asset forfeiture was first introduced in South Africa in 1992, in the Drug and Drug 
Trafficking Act.2 This Act provided for conviction-based forfeiture of proceeds and 
instrumentalities of drug trafficking. However, Chapter 5 of the Act which provided 
for proceeds of drug trafficking was repealed by section 37 of the Proceeds of Crime 
Act3. This Act provided for conviction-based forfeiture of benefits derived from any 
offence. The Drug and Drug Trafficking Act, nevertheless, only retained provisions 
on the forfeiture of drug contraband and instrumentalities of drug trafficking. 
The current asset forfeiture regime is provided for extensively in the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the POCA). Chapter 5 
of POCA provides for conviction-based forfeiture of proceeds of unlawful activity. 
Chapter 6 of POCA provides for the civil forfeiture of both proceeds and 
instrumentalities of an offence, and this makes POCA the first South African law to 
provide for civil forfeiture.  
Emphasising on the deterrent aim of POCA, the Supreme Court of Appeal has held 
that 
“One should not lose sight of the fact that the purpose of the Act [POCA] is 
to divest criminals of the proceeds of their criminal activity and to prevent 
them from deriving benefit from such proceeds.”4 
The South African approach is to achieve deterrence through the removal of 
incentives for the commission of crime. Hence, it is argued that the success of POCA 
is not measured by the number of people that have been prosecuted and 
convicted, but by the number of people who have been deprived of unlawfully 
                                                          
2  No 140 of 1992. 
3  No 76 of 1996. 
4   ABSA Bank Ltd v Fraser and another 2006(2) SACR 158(SCA) Para 24. 
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obtained property.5 In the same manner, the measure of Malawi’s fight against 
economic crimes and money laundering should be measured by the number of 
people who have been deprived of illicit gains, because that is what the movement 
against money laundering is about. 
Since civil forfeiture was only introduced by POCA, South African courts were faced 
with a daunting task of giving form to the new law, despite its novel and complex 
nature.6 The courts in Malawi are facing a similar task at the moment, as they are in 
the process of giving form to the 2006 AML Act, the jurisprudence of which is yet to 
be developed. Notably, the development of the South African asset forfeiture 
jurisprudence has been shaped by the need to balance the public interest served by 
asset forfeiture with the private interests directly affected by it.7 Given the 
constitutional concerns which civil forfeiture gives rise to, especially with regard to 
the civil forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime, South African courts have been 
most active in developing jurisprudence on this aspect of asset forfeiture, by trying 
to make it justifiable constitutionally.8 Similar issues are bound to arise in the 
Malawian context, as can be appreciated already from the discussion on 
constitutional debates that have arisen with regard to the implementation of 
provisional measures in Chapter Five. 
                                                          
5  Mujuzi (2010: 3). 
6  Keightley (2009: 95) 
7  Keightley (2009 : 96). 
8  Keightley (2009: 97). 
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6.2.1 Criminal asset forfeiture 
The South African criminal asset forfeiture scheme is modelled on United States of 
America’s Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organisations Act (RICO)9 and the United 
Kingdom’s Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA)10.11 As it is the case with other countries, 
in South Africa too, criminal asset forfeiture is aimed at restoring the ex ante legal 
situation by depriving the offender of what is not legally his.12  
As it is the case in Malawi, there are three stages for criminal asset forfeiture in 
South Africa, namely; the restraint stage, confiscation stage and the realisation 
stage.13  
The law on asset forfeiture in Malawi does not specify the nature of criminal 
forfeiture proceedings. In South Africa, POCA indicates that proceedings for 
conviction-based forfeiture are civil not criminal in nature.14 Further, POCA 
stipulates that rules of evidence that are applicable to restraining orders and 
forfeiture orders are those that apply to civil proceedings.15 
6.2.2 Civil asset forfeiture 
As established in Chapter Four of this thesis, Malawi does not have a legal 
framework for civil recovery of illicit property. There is, therefore, need to amend 
the law to include civil asset forfeiture. This thesis suggests the adoption of a model 
                                                          
9  Came into force on 15 October 1970. 
10  Came into force on 24 July 2002. 
11  Basdeo (2013: 304). See also Constitutional Court’s comments in National Director of Public  
Prosecutions v Prophet 2003] 8 BCLR 906 (C) 914E-H; Pretorius et al (1998: 385-386), Willis J 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Cole and others [2004] 3 All SA 745 (W)  
752C-D. See also Redpath 2014. 
12  Basdeo (2014: 1061). 
13   Parts 3,2 and 4 of Chapter 5 of POCA, respectively. 
14  Section 13(1) of POCA. 
15  Section 13 (2) of POCA. 
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that is similar to that of the United Kingdom and South Africa. The United Kingdom 
(UK) uses civil forfeiture to recover criminal proceeds in the following situations: 
(a) Where a criminal investigation has been carried out but there is 
insufficient evidence to pursue criminal charges 
(b) Where a decision not to commence criminal proceedings has been 
made due to public interest criteria 
 (c)  Where confiscation proceedings have failed due to procedural faults 
 (d)  Where the defendant cannot be prosecuted because he is dead or  
  abroad, and there is no prospect of securing his extradiction, or that  
  the person has been convicted of an offence abroad but has  
  recoverable property in the UK. 
The UK civil recovery model is relevant for Malawi, because it allows for the 
forfeiture of not only proceeds of crime, but also of cash which is discovered by law 
enforcement authorities during searches, which cash is suspected to have been 
unlawfully obtained, or being intended to be used in the commission of an 
offence.16 If Malawi adopts this cash forfeiture model, it can be useful for Malawi to 
use in cases where the police find suspiciously huge sums of money on suspects, as 
was the case during the 2013 cashgate investigations.17 One such case is The 
Republic v Sithole18 where the Malawi Police investigators found in Mr Sithole’s 
house and cars, huge sums of money, that is; K11240000, US$31850 and 
                                                          
16  Section 240(1) of POCA. 
17  Huge sums of money was found hidden under beds and other places in the houses of civil 
servants suspected to have stolen public funds. See Tenthani (2014).  
18  Criminal Case No 908 of 2013. 
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ZAR122,200.00, suspected to be stolen or unlawfully obtained. He was prosecuted 
for money laundering, illegal possession of foreign currency and being found in 
possession of property suspected to be stolen and money laundering.19  
In South Africa, civil forfeiture is considered a useful crime prevention weapon 
because it enhances the power of the state to combat organised criminal activity, 
by making it easier for law enforcement authorities to take profit out of crime 
without being required to obtain the conviction of an offender.20 Civil asset 
forfeiture proceedings are civil in nature and the only applicable rules of evidence 
are those that apply to civil proceedings.21 The forfeiture process takes two stages, 
the preservation stage and the forfeiture stage. The preservation stage involves the 
granting of a preservation order by a court,22 while the forfeiture stage is marked by 
the granting of a final order by which property is forfeit to the state.23  
A constitutional challenge arises due to the framing of restraining orders in relation 
to conviction-based and non-conviction-based forfeiture under POCA. Section 26 of 
POCA allows the state to make an ex parte application for a restraining order. The 
court makes a provisional restraining order, and simultaneously grants a rule nisi 
calling upon the defendant to appear before court and show cause why the 
restraining order should not be made final. However, section 38 of POCA, which 
relates to a preventive order pending civil forfeiture proceedings, allows a court to 
make a final preservation order, upon an ex parte application by the state. The 
                                                          
19   Contrary to Regulation 25 of the Exchange Control Regulations; Section 329 of the  
Penal Code and Section 35(1)(b) of the AML Act respectively. 
20  Gupta (2002: 160). 
21  Section 37(1)&(2) of POCA. 
22  Section 38(1) of POCA. 
23  Section 50 of POCA. 
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court does not make a provisional restraining order, to allow interested parties to 
show cause why a final restraining order should not be made. This has given rise to 
a constitutional challenge, pertaining to the right of access to justice.24 Therefore, 
Malawi should take note of this oversight and make sure that the court makes a 
provisional restraining order, allowing interested parties to come forward and 
contest the making of a final restraining order. 
If none of the people who indicated their interest in the restrained property comes 
for the hearing of the forfeiture application, the state can apply for a default 
forfeiture order.25 Before the court grants the default order, it requires the state to 
show sufficient proof that all the interested parties had knowledge of the notices of 
the forfeiture hearing. Upon hearing the state, the court has the discretion to make 
the forfeiture order as prayed for by the state, make a forfeiture order as the court 
deems fit or refuse to make a forfeiture order.26 Requiring the state to give proof of 
service of notice of hearing on interested parties is one sure way of making sure 
that indeed they had notice but they opted not to appear.  
In the case of property belonging to a dead person, any notice in relation to the 
making of a preservation order or a forfeiture order should be directed at the 
executor of the person’s estate.27 This is as far as the state and the courts can go in 
ensuring that all interested parties are given a chance to contest the making of a 
forfeiture order. Malawi should also make sure of this, so as to avoid the injustice 
caused by the repealed Forfeiture Act which did not allow interested parties a 
                                                          
24  Section 34 of the Constitution. 
25   Section 53 of POCA. 
26   Section 53(a)(b)&(c) of POCA. 
27   Section 59(1) of POCA. 
 
 
 
 
228 
 
chance to contest the making of a forfeiture order, and neither was notice of the 
forfeiture given before the making of the order. 
In South Africa, Under POCA, provisional orders or civil forfeiture the orders can be 
made against property that the person held immediately before his or her death.28 
These orders may be made in respect of property which forms part of a deceased 
estate; and on evidence adduced concerning the activities of the deceased.29 
Disgorging illicit proceeds from a deceased estate enforces Robert Nozick’s justice 
in transfer principle which ensures that no one should transfer illegally acquired 
property to any person. Nozick’s justice in rectification principle ensures that 
through civil forfeiture, the state should trace and remove all unjustly acquired 
property which a deceased person transfers to his heirs through the rules of 
inheritance. Thus, civil forfeiture ensures that the rectification of injustice in 
acquisition or injustice in transfer should not be stopped by death. 
6.3 Instrumentality test 
Mere facilitation of a crime does not make property an instrumentality of crime. 
The debate about what constitutes an instrumentality of crime keeps surfacing in 
cases where the state applies for the forfeiture of property as an instrumentality of 
crime. 
In Malawi, the debate arose in the case of The Republic v Sithole.30 In this case, the 
state applied the forfeiture of a car that had been used to keep money suspected to 
be stolen or obtained unlawfully. The defendant, through his lawyer, argued that 
                                                          
28   Section 59(2) of POCA. 
29  Section 59(3)(a)&(b) of POCA. 
30  Criminal Case No 908 of 2013. 
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the court should consider the ordinary use of the car and ask whether putting 
money in the car was wrong in the first place. He submitted that cars and houses 
are normal places where money may be put.31 The court made a finding that the 
car was used in the commission of the offence of money laundering because it was 
used to facilitate the hiding of money which was stolen or unlawfully obtained.32 
The court opined that hiding suspect money in a car did not constitute ordinary use 
of the car, as claimed by the defendant. The court’s analysis did not go beyond the 
finding that the car was indeed used in the commission of money laundering. The 
following discussion will show that this analysis was not enough. 
To resolve the instrumentality question, South African courts have adopted what is 
called an instrumentality test, in order to determine whether property against 
which the state seeks its forfeiture is indeed an instrumentality of crime. Suffice to 
say that the POCA simply stipulates that the court shall order the forfeiture of 
property is it is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the property in question 
is an instrumentality of crime.33 It does not offer further guidance on the 
determination of an instrumentality. 
To start with, it is submitted that forfeiture should be ordered in cases where 
ordinary criminal law would not be sufficient to deal with the criminal. In this vein, 
the National Director of Public Prosecutions v Van Staden34 the court said that POCA 
exists to supplement criminal remedies in appropriate cases and not merely as a 
more convenient substitute, and it should be used only in cases where ‘detection 
                                                          
31  The Republic v Sithole Criminal Case No 908 of 2013 at 2. 
32  The Republic v Sithole Criminal Case No 908 of 2013 at 4. 
33  Section 50(1)(a) of POCA. 
34  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Van Staden and others  2007(1) SACR 338(SCA)  
Para 7. 
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and successful prosecution’ pose ‘particular difficulties.’35 The forfeiture must be 
necessary, and the court must be convinced that the instrumentality was critical to 
the commission of the offence. Further, in the case of National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Magdalena Elizabeth Parker36 suggested that it is necessary, when 
determining whether property is an instrumentality of crime, to look at the broader 
picture of instrumentality. The court ought to determine whether the property in 
question was a meaningful and substantial instrumentality in the commission of an 
offence.37 
Similar arguments were raised by the Supreme Court in National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others.38 The court said: 
‘‘words ‘concerned in the commission of an offence’ must…be interpreted 
so that the link between the crime committed and the property is 
reasonably direct and that the employment of the property must be 
functional to the commission of the crime…The property must play a 
reasonably direct role in the commission of the offence. In a real or 
substantial sense the property must facilitate or make possible the 
commission of the offence.’’39 
Thus, forfeiture should not lead to the forfeiture of property whose role in or utility 
to a crime is entirely incidental to its commission.40 If is merely incidental to the 
commission of a crime, it would be unfair and unjust, and this thesis rejects such 
forfeitures for they violate the tenets of justice within the social contract. An 
                                                          
35   National Director of Public Prosecutions v Van Staden and others 2007(1) SACR 338(SCA) 
Para 7. In this case, the National Director of Public Prosecution had sought to make a  
forfeiture order against a car that was being driven whilst the driver was under the  
influence of alcohol. 
36  SCA Case number 624/04. 
37  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Magdalena Elizabeth Parker SCA Case No  
624/04 17. 
38   2004 (2) SACR 208 (SCA). 
39  2004 (2) SACR 208 (SCA) Para 31. 
40  National Director of Public Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2004 (2) 
SACR 208(SCA) Para 12. 
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example of such incidental cases arose in the case of National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others41 the SCA had to determine, 
inter alia, where the court had to determine whether a hotel where drug deals 
frequently occurred was an instrumentality of an offence. In its interpretation of 
what constitutes an instrumentality of crime, the court said: 
“First, the purport of the statute itself suggests some restriction. The 
purpose of Chapter 6’s forfeiture provisions is signalled in the part of the 
Act’s Preamble that states that “no person should benefit from the fruits of 
unlawful activities, nor is any person entitled to use property for the 
commission of an offence”. The “use” of property “for” the commission of 
crime denotes a relationship of direct functionality between what is used 
and what is achieved.”42 
In its finding, the court held that the hotel did not constitute an instrumentality of 
crime, since the NDPP had failed to establish the required closer connection. 
Consequently, the forfeiture application was dismissed. In another similar case, 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Braun and Another,43 the court held that 
the fact that sexual offences involving minors were committed twice on residential 
property did not in itself make the property an instrumentality of an offence. The 
court reasoned further that “the fact that not the whole property was used for the 
commission of the offences, is significant and a consideration which militates 
against forfeiture.”44 
 
 
                                                          
41  2004 (2) SACR 208 (SCA). 
42   2004 (2) SACR 208 (SCA) Para 14. 
43 [2009] ZAWCHC 33 Para 52 and 62. 
44   National Director of Public Prosecutions v Braun and Another [2009] ZAWCHC 33 Para  61. 
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However, in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Prophet, the High Court, in 
finding a house to be forfeitable as an instrumentality, said that: 
“It was a place to store the chemicals, room on the property were being 
used to process, refrigerate and ‘synthesise’ these chemicals, into what on a 
balance of probabilities was methamphetamine. The property cannot be 
divorced from these acts, as it was an integral part, an instrumentality.”45 
On an appeal in the same case, the Supreme Court having found that property was 
adapted and equipped to manufacture drugs from chemical substances unlawfully, 
stated as follows: 
“Its use was deliberate and planned and important to the success of the 
illegal activities, which could not be conducted openly. So far as the spatial 
use of the house is concerned, almost the entire house was used either to 
store chemicals and equipment necessary for the manufacturing process or 
to manufacture scheduled substances and drugs particularly 
methamphetamine.”46 
To arrive at this determination, the Supreme Court had regard to the following 
factors: 
i. whether the use of the property in the offence was deliberate and planned 
or merely incidental and fortuitous 
ii. whether the property was important to the success of the illegal activity 
iii. the period for which the property was illegally used and the spatial extent of 
its use 
iv. whether its illegal use was an isolated event or had been repeated 
v. whether the purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using the property was to  
 carry out the offence 
                                                          
45  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Prophet 2003 (6) SA 154 (C); 
2003 (8) BCLR 906 (C) Para 27. 
46 Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (1) SA 38 (SCA) Para 29. 
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Going back to Malawi’s Sithole case, the instrumentality test would imply a survey 
on whether the money laundering offence could have been committed anyway, if it 
were not for that specific car. First, the use of the car was deliberate and planned, 
for the reason that a person does not incidentally or spontaneously stash huge 
sums of money into a car. The car was important to the hiding of the money, which 
was the essential element for the offence of money laundering. The car played a 
direct role in the laundering of the stolen money. Nevertheless, the hiding of this 
money could have happened anywhere, either in the defendant’s car (since this one 
belonged to his wife), or in his house. Thus, even though the car played an 
important role, the commission of the offence was not merely dependent on it.  
Further, there was no evidence to indicate whether hiding of money in this car was 
an isolated or repeated case. It may happen that the all the money was put in the 
car at once and this was the first time to hide money in the car. It was not proven 
also, whether the car was bought specifically for purposes of hiding illicit money. 
Applying the principle elucidated in the South African cases discussed above, the 
application for forfeiture of the car could not have passed the instrumentality test, 
and this thesis submits that the car in this case was not an instrumentality. 
6.4 Proportionality analysis 
 After determining that property is an instrumentality of crime, courts in South 
Africa embark on a proportionality analysis. It is not enough to establish that a 
specific object or property is an instrumentality of crime. The proportionality 
analysis allows the state to justify forfeiture measures without compromising the 
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legitimacy of a forfeiture regime.47 In addition, the analysis ensures that the state, 
in the pursuit of its asset recovery mission, does not confiscate the property of its 
people without sufficient justification.48  
The mixed theory of punishment which guides this thesis, disapproves of 
disproportional punishments. Thus, the courts should embark on a proportionality 
analysis, to find out if the forfeiture of the property could occasion a miscarriage of 
justice by being tantamount to unnecessarily harsh punishment. The analysis seeks 
to examine whether there exists a reasonable relationship between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realised.49 In all cases, forfeiture must not 
result into excessive punishment, as that would be against public interests and the 
limits of state power to punish offenders in proportion to their crimes. The need for 
a proportionality inquiry indicates that, “although the property may be found to 
have been an instrumentality of an offence and there are no third party interests 
involved, the court may decline to order it forfeit to the state on the sole ground 
that such an order would violate the principle of proportionality”.50 
6.4.1 Proportionality of instrumentalities forfeiture 
In advancement of the mixed theory of punished as proposed by John Locke, the 
South African framework for the forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime ensures 
that deterrence is achieved but only through forfeiture orders that are proportional 
to the offence. To this end, the court in Mohunram and another v National Director 
                                                          
47  Krane (2011: 171). 
48  Krane (2011: 170). 
49   Pretorius (1998: 418). 
50   Mujuzi (2010: 5). 
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of Public Prosecutions and another51 held that before making a forfeiture order, the 
court must consider whether three main requirements have been met: (1) whether 
the property in question was an instrumentality of an offence; (2) whether any 
interest (that is, a third party interest) should be excluded from the forfeiture 
order; and (3) whether the forfeiture sought would be disproportionate.52  
Furthermore, Mosesekene CJ in Mohunram and Another v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions and another53 said: 
“Proportionality is not a statutory requirement but an equitable 
requirement that has been developed by the courts to curb excesses of civil 
forfeiture. Put otherwise, the requirement of proportionality is a 
constitutional imperative. It is imposed not by the relevant statute [POCA] 
but by constitutional disdain for arbitrary dispossession of property and 
unwarranted or excessive punishment.”54 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd55 the Court 
underscored the significance of the proportionality test by stating that in post-
conviction forfeitures, the touchstone of the constitutional enquiry is the principle 
of proportionality. Thus, the amount or value of forfeited property must be 
compared to the gravity of the offence. If the amount is disproportional to the 
gravity of the offence, it is unconstitutional. 
In the same vein, in Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions,56 the 
Constitutional Court contended that once a court has determined that the property 
in question is an instrumentality, the next step is to embark on a proportionality 
                                                          
51  SACR 145(CC). 
52   Mohunram and another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and another  
(Law Review Project as amicus curiae) SACR 145(CC) 154. 
53   Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 4 SA 222 (CC) 237. 
54  Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 4 SA 222 (CC) 237. 
55  2002 4 All SA 692 (W) Para 29. 
56   [2006] ZACC 17. 
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enquiry. This involves weighing the severity of the interference with individual 
rights to property, against the extent to which the property was used for the 
purposes of the commission of an offence, while bearing in mind the nature of the 
offence.57  
In Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions58 Moseneke DCJ said: 
“Courts have correctly held all requests by State prosecutors for civil 
forfeiture to the standard of proportionality which amounts to no more 
than that the forfeiture should not constitute arbitrary deprivation of 
property or the kind of punishment not permitted by section 12(1)(e) of the 
Constitution.”59 
Thus, the ultimate purpose of the proportionality enquiry is to avoid arbitrary 
deprivation of property and to ameliorate the potentially unjust consequences that 
could follow if the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the offence.60 
In Malawi’s Sithole case, the court did not deliberate upon the proportionality of 
making a forfeiture order against the car that had been used as an instrumentality 
of money laundering. Even though the court found that the car was an 
instrumentality, it ought to have considered the proportionality of the forfeiture 
order. It ought to have weighed the severity of the order against nature of the 
offence. It ought to have considered also the extent to which the car had been used 
for the purposes of the commission of the offence of money laundering through 
                                                          
57   [2006] ZACC 17 Para 58. The court suggested that the following factors should be taken into 
account when assessing the proportionality of a forfeiture order: (a)whether the property is 
integral to the commission of the offence; (b)Whether the forfeiture would prevent the 
further commission of the crime and the social consequences of the offence; (c)Whether 
the innocent owner defence would be available to the owner; (d)The nature and use of the 
property; (e)The effect on the respondent of the forfeiture. 
58  [2007] ZACC 4; 2007 (4) SA 222 (CC); 2007 (6) BCLR 575 (CC).  
59   Para 121. 
60  Hilda Van Der Burg and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions  
2012 ZACC 12 at 24. 
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concealment of illicit money.61 The stolen money was a lot, and the gravity of the 
offence was big considering that the defendant was a public servant who had stolen 
public funds. Owing to the gravity of the offence and the effects of theft of public 
funds on the people of Malawi, the forfeiture of the car could have been justifiable 
and proportional by all standards, if it was truly an instrumentality of crime. Such 
forfeiture could not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of the car.  
Even though the court did not consider addressing the question of the 
proportionality of the forfeiture, this thesis suggests that courts should make the 
proportionality analysis an integral part of the forfeiture proceedings. Such analysis 
may enable them to refuse to grant a forfeiture order on the basis that the order 
would be disproportionate. Thus, a proportionality analysis is one way of ensuring 
that forfeiture of an instrumentality of crime, which in most cases is property that 
was legally acquired, does not amount to excessive punishments and arbitrary 
forfeitures, as was the case with the repealed Forfeiture Act. 
6.4.2 Proportionality of proceeds forfeiture 
In principle, it is less complicated to justify the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime 
or to require a convict to pay to the state an amount equivalent to what he or she 
benefited from an offence.62 Nevertheless, the forfeiture of proceeds of crime; be it 
through the criminal or civil avenue, must survive constitutional scrutiny and should 
not be arbitrary.63 Such arbitrariness may be due to forfeiture orders that are 
disproportional. Kruger has argued that the proportionality test should not apply to 
                                                          
61   Para 58. 
62  Basdeo (2014: 1060). 
63  Basdeo (2014:  1060). 
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the forfeiture of proceeds of crime in the same way that it applies to 
instrumentalities.64 The reason is that ordinarily, forfeiture of proceeds of crime 
would not be disproportionate because it relates to property which a defendant is 
not entitled to in the first place.65 Another argument is that since forfeiture of 
proceeds of crime is rationalised on the basis of restitution, there is neither a fine 
nor punishment, and therefore, the excessive fines or proportionality principles do 
not apply.66 To this end, it is argued that: 
“As a rule, forfeitures of criminal proceeds serve the nonpunitive ends of 
making restitution to the rightful owners and of compelling the surrender of 
property held without right of ownership. Most forfeiture of proceeds, as a 
consequence, are not fines at all, let alone excessive fines.”67 
The non-excessiveness of the forfeiture of proceeds of crime is true, only if what is 
forfeited is the value of criminal proceeds, and nothing more. The proportionality 
principle would demand the forfeiture of property which represents criminal 
proceeds only. It is the forfeiture of any property which is beyond the value of 
criminal proceeds that would be disproportionate, and therefore, arbitrary. Going 
by Nozick’s rectification of injustice theory, the injustice of acquiring property 
through crime should be corrected only to the extent which disgorges the value of 
property that was acquired unjustly. 
Thus, courts must embark on a proportionality analysis, which may in some cases 
lead to a refusal to order the forfeiture of some of the items claimed by the state. 
The court can refuse to grant forfeiture orders if it is not satisfied that the some of 
the items listed by the state are also part of the criminal proceeds, or if it thinks 
                                                          
64   Kruger (2008: 118). 
65   Kruger (2008: 118). 
66  Gupta (2002: 167). 
67  Bakajahian 524 US 349-350. 
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that the value of all criminal proceeds will be realised without the forfeiture of such 
items. 
The proportionality principle is already embedded in the law of Malawi and South 
Africa, which stipulate clearly that the state should seek the forfeiture of proceeds 
of crime.68 Thus, in adherence to the proportionality principle, courts must order 
the forfeiture of proceeds of crime, or any lawfully acquired property only up to the 
corresponding value of the criminal proceeds.  
In reference to the case of The Republic v Sithole,69 apart from seeking the 
forfeiture of the huge sums of money which the police found in and seized from the 
defendant’s car, the state sought the forfeiture of K750000.00 which the defendant 
had paid for house rentals, on the basis that it was unlawfully obtained money. 
Further, the state sought the forfeiture of K1400000.00 which the suspect had used 
to pay certain boys to buy farm produce for him, on the same basis. However, the 
state dropped the K750000.00 and K140000.00 from the application, on the basis 
that the defendant could not be identified easily. This speaks volumes about the 
ability of investigators to trace property which could have assisted in the realisation 
of the value of this money. Perhaps, the state should have considered applying for a 
pecuniary order against the defendant since the forfeiture proceedings were in 
personam. Failure to satisfy the pecuniary order ought to have been treated as 
failure to satisfy a fine, and that could have necessitated the imposition of an 
                                                          
68   See definition of proceeds of crime under POCA and Malawi’s AML Act. 
69   Criminal Case No 908 of 2013. 
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imprisonment term instead, which was to run consecutively to the imprisonment 
terms he had been slapped with already.70 
The need for a proportionality analysis in the determination of the value of 
proceeds of crime that must be targeted applies to the case of Tressa Namathanga 
Senzani v Republic.71 In this case, Tressa Namathanga Senzani was convicted of the 
theft of K630000.00 which she had stolen from the public coffers in her capacity as 
a principal secretary to the Minister of Tourism. She was also convicted of the 
laundering of the stolen money. She was awarding fake contracts to her company 
and getting payment for services that were never delivered to the government. The 
court, in its ruling on sentence, did not make a forfeiture order because the convict 
had already returned the money she had stolen, at the beginning of the criminal 
trial.72  
However, this thesis contends that the prosecution and the state must not only 
focus on recovering the actual amount or actual value of the tainted assets. They 
must seek further the forfeiture of any interest, income or profit a person has made 
from the illicit assets, because that is what the international legal framework as well 
as the domestic law requires. Merely stopping at the actual stolen amount limits 
the reach of Nozick’s justice in rectification, since an offender would be left to enjoy 
the profit, income or interest made from the illicit assets.  
Nevertheless, in the present case, the court ordered the forfeiture of all the money 
that was in the bank account of the company which the convict was using to steal 
                                                          
70   The defendant was sentenced to serve a jail term of 9 years with hard labour. 
71   High Court Criminal Case No 63 of 2013. 
72   Tressa Namathanga Senzani v Republic High Court Criminal Case No 63 of 2013 38. 
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public funds. The basis for the forfeiture of the rest of the money, the court 
reasoned, was that the remaining money had been tainted by virtue of it being 
mixed with the stolen money. This, however, does not address the concern raised 
above in relation to the forfeiture of interests or profits, because there was no 
assessment of such interests or profits. It could be that the total value of profits the 
convict made from the theft of the K63000000.00 was more than the money that 
was still in her business’ account. After all, the profits may not necessarily be placed 
in the same account. They might have been used to purchase certain property or to 
finance other businesses.  
Thus, this case serves as an example of the possible oversights courts and the 
prosecution may make in the determination of what constitutes proceeds of crime 
and what proportionality should mean in relation to criminal proceeds. 
A good approach has been evidenced in the case of The Republic v Maxwell Namata 
and Luke Kasamba in which the convicts had restored K24,179120.79, being stolen 
and laundered public funds. Unlike the Tressa Namathanga Senzani v Republic,73 in 
this case the court did not stop at the restitution. The court reckoned that 
restitution of stolen money simply means the return of the principal amount. The 
spirit of the anti-money laundering regime, however, seeks the forfeiture of any 
proceeds made by the offenders from the principal amount. The court stressed that 
allowing offenders to merely restore what they stole but permitting them to keep 
any proceeds that derive from the stolen money would be as if the government is 
running “an interest-free loan scheme”, where a person is allowed to steal money, 
                                                          
73   High Court Criminal Case No 63 of 2013. 
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make profit from it and then return what was stolen.74 Thus, the court welcomed 
the state to make an application for the forfeiture of any property the state deems 
to be proceeds of the stolen money. The court’s reasoning in this case reflects what 
the anti-money laundering regime is all about. Restitution of the direct proceeds of 
crime is not enough. Courts and the prosecution must always think outside the box 
by being awake to the possibility that an offender might have made some profit, 
income or interest out of the direct proceeds of crime. Rectification of the injustice 
in the acquisition of such profit, income or interest must be pursued vigorously, 
making sure that crime does not pay the offender in any possible way. This is how 
courts arrive at making a forfeiture order of proceeds of crime that is proportional 
to the crime, meaning, proportional to every illicit gain. 
6.4.3 Making a forfeiture order in addition to any punishment 
Since the focus of asset forfeiture is the removal of property from a wrongdoer, a 
confiscation order should be ordered in addition to any punishment the court may 
impose for any given offence.75 In both the Senzani and Sithole cases discussed 
above, the courts imposed imprisonment sentences in addition to the forfeiture 
orders.76 This approach would not occasion any failure of justice, as long as the 
courts apply the proportionality analysis in all cases. 
                                                          
74   The Republic v Maxwell Namata v Luke Kasamba Criminal Case No 45 of 2013. 
75   Section 18(1) of POCA. 
76   Namata was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment for theft and 3 years imprisonment for 
money laundering, to run concurrently. Sithole was sentenced to I year imprisonment for  
being found in possession of foreign currency, 1 year imprisonment for being found in  
possession of property suspected to be stolen or unlawfully obtained, and 7 years  
imprisonment for money laundering, all to run concurrently. 
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6.4.4 Onus to prove proportionality 
The proportionality assessment is a legal one and thus, the onus rests on the state 
to establish the proportionality of forfeiture that it seeks in each case.77 Thus, the 
state must make sure that the items it includes in the application for a forfeiture 
order adhere to the proportionality principle by including only items that are 
necessary to disgorge illicit gain, and nothing more.  
6.4.5 Factors to consider when making a forfeiture order of instrumentalities of 
crime 
Forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime constitutes punishment. It is punishment for 
one’s misuse of property, or allowing property to facilitate the commission of 
crime. In National Director of Public Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd78 
the court reiterated this point by stressing that POCA requires property owners to 
exercise responsibility for their property and to account for their stewardship of it 
in relation to its possible criminal utilisation. However, property owners may have 
different reasons showing that even though they were negligent in handling their 
property, there are certain factors that militate against the forfeiture of their 
property.  
6.4.5.1 Degree of culpability  
In trying to answer the question of proportionality, it is prudent for courts to take 
into account personal mitigating and aggravating factors before making a forfeiture 
order. Generally, courts should consider the degree of culpability, and personal 
circumstances, before they make an order for the forfeiture of instrumentalities. In 
                                                          
77  Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (2) SACR 145 (CC). 
78  2002 4 All SA 692 (W) Para 29. 
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National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Vermaak79 the Supreme Court 
of Appeal opined that the more one commits an offence in the course of a broad 
and protracted enterprise of criminal activity, the more appropriate a forfeiture 
order would be.80 
This is a valid factor to consider since it indicates the established plan to use the 
property in the repeated commission of offences. Repeated offending shows 
impunity, and such offenders should not be allowed to continue offending. One 
way of stopping them is by removing the property which offers them the 
convenience of repeating the commission of offences. It would not be arbitrary nor 
disproportionate to deprive such people of the property which they use in the 
commission of offences. 
6.4.5.2 Frequent use of property in the commission of a crime 
Apart from repeated offending, another related factor for the courts to consider is 
the repeated use of property in the commission of a crime. In the case of National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Constable,81 two immovable properties were 
forfeited to the state because they were found to be instrumentalities of drug 
dealing. When assessing the proportionality of the forfeiture of the properties, 
Davis J stated as follows: 
“In my view, when properties are used this consistently for nothing more 
than drug houses, there is no disproportionality when these particular 
properties are forfeited, particularly if regard is had to the socio-economic 
costs of drug-related offences in this country, particularly in this part of 
South Africa and especially given the pernicious influence which organised 
                                                          
79   [2007] SCA 150. 
80  National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others v Vermaak [2007] SCA 150 Para 11-3. 
81  CPD, Case No 5147/2004 delivered on 2006-02-28 (Unreported). 
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drug-dealing have had on the social fabric of the society, particularly in 
disadvantaged communities.”82 
The repeated use the property in the commission of a crime that has adverse 
effects on society justified the forfeiture. The use of the property in this case was 
not incidental. Even John Locke justifies the forfeiture of anything that is noxious to 
society.83 
Similarly, in the case of Hilda Van Der Burg and Another v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions,84 the forfeiture of the appellant’s house was not a top up to other 
criminal penalties. It was a last resort to stop the appellants’ continued sale of 
liquor without a licence, which they did not stop selling even after warnings, seizure 
of liquor, admissions of guilt and preservation orders were executed on the 
appellants. The continued offending showed that to the appellants, crime pays. This 
justified the need to put a stop to their unlawful behaviour by taking away the 
instrument used in its commission.85 This, the court said, is not an abuse of POCA or 
the criminal justice system, and it does not offend the Constitution.86 
6.4.5.3 Welfare of children 
The courts should also go as far as considering domestic circumstances of the 
property owner before ordering the forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime. In Hilda 
Van der Burg and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions,87 the 
Constitutional Court upheld a forfeiture order made against the appellant’s house 
as an instrumentality for selling liquor without a licence, contrary to section 
                                                          
82  Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (1) SA 38 (SCA) Para 27. 
83   Locke (1990: 121) II.8. 
84   [2012] ZACC 12. 
85  Hilda Van Der Burg v National Director  of Public Prosecutions [2012] ZACC 12 at 25. 
86  Hilda Van Der Burg V NDPP [2012] ZACC 12 at 25. 
87  [2012] ZACC 12. 
 
 
 
 
246 
 
154(1)(a) of the Liquor Act. The appellants challenged the forfeiture, inter alia, on 
the ground that the order was not proportionate, and it would leave them and their 
little children homeless.  
The Centre for Child Law joined the case as amicus curiae, submitting that the 
Constitution obliges a court to consider the best interests of the applicants’ children 
before a final determination can be made on the forfeiture. Thus the amicus 
requested the Court to appoint a curator ad litem to prepare a report concerning 
the impact the forfeiture would have on the applicants’ children. This argument 
was based on section 28(2) of the Constitution which provides that “[a] child’s best 
interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.” The 
amicus also stressed the importance of the children’s rights to family or parental 
care and to basic shelter, pursuant to section 28(1) of the Constitution.88 
In its determination, the Constitutional Court stated that even though the 
proportionality requirement is aimed at balancing the constitutional imperative of 
law enforcement and combating crime and the seriousness of the offence, against 
the right not to be deprived arbitrarily of property, the possible homelessness of 
the applicants and their children was a relevant factor, which may not be 
overlooked. For the purposes of forfeiture, it makes a difference whether the 
                                                          
88  Section 47(1) of the Children’s Act states: ‘’If it appears to any court in the course of  
proceedings that a child involved in or affected by those proceedings is in need of care and 
protection as is contemplated in section 150(3) the court must order that the question 
whether the child is in need of care and protection be referred to a designated social  
worker for an investigation contemplated in section 155(2).” 
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property instrumental in crime is for example an uninhabited factory building, or a 
home.89 
The court stated further that law enforcement must always be child-sensitive and 
courts must at all times show due regard for children’s rights.90 The court asked 
whether the interests of children should be part of a proportionality enquiry. It is 
the duty of the court to consider the specific interests of children, and the NDPP, as 
officers of the court, must assist the court in this exercise even if parents of the 
children do not raise it.91 The High Court considered the children’s interests when 
the granting of the forfeiture order. However, the High Court concluded that the 
forfeiture order would not render the children homeless because their parents had 
a fruit and vegetable business, which would enable them to find alternative 
accommodation.92 This means that had the court found the likelihood that the 
children could have been rendered homeless, it could have declined to make the 
forfeiture order. 
In addition, in the case of Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions,93 the 
Court considered the fact that though unemployed, the applicant was receiving 
rentals from immovable property owned by his father, and that the forfeiture 
would therefore not leave him destitute.94 This means that the court could have 
refrained from making a forfeiture order had it found that the order was going to 
render him destitute. 
                                                          
89  Hilda Van Der Burg v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] ZACC 29 Para 58. 
90  Hilda Van Der Burg v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] ZACC 31 para 62. 
91  Hilda Van Der Burg v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] ZACC 34 Para 68. 
92  Hilda Van Der Burg v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] ZACC 39 Para 80. 
93   2006 (1) SA 38 (SCA). 
94  Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 (1) SA 38 (SCA) Paras 38-40. 
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The consideration of all these and many other personal factors is relevant and 
important in making sure that the forfeiture orders do not occasion a miscarriage of 
justice. It is acceptable for courts to accept mitigating factors when making 
forfeiture orders of instrumentalities of crime, for the same reasons that justify the 
consideration of mitigating factors in a criminal trial’s sentencing stage. Forfeiting 
an instrumentality of crime merely because it has connection to the commission of 
crime would render the modern day forfeiture laws draconian, as was the case in 
the old days when every instrumentality was subject to forfeiture for its mere 
connection to the commission of crime. The current societies that are built based 
on constitutional constraints would disapprove and reject any draconian, 
oppressive and disproportionate forfeiture.  
6.4.5.4 Other factors in the determination of sentence in Malawi 
In Malawi, too, courts are encouraged to take into account a number of factors 
before meting out punishment.95 Hence, the call to consider the proportionality of 
the forfeiture orders among other mitigating and aggravating factors will not be an 
alien principle at all. For instant, in Ayami v Republic96 the Supreme Court stated 
that when considering the appropriate sentence to impose in each case, it is 
imperative to evaluate the extent of the crime, its impact on victims; and the 
circumstances in which it was committed. Further, on proportionality, the court 
stated that the question is not whether the sentence is manifestly excessive on its 
own, but what the court is legally entitled to pass.97 The court will be ordered to 
                                                          
95   Section 321(j) of the CP&EC. Factors such as the impact of the offence on victims and 
gravity of the offence. 
96    1990 13 MLR 19 (SCA). 
97   Ayami v Republic 1990 13 MLR 19 (SCA). 
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order forfeiture when it is appropriate to do so, depending on circumstances of 
each case. 
In the case of Tressa Namathanga Senzani v Republic,98 where the convict had 
stolen K630000.00 from government coffers, the state asked the court to consider 
the impact of stealing public funds had on the ordinary Malawian,99 how the misuse 
of public funds had caused the government to lose credibility in the eyes of donors 
who supplement the national budget, as well as her breach of trust occasioning 
from her high-profile position in public service as a Principle Secretary to the 
Ministry of Tourism. In agreement, the court recognised the nature of the offences 
of theft and money laundering, and their impact on the economy and health 
supplies in the country.100 Similarly, the court in the case of The Republic v Maxwell 
Namata and Luke Kasamba101 took judicial notice of the effects of the cashgate 
scandal on the economy of Malawi, among other effects. All this shows the 
relevance of other factors in the determination of a just and befitting punishment. 
The same should apply to the determination of a forfeiture order. 
However, the courts must exercise caution when they are considering the personal 
circumstances of an offender or a property owner, as it was the case in Prophet v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions102 and Hilda Van der Burg and Another v 
National Director of Public Prosecutions.103 The courts must only refrain from 
making a forfeiture order against an instrumentality of crime if the case presents 
                                                          
98  High Court Criminal Case No 63 of 2013. 
99   Tressa Namathanga Senzani v The Republic Criminal Case No 63 of 2013 (HC) at 21. 
100    Tressa Namathanga Senzani v The Republic Criminal Case No 63 of 2013  (HC) at 37-38. 
101   Criminal Case No 45 of 2013 (HC). 
102   2006 (1) SA 38 (SCA). 
103  [2012] ZACC 12. 
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very exceptional circumstances. The Malawi High Court in Chitsonga v The 
Republic104 reasoned that courts should not take domestic matters into account 
when sentencing. All offenders have families, and for most, any sentence brings 
some measure of hardship and deprivation. Therefore, courts should only take into 
consideration domestic matters only when they are exceptional or unusual. This 
reasoning is laudable as it balances the interests of the public in punishing an 
offender for their violation of the social contract, as well as ensuring that under 
very exceptional circumstances, their innocent family members are not greatly 
inconvenienced as a result of their relation’s criminality. This is in pursuit of the 
principle of proportionality. 
Be that as it may, it has been argued, that proportionality considerations negate the 
deterrent and denunciatory value of the forfeiture regime.105 This thesis’ response 
to this assertion is that no, it does not. The reason is that within the mixed theory of 
punishment applicable to this thesis, deterrence exists within the same framework 
with the principle of proportionality of punishments. The recognition of the 
proportionality principle is a deliberate effort to ensure that the state should not 
oppressive its people through the imposition of excessive punishments all in the 
name of the pursuit for deterrence. Within John Locke’s social contract, 
proportionality is the constraint for deterrence. Thus, proportionality does not 
negate deterrence, rather, it complements it in order to achieve at just and fair 
results. 
                                                          
104   (1995) 1 MLR 86(HC). 
105   Krane (2011: 181). 
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6.5 Constitutional rights vs civil asset forfeiture 
The government of South Africa, as it is the case with Malawi, has a duty to protect 
individual rights, such as the right to property.106 The state is faced with the duty to 
implement appropriate law enforcement measures such as asset forfeiture in 
pursuit of the protection of the rights of society, on the one hand, and the duty to 
protect individual rights of property rights on the other hand.107 In determining 
whether asset forfeiture is justifiable, South African courts are guided by 
constitutional imperatives.108 The constitutionality approach is necessary in order 
to avoid implementing an asset forfeiture regime in a matter which would 
constitute the arbitrary limitation of human rights. However, the constitutionality 
approach is desirable only in a context where the constitution in question confers 
fundamental human rights to the citizens and provides the process by which these 
rights can be invoked and upheld.  
The traditional in rem fiction which informs the basis of civil forfeiture today 
attracts constitutional concerns and it can lead to legal complications because it is 
constitutionally problematic. The fiction has led to the questioning of legitimacy of 
civil forfeiture in South Africa.109 It is, therefore, suggested that “South Africa 
should down play the in rem fiction and focus instead on criminal doctrinal 
arguments that illuminate POCA’s constitutionality”.110 The argument is that given 
the oppressive history of apartheid in South Africa, any law enforcement measure 
                                                          
106  Section 7(2) and Section 25 of the South African Constitution. 
107  Basdeo (2014: 1058). 
108  Basdeo (2014: 1059). 
109  Gupta (2002: 164). 
110  Badeo (2014: 1062).  
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such as the civil asset forfeiture, must withstand vigilant constitutional scrutiny lest 
South Africa’s transition entail a shift from one oppressive regime to another.111  
Civil asset forfeiture orders under chapter 6 of POCA are deemed to be inherently 
intrusive in that they may carry dire consequences for property owners. Courts are, 
therefore, enjoined by section 39(2) of the Constitution to interpret legislation such 
as the POCA in a manner which “promote[s] the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights”, to ensure that its provisions are constitutionally justifiable, 
particularly in the light of the property clause enshrined in terms of section 25 of 
the Constitution.112 However, the success and legitimacy of the civil forfeiture 
regime in South Africa rests on its use as a supplement to criminal remedies to 
combat organised crime, and not merely as a more convenient substitute.113 
The same suggestions given to South Africa above, should apply to Malawi and all 
other countries whose torch is the constitution. If Malawi adopts civil forfeiture, its 
success is most likely going to be confronted with legal challenges which countries 
such as South Africa  face in the implementation of their civil forfeiture laws. It is, 
therefore, prudent to discuss the debates surrounding these legal challenges, so as 
to prepare Malawi on what lies ahead and how best to tackle the potential 
challenges if they arise once it introduces civil forfeiture laws. The challenges are 
foreseeable because civil forfeiture by its nature, somewhat resembles the 
forfeiture regime under the repealed Forfeiture Act of 1966, in the sense that in 
both, the conviction of the property owner is irrelevant. Thus, the introduction of 
                                                          
111  Gupta (2002: 160.) 
112  Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions Case CCT 56/05 Para 46. 
113   National Director of Public Prosecutions v Staden and Others 2007 (1) SACR 338 (SCA) 
Para 7. 
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civil forfeiture is more likely to be confronted by s the questioning of its 
constitutionality, among other questions. 
6.5.1 Arbitrary deprivation of property 
The social contract theory, which this thesis argues that it should inform the 
government’s crime prevention strategies such as civil asset forfeiture, emphasises 
that punishment must not be arbitrary. Thus, the implementation of civil asset 
forfeiture must not result into the arbitrary deprivation of property, as this is 
prohibited by the Malawi Constitution.114  
In South Africa, section 25(1) of the Constitution for the Republic of South Africa 
prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property and further states that no law may 
permit such deprivation. The first clause of this provision confirms the existence of 
property rights, but it also recognises that there may be measures that limit this 
right without resulting into arbitrary deprivation of the right to property.115 The 
purpose of the constitutional protection is to establish a just and equitable balance 
between the protection of private property and the promotion of the public 
interest.116 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd and 
Others117 the SCA said: 
“A deprivation of property is arbitrary when the statute in question does 
not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation or is procedurally 
unfair.”118 
                                                          
114   Section 28 of the Malawi Constitution. 
115  Krane (2011: 174). 
116  Justice Belinda Van Heerden in Monhunram and another v National Director of Public  
Prosecutions(2007) 2 SACR 145(CC). 
117   2004 (2) SACR 208 (SCA); 2004 8 [BCLR] 844 (SCA). 
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In the case of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance (FNB),119 the Constitutional Court said: 
“For the validity of such deprivations, there must be an appropriate 
relationship between means and ends, between the sacrifice the individual 
is asked to make and the public purpose this is intended to serve. It is one 
that is not limited to an enquiry into mere rationality, but is less strict than a 
full and exacting proportionality elimination.”120 
In Deutschmann v Commissioner for the Revenue Service121 the court stated that a 
law that limits property rights is not arbitrary as long as the application for such 
deprivation of rights is based on reliable information; an order is made 
discretionary by a judge; and that any concerned party is free, in terms of the 
statute, to establish his entitlement and claim delivery. Deprivation of property 
rights through forfeiture in POCA is also based on clear grounds for suspecting the 
tainted nature of property, and anyone is free to challenge forfeiture orders or to 
establish entitlement to the property through the innocent owner defence.  
Civil forfeiture may also pose potential violation with the right to property. The 
argument is that since the state only has to prove the tainted nature of the 
property on a balance of probabilities, it would be unfair to deprive someone of 
their property on such a weak link.122 The forfeiture could be attacked on the basis 
that there is no rational connection or substantial relationship between the 
forfeiture and the aims that it seeks to achieve, such as crime prevention, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
118   National Director of Public Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others 2004 (2)  
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119  2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC). 
120  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue  
Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance (FNB ) 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC) Para 98. 
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deterrence and compensation.123 It may also be criticised on the lack of 
proportionality between its purpose and the means used.124 In the Austin case, 
Justice Scalia stated that: 
 “The question is not how much the confiscated property is worth, but  
 whether the confiscated property has a close enough relationship to the  
 offence.”125 
The foregoing arguments are in line with the argument that this thesis advances, 
that the means justify the end. Going beyond Justice Scalia’s views, this thesis adds 
that in the spirit of the proportionality analysis and instrumentality test discussed 
earlier, the question is about the worth of the confiscated property, as well as the 
property’s close relationship to the offence. The focus should not only be on 
proving that the property in question is an instrumentality. The focus is also on how 
much it is and whether its forfeiture would not be arbitrary due to the fact that it is 
would constitute excessive punishment. Thus, there should be a clear relationship 
between the forfeiture and the purpose it seeks to achieve, i.e. deterrence, and the 
value of the property.126  
In Malawi too, the introduction of civil asset forfeiture would demand that the state 
should disclose reasons for the intended forfeiture; that the making of the 
forfeiture order is up to the determination of the courts, and that any concerned 
party is free to challenge the forfeiture orders. This would avoid the repetition of 
the injustice of the repealed Forfeiture Act, which did not meet any of these 
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requirements because there were no reasons given for the forfeiture, it was made a 
cabinet Minister and no one had the right to challenge it. 
6.5.2 Right to legal representation 
Further, under civil forfeiture, oftentimes, all or a significant part of a defendant’s 
property is frozen, making it hard for them to afford the services of a lawyer.127 
However, since the proceedings are civil in nature but arguably pursuing criminal 
penal law objectives, one can argue that the state should provide legal 
representation for defendants of civil forfeiture applications.128 But even if the state 
is to provide a legal counsel, still the argument is that the defendant would be 
denied the right to be represented by counsel of their choice; the one they could 
have afforded had their property not be frozen.129  
However, provision of a court-appointed lawyer is arguably blind to the “function of 
the independent lawyer as a guardian of our freedom”.130 Forcing a person to rely 
on the services of a lawyer other than a lawyer of their choice violates basic 
fairness, deprives defendants of attorney-client relationships which are 
characterised by trust; disrupts the equality of legal representation between state 
and defendants’ threatens the foundations of the criminal defence bar and does 
not further forfeiture’s core aim of taking profit out of crime.131 
The dilemma is that since technically, a criminal has no property rights in criminal 
proceeds, allowing them to use part of the suspected criminal proceeds to seek 
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legal expenses is problematic because it would amount to allowing them to spend 
money that does not belong to them.132 This argument is problematic also because 
the legitimacy of the defendant’s title to the targeted property is what the court 
seeks to determine at the end of the forfeiture proceedings.133  
Section 45 of POCA makes provision for legal expenses to be met out of property 
that is subject to a preservation order, pending a forfeiture hearing. It, however, 
sets a limit for the amount payable towards legal expenses by saying that legal 
expenses should not be met out of that property to the extent that the amount 
payable for any legal service concerned exceeds any prescribed maximum allowable 
cost for that service. 
In addition, the High Court has discretion in terms of section 26(6) to make 
provision in a restraint order for the reasonable living and legal expenses of the 
defendant. In the case of Trent Gore Fraser v ABSA Bank Limited (National Director 
Public Prosecutions as amicus curiae),134 Mr Fraser was charged with racketeering, 
money laundering and drug-related offences. The state obtained (in the High Court) 
a provisional restraint order against his property, placing it in the hands of a 
curator. 
Subsequently, Mr Fraser applied for an order directing the curator to sell the 
property and use its proceeds for the payment of his legal expenses. This prompted 
ABSA Bank, a third party with an interest in the same property and who had a four 
year old default judgment against Mr Fraser, to apply for intervention in the matter. 
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ABSA’s interest was to oppose Mr Fraser’s application for the sale of the property 
that had been placed in the hands of a curator, arguing that if Mr Fraser were 
successful, the Bank would be unable to recover its judgment debt.135 
The High Court, however, dismissed ABSA’s application to intervene, confirmed the 
provisional restraint order and granted Mr Fraser’s application for the sale of the 
property. The court reasoned that the effect of a restraint order was to protect 
defendants against the claims of creditors and to provide defendants the right to 
have first call upon their property in order to meet legal expenses. This reasoning 
was based upon the High Court’s construction of section 33(1) of POCA, thereby 
concluding that claims of concurrent creditors, such as ABSA, were “obligations” of 
the applicant that “conflict with the obligation to satisfy a confiscation order” 
within the meaning of section 33(1).  
On appeal by ABSA, the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Fraser’s application 
to sell property and granted ABSA’s application to intervene. Consequently, ABSA’s 
claim against Mr Fraser was secured. The Court, in interpreting the section 26(6) of 
POCA, said: 
“The legislature could not have intended that a concurrent creditor, who 
had pursued a claim and obtained a default judgment prior to the issuance 
of a restraint order, would be prevented from satisfying that judgment 
simply because the debtor’s assets had been restrained.” 
Consequently, Mr Fraser made an appeal to the Constitutional Court against the 
decision of the Supreme Court. The question before the court was whether a 
creditor of a defendant may join the proceedings when the defendant applies to a 
court to provide in a restraint order for reasonable legal expenses connected to his 
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criminal trial. He argued that the failure to make provision for his legal expenses 
would violate his right to a fair trial, in particular, the right to legal representation.  
The Constitution court upheld the Supreme Court’s decision to allow ABSA to 
intervene the proceedings. However, it held that the Supreme Court was incorrect 
in holding that ABSA’s claim against Fraser was secured against the provision for his 
reasonable legal expenses. The Court stated: 
“A decision to allow a creditor to intervene does not automatically result in 
an order to ‘ring-fence’ its claim against competing claims and the 
defendant’s claim for reasonable legal expenses.”136 
In its analysis, the Constitutional court argued that when considering an application 
for the provision for reasonable legal expenses, pursuant to section 26(6) of POCA, 
the High Court must balance up the interests of all who have a claim in the property 
in question. That is, the accused person’s right to legal representation, the interest 
of the state in preserving the property and the interests of creditors. The court then 
referred the matter back to the High Court for it to exercise its discretion in terms 
of section 26(6) of POCA. 
In the case of National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO 
and Others,137 the Constitutional court considered whether section 38 of POCA 
infringed the right of access to courts. Even though section 38 deals with 
preservation orders, it is drafted in very similar terms to section 26 in that it allows 
the NDPP to apply for an order ex parte. In Mohamed, the court a quo struck down 
section 38 on the basis that the section made no provision for a rule nisi calling 
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upon interested parties to show cause why a preservation order should not be 
made. This Court found that the High Court erred in the order it made in that: (a) it 
had attempted to remedy, by way of a notional severance formulation, a 
constitutional invalidity caused by an omission. The Court held that the correct 
procedure would have been to read-in the rule nisi requirement; and (b) section 38 
was not specifically challenged in the court a quo. Rather, the whole of chapter 6 
was challenged. This Court, therefore, found that the High Court erred in 
attempting to decide the matter on the narrow basis it did rather than deciding the 
constitutionality. 
The court observed that the forthcoming criminal trial was anticipated to be 
strenuous and long, and emphasised the need for reasonable legal expenses to be 
provided for as a fair trial requirement. The High Court stated that an order 
regarding legal expenses does not amount to allowing a convicted person to retain 
ill-gotten gains. A fair criminal trial is required by the Bill of Rights and is not only 
advantageous to the accused, but also to the state.  
In view of the foregoing, Malawi courts ought to be awake to the possibility of such 
arguments. The right to legal representation should be upheld, but not in a manner 
that will lead to the depletion of the value of the preserved property. Since this 
right is not absolute, the limitation on the choice of counsel by providing people 
with state or court-appointed lawyers is a good balance between the interests of 
the state in preserving the value of the targeted property, and the recognition of 
the right to fair trial through legal representation for the respondent.  
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However, should a person insist on finding their own lawyer using part of the 
preserved assets to pay legal fees, once a forfeiture order is made, they should pay 
an amount which represents a reduction in value which results from the payment 
for legal expenses. The basis for this argument is that the suspect has no right to 
spend unlawfully gained property, hence should not be allowed use such property 
to meet expenses which any other citizen meets from the fruits of their clean 
labour. This proposal would secure the interests of the property owner in the sense 
that their right to legal representation is not limited from the time their property 
has been subjected to forfeiture proceedings. They should not be forced to rely on 
a state or court-appointed lawyer, if they feel their interests would be better 
represented by a lawyer of their choice.  
However, this proposal would not work in relation to civil forfeiture proceedings, 
since the proceedings are in rem not in personam. Thus, the state would have no 
choice but to allow property owners to use part of the frozen, seized or restrained 
property for their reasonable living expenses until the determination of the 
forfeiture application. However, in order to minimise the reduction of the value of 
the targeted property, the state and the court must ensure speedy proceedings, so 
as to minimise the period within which the property owner will need to survive 
from part of the property. This is one way of ensuring that no one benefits from 
tainted property any further. 
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6.5.3 Presumption of innocence 
There is a presumption that civil forfeiture does not interfere with the presumption 
of innocence because it does not involve a criminal charge.138  
In the mid 1990’s, before POCA was enacted, in the case of S v Zuma, the South 
African Constitutional Court opined that if a law requires an accused person to 
establish, on a balance of probabilities either an element of an offence or an 
excuse, then it contravenes the constitutional right to be presumed innocent.139  
In addition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) suggested that forfeiture 
proceedings do not amount to a criminal charge, as the person is not being accused 
of any crimes, and there is no effect on the person’s criminal record.140 For this 
reason, it is argued that civil forfeiture does not fall within the ambit of 
presumption of innocence, which arises only in connection with a criminal 
charge.141 Further, in R (Director of the Assets Recovery Agency) v Belton,142 the 
state argued that civil forfeiture proceedings are classified as civil action against any 
person who holds or controls property, whether or not he is the one who 
committed the offence. Therefore, the proceedings the do not contravene the 
presumption of innocence rule.143 
In Walsh v United Kingdom,144 a case based on an action for civil recovery of the 
applicant’s assets, the applicant contended that the proceedings for recovery of his 
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assets were not civil but criminal in nature and were proceedings to which the right 
to be presumed innocent under  the European Convention on Human Rights 
applied.145 The European Court of Human Rights had to decide whether the 
recovery proceedings involved the determination of a criminal charge such as to 
invoke the provisions of Article 6. The court considered three important criteria, 
namely, the domestic classification of the matter, the nature of the charge and the 
penalty to which a person becomes liable. 
Firstly, the court found that, according to the UK domestic law, the recovery 
proceedings were regarded as civil and not criminal. Secondly, the purpose of the 
proceedings was not punitive or deterrent but to recover assets to which the 
defendant lawfully was not entitled.146 The court further confirmed that there was 
no finding of guilt of specific offences and that though the recovery order made by 
the lower court involved a huge sum (£70 250), it was not intended to be punitive. 
The tricky part about civil forfeiture is that it is an action related to the commission 
of crimes, but the commission is not proved to the requisite standard of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt through criminal trial in some cases because there is no 
sufficient evidence for the state to open a criminal case. In such cases, if evidence 
was enough, the state could have instituted a prosecution. Thus, it is argued that a 
civil forfeiture application constitutes an express  accusation of the unlawful origin 
of the property and an implicit accusation of the commission of the crime.147 The 
accusation of the commission of crime is made indirectly.148 By being required to 
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prove the lawful origin of assets, a person is called to rebut implicitly, the indirect 
accusation of the commission of crimes. When courts are convinced that indeed the 
property is proceeds of crime, they are, impliedly, convinced that a crime was 
committed. Thus, civil forfeiture involves an indirect accusation and an implied 
criminal charge for the commission of crime.149 
6.5.4 Third party rights 
The social contract prohibits punishment of innocent people. Thus, forfeiture 
orders should not be imposed on property which belongs to innocent people. South 
Africa is keen on making sure that innocent people do not experience the punitive 
aspect of asset forfeiture. Thus, POCA contains a significant safeguard of the 
interests of innocent owners of property which may be subject to forfeiture. It 
provides that forfeiture does not affect the rights of a person who claims and 
proves that he had no knowledge of the instrument's use in the commission of an 
offence.150 Furthermore, person can save their property from forfeiture if they 
prove that they could not prevent its use in the commission of a crime, and that 
they may lawfully possess the instrument which has become subject to forfeiture. 
This provision has been tested in the case of National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Magdalena Elizabeth Parker,151 Mrs Parker was staying in her house, 
and her son and his family were staying in another side of her house. The son was 
involved in drug dealing, using the house as a drug selling spot. When the NDPP 
applied for the preservation of the property in terms of section 38 of POCA, the 
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woman did not dispute the drug dealing allegations by the NDPP, but rather 
claimed that she was an innocent owner.152 Thus, as a property owner who was not 
involved in the commission of the offences, she exercised her right to challenge the 
preservation order, on the basis of her innocence. This is commendable. 
In the UK, too, interests of innocent third parties are protected. In the case of Air 
Canada v United Kingdom153 the court said that in relation to forfeiture of 
instrumentalities of crime, and when it belongs to an innocent third party, proper 
safeguards must be provided with respect to the rights of persons who are not to 
blame.154 The court contended further that forfeiture of property will only comply 
with the protection of the right to property when the owner can be blamed in 
respect of an offence committed using his property.155 The court said: 
“Confiscaton of property as a sanction to some breach of the law…without 
there being any relationship between the behaviour of the owner or person 
responsible for the goods and the breach of the law, is definitely 
incompatible both with the rule of law and with the right guaranteed in 
Article 1 Protocol No.1.”156 
The court further stressed that a property owner must be allowed to prove that he 
could not reasonably have known or suspected that his property would serve as an 
instrumentality, or even with due diligence have prevented its use. Failure to allow 
a property owner to show his innocence would upset the fair balance between the 
protection of the right of property and the requirements of general interest.157 
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The protection of the rights of innocent party is also a subset of the proportionality 
principle. The proportionality principle would demand that interests of the state are 
balanced with the interests of a property owner. This was confirmed in the 
Allgemein Gold-und Silberscheideanstalt v United Kingdom case,158 where the 
European Human Rights Commission stated: 
“It cannot be seen as proportionate towards an innocent property owner to 
confiscate his goods which were smuggled, without notice to him and 
without giving him any chance to argue his innocence.”159 
Thus, proportionality of a forfeiture order will also have to be measured against the 
protection of the rights of innocent people, since a forfeiture order which victimises 
innocent property owners would be arbitrary. 
In relation to Malawi, the same principles innocent party principles apply. The law 
provides comprehensively for the protection of third party and innocent party 
interests.160 In the Sithole case, the car which was subject to forfeiture as an 
instrumentality of crime was alleged to belong to the defendant’s wife. As the law 
requires, she swore and filed an affidavit, claiming ownership of the car and arguing 
that it should be excluded from forfeiture. During forfeiture proceedings, the 
defence counsel argued for the exclusion of the car from forfeiture, arguing that 
the car belonged to the wife and she was not aware that her husband, Mr Sithole, 
intended to use it in connection to a crime.  
In its analysis, the court stated that she had failed to prove on the balance of 
probabilities, that she was not aware of the car’s criminal usage. Thus, the court 
imputed knowledge of the car’s usage in the commission of a crime. It cited reasons 
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such as the fact that she was operating from the same house with the defendant, 
and being the owner of the car, she must have been aware of the presence of the 
money in the car and had all the opportunity to confront her husband about it.161 
This thesis submits that the analysis of the court in this case was comprehensive. 
The court gave the third party an opportunity to show cause why the car should not 
be forfeited. On account of what court in the Allgemein Gold-und 
Silberscheideanstalt v United Kingdom case said,162 this forfeiture was not 
disproportional on Mrs Sithole’s part because knowledge of the car’s use in the 
commission of money laundering was imputed on her, and she was given a chance 
to prove her innocence. For the same reasons, neither was the forfeiture arbitrary.  
In the spirit of crime prevention, forfeiture of property such as the car in the Sithole 
case is justified on the basis that the owner is believed to have been negligent with 
her property.163 Thus, deterrence justifies the punishment of negligent or complicit 
property owners for negligently or knowingly letting their property to be used in 
the commission of crime. Requiring the forfeiture of property used in the 
commission of a crime “encourages property owners to take care in managing their 
property and ensures that they will not permit that property to be used for illegal 
purposes.”164 Thus, allowing people to prove their innocence on a balance of 
probabilities is one way of ensuring that a forfeiture order does not punish those 
who are not culpable of negligence in the usage of their property. 
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6.5.5 Double jeopardy concerns  
Civil forfeiture attracts criticism for its likelihood to violate the double jeopardy 
rule.165 The rule prohibits the prosecution of a person twice for the same offence, 
and that a conviction shall be a bar to further criminal proceedings.166 The 
argument is that civil forfeiture is a criminal trial that is disguised in civil 
proceedings, and it should bar subsequent criminal prosecution on the basis that a 
person has been tried already in civil forfeiture proceedings.167 Similarly, the law 
should bar civil proceedings that are instituted after a criminal trial, on the same 
double jeopardy arguments. The criticism and debate stems from the assertion that 
civil forfeiture is punitive, not remedial. American courts grappled with this issue 
also. In Halper v United States168 the court reasoned as follows: 
“[a] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial 
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive 
or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the 
term…We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause, a 
defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not 
be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second 
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial but only as a deterrent 
or retribution.”169 
In this case, the court found that a fine is remedial and not punitive by nature, but it 
would become punishment if it created ‘tremendous disparity’ between the fine 
and the amount of harm the defendant caused.170 The issue here was the 
excessiveness of the fine. It would not be punitive if it were not excessive.  
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Following the Harper case, the court in the case of Austin v United States171 
reasoned that the provision for an innocent owner defence in relation to forfeiture 
proceedings indicated that culpability was a requirement for forfeiture. 
“If forfeiture had been understood not to punish the owner, there would 
have been no reason to reserve the case of a truly innocent owner. Indeed, 
it is only on the assumption that forfeiture serves in part to punish, that the 
Court’s past reservation of that question makes sense.”172 
Nevertheless, the court contended that the legislative history indicated that the 
forfeiture provisions were necessary because criminal sanctions were inadequate to 
achieve deterrence.173 In addition, the court held that forfeitures were punishment 
and were thus subject to the limitations of the excess fines. 
Later on, the Supreme Court in the case of United States v Ursery174 went back to its 
original position in the Various Items of Personal Property v United States175 case, 
where it held that in rem civil forfeiture is remedial, distinct from punitive in 
personam civil penalties such as fines, and that it does not constitute punishment 
for double jeopardy purposes. The difference lies in the subject of the proceedings. 
In proceedings such as civil action to recover penalties such as fines, and in criminal 
prosecutions, it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded against and punished, 
while in civil forfeiture, it is property that is proceeded against and by legal fiction, 
condemned.176 Thus, the court confined the double jeopardy rule to in personam 
civil penalties, such as fines. Civil forfeitures are designed primarily to confiscate 
property used in violation of the law and to disgorge fruits of unlawful conduct. 
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Thus, the court held that the opinion it held in the Harper case cannot apply to civil 
forfeiture. 
However, in his dissenting judgement, Justice Stevens in the case of United States v 
Ursery opined that civil forfeiture is punitive, and that naming the proceedings as in 
rem or in personam should not be the sole determinant of their nature. He 
reasoned as follows: 
 “There is simply no rational basis for characterising the seizure of this  
 respondent’s home as anything other than punishment for his crime. 
The house was neither proceeds nor contraband and its value had no 
relation to the government’s authority to seize it. Under the controlling 
statute, an essential predicate for the forfeiture was proof that the  
respondent had used the property in connection with the commission of a 
crime. The forfeiture of this property was unquestionably a penalty 
‘that had absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society 
or to the cost of enforcing law.”177 
In addition, Justice Kennedy in the same United States v Ursery case reasoned that 
providing for the forfeiture of real property used to facilitate drug offences, only 
the culpable stand to lose their property, and interests of innocent owners are 
protected if they can show that they did not know or consent to the use of their 
property in the commission of crime. The law on the forfeiture of instrumentalities 
of crime is not directed at those who commit crimes, but those who are guilty of 
misuse of their property, he said.178 The property stands to be hazardous in the 
hands of such owners who either use or let others to use their property in the 
commission of crime.  
Since the punitive purpose affects culpable property owners, whether they 
committed an offence or not, the forfeiture is not punishment for a person’s 
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criminal wrongdoing. Thus, in the opinion of the court, the forfeiture is not an in 
personam punishment for the offence, which is all the double jeopardy clause 
prohibits.  
So far, this thesis has argued that civil forfeiture of proceeds of crime is 
punishment. It is punishment even though it serves both remedial and deterrent 
purposes. The remedial aspect is the recovery of unlawfully obtained property, and 
it serves to deter criminals from committing profit crimes. The thesis has argued 
that the forfeiture of instrumentalities is punishment also, as it punishes negligent 
property owners and seeks to deter them and others from using or letting their 
property to be used in the commission of crime. The punitive nature of both types 
of forfeitures lies in the effects of the forfeiture orders, and not in the nominal 
description of their proceedings. 
All this debate begs the question: Do civil forfeiture proceedings constitute a 
criminal trial? The answer is no, for the reason that not all forms of punishment 
emanate from a criminal trial. In the case of forfeiture of criminal proceeds, a 
criminal prosecution that follows civil recovery will not constitute a second trial. 
The criminal trial is the only trial and it aims at establishing the guilt of the offender, 
where a conviction goes into the person’s criminal record. 
The misuse of the property, which the forfeiture of instrumentalities seeks to curb, 
is not the subject of the criminal trial. The trial concerns the commission of the 
crime, while the forfeiture concerns the use of property in the commission of the 
crime. Thus, if civil forfeiture precedes a prosecution, the punishment that will be 
imposed will not include forfeiture of criminal proceeds again. The court would 
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have to impose different types of punishment, such as imprisonment for the 
underlying offence. Similarly, in cases where civil forfeiture precedes a criminal 
trial, the punishment that is imposed at the end of the trial will not include 
forfeiture of instrumentalities again, and the conviction will not be based on the 
misuse of property, but on the commission of the underlying offence. 
Therefore, on the basis of the arguments made above, an inquiry into civil 
forfeiture’s punitive nature should be embarked on in order to assess whether  a 
forfeiture order violates the proportionality principle, which is not related to the 
double jeopardy principle. 
Perhaps, one way around this double jeopardy debate is for states to consider the 
criminalisation of the misuse of property in unlawful activities. Thus, property 
owners would have to be prosecuted for using or letting their property to be used 
in the commission of an offence. The prosecution can be followed by conviction-
based proceedings for the forfeiture of the property. If the state deems it 
convenient and proper, it may just opt to institute civil forfeiture proceedings 
against the property and forgo the prosecution. If a forfeiture order is granted, the 
granting of the order should bar the prosecution of the property owner on the 
charge of misuse of property. However, should the property owner be the one 
charged with the underlying offence, the civil forfeiture order would not act as a 
bar for his prosecution in the underlying offence. This is because the forfeiture 
proceedings only related to the offence of misuse of property.  
In order to avoid any miscarriage of justice, the offence should be accompanied by 
the innocent owner’s defence. Property owners ought to prove, on a balance of 
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probabilities that they did not know about the property’s use in the commission of 
the offence. 
6.5.6 Right against self-incrimination 
POCA allows for the parallel commencement of both criminal prosecution and civil 
forfeiture. This has raised arguments relating to the right to against self-
incrimination, for the fear that what one says in his defence in one proceeding may 
be used against him in the other proceeding. Civil forfeiture proceedings have the 
potential of infringing on the right against self-incrimination. The state simply has to 
prove on the balance of probability that the property in question is tainted 
property, either as an instrumentality or proceeds of crime. The property owner is 
also given an opportunity to prove on a balance of probability that the property is 
not tainted.  
At that stage, the defendant is put in a tight corner where he has the choice to 
either remain silent and not oppose the forfeiture application, or argue his case and 
risk divulging criminally incriminating information, which the state may use in 
criminal prosecution.179 The complication with the civil proceedings is that there are 
disclosure requirements under the discovery rules, where the state may make 
discovery requests which may be significantly self-incriminating.180 However, the 
defendant would not face similar discovery requests in criminal prosecution 
because in a criminal trial, it is only the state which is under an obligation to 
disclose the evidence it has against a suspect. Thus, a person finds more safeguards 
in criminal procedure than in civil proceedings. In relation to conviction-based 
                                                          
179   Pretorius (1998: 404-405). 
180   Pretorius (1998: 405). 
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forfeiture, the same does not apply because the proceedings take place after a 
criminal trial, hence no self-incrimination fears would arise. 
6.6 Retroactive application of the law of civil forfeiture 
Generally, the law prohibits retroactive punishment or prosecution. The Malawi 
Constitution prohibits the conviction or punishment of a person for an act which 
was not an offence at the time of its commission.181 Thus, it is necessary to assess 
whether the introduction of civil forfeiture as proposed by this thesis will result into 
the retroactive forfeiture of criminal proceeds that were acquired before the 
enactment of the civil forfeiture law. If it really results into a retroactive application, 
it is necessary to examine whether this retroactivity can be justified. 
In other jurisdictions, the courts have held that the rule against retroactive 
punishment cannot apply to civil forfeiture proceedings because forfeiture orders 
are just “a civil law consequence of the fact that a perpetrator or other 
beneficiaries had obtained assets from an unlawful act”.182 The basis for such a 
position is that the claimant’s conduct was already criminalised and that he never 
had a vested right to property.183  
For instance, in Dassa Foundation v Liechtenstein184 the court held that civil 
forfeiture law was comparable to civil law restitution of unjust enrichment, hence, 
retroactive application of the law would not constitute retrospective penalty. 
Applying this court’s reasoning in Malawi would imply that the state can seek the 
                                                          
181   Section 42(2)(vi) of the Constitution of Malawi. 
182   Greenberg et al (2009: 44). 
183   US v Four Tracts of Property on the Waters of Leiper’s Creek 181 F.3d 104, 1999 WL  
357773 at 3-4 (6th Cir. 1999). 
184   ECHR Application No 696/05 (10 July 2007). 
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forfeiture of all illicit proceeds from crimes that were committed before the 
introduction of civil forfeiture in the Malawian legislation. This could be a powerful 
tool in ensuring that undeserving people do not continue to enjoy fruits of crime, 
while hiding behind the rule against retroactive punishment. However, such 
retroactive forfeiture should only be limited to illicit proceeds which derived from 
acts that had been criminalised already by the time of the acquisition. This is 
because the basis of the forfeiture is the acquisition of assets through the 
commission of a criminal act.  If the act was not criminalised, then the forfeiture 
would lack legal basis, rendering it an arbitrary act by the state. The state could 
have difficulties to prove the injustice that has been occasioned by the acquisition 
of the property in question. Further, Robert Nozick’s rectification of injustice 
principle cannot apply because there would be no injustice which needs to be 
rectified in the first place. 
Additionally, being civil proceedings, others have suggested that the state must 
stipulate the extent to which the civil forfeiture actions should be subject to the 
statute of limitation.185 For example, in the UK, civil forfeiture proceedings can be 
instituted against property that was acquired within 12 years from the day it was 
unlawfully acquired.186 However, such limitation is problematic as it may limit the 
application of Robert Nozick’s rectification of injustice principle, by allowing a 
person to keep criminal proceeds that were acquired beyond the set time limit. 
Therefore, in the interest of justice within Nozick’s theory, the state should not 
subject civil forfeiture actions to any statutory limitations. Such limits would also 
                                                          
185   Kennedy (2006: 135-136). 
186   See Section 316(3) of the POCA (UK). 
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pose a problem in the recovery of proceeds of offences committed by government 
leaders who stay in power for long and have had all the opportunity to hide their 
criminal loot.187 
Ultimately, having a retroactive application of civil forfeiture law could help Malawi 
in the recovery of illicit property in all cases of the past where the state could not 
prosecute an individual for one reason or the other. The law can be used to recover 
illicit proceeds from suspects who were acquitted, absconded or who died but left 
illicit proceeds to be inherited by their families. However, the rule of the thumb is 
that such retrospective forfeiture should not be arbitrary. The state must bring 
before court enough evidence to convince the courts about the illicit nature of the 
property, and show that its acquisition relates to an act that was criminalised 
already at that time. The law must further allow people to come and contest the 
making of a forfeiture order, so as to avoid inconveniencing innocent people, such 
as bona fide purchasers. 
6.7 Criminal trial proceedings and civil forfeiture 
In order to avoid the abuse of civil forfeiture, there is a suggestion, which this thesis 
agrees with, that civil forfeiture proceedings should be initiated only where criminal 
prosecution has failed or is impossible.188 If there is evidence which allows the 
commencement of both criminal and civil forfeiture, priority should go to the 
commencement of criminal proceedings. This is one way of ensuring that the state 
will not abuse the civil forfeiture measure. It is also one way of allowing offenders 
                                                          
187   Greenberg  et al (2009: 44). 
188  Greenberg  et al (2009: 62). 
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to enjoy the full fair trial rights that are obtained in criminal trials.189 Thus, the state 
should consider commencing a criminal trial first, and wait until its conclusion 
before commencing civil forfeiture proceedings, regardless of whether the trial 
yields a conviction or not. The advantage of doing this is it could circumvent 
arguments relating to self-incrimination through potentially incriminating 
information which the property owner may decide to use to argue their case.190  
Alternatively, the state can commence civil recovery proceedings before a criminal 
trial. This usually attracts criticism in relation to the right against self-incrimination, 
due to the incriminating information which a property owner may bring in a bid to 
exclude their property from forfeiture, as well as information which the state may 
request through discovery rules attendant in civil proceedings.191 
It is argued that this approach may work to the advantage of the property owner as 
well, in case he has to stand subsequent criminal trial because he may use the 
information laid bare by the state in the civil proceedings, in accordance with 
discovery rules.192 However, this is not a problem on the part of the prosecution’s 
case because unlike an accused person, the state has no fair trial rights such as right 
to remain silent or right against self-incrimination. After all, in criminal trials, the 
state has the duty to disclose the evidence it has against a suspect, so whether the 
suspect gets the state’s evidence through disclosure arrangements within a criminal 
trial or through previous civil forfeiture proceedings does not offend any principle 
of justice. 
                                                          
189   Opedayo (2010: 65) 
190   Opedayo (2010: 63). 
191   Opedayo (2012: 64). 
192   Opedayo (2012: 74). 
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Another approach is for the state to institute parallel civil forfeiture proceedings 
and criminal trial proceedings. This approach poses self-incrimination fears in the 
property owner as argued earlier. Hence, he may be forced not to defend his 
interests in the property in civil forfeiture proceedings for fear of giving implicating 
evidence which the state may use in the parallel criminal trial.193 This was the 
situation in the case of Payton v R.194 The court ruled that the defendant’s fair trial 
rights should not be violated by any evidence or information given in the civil 
proceedings, and the state had to make sure of that. In the USA, the law allows for 
the stay of civil proceedings pending the conclusion of criminal prosecution.195 A 
person can apply for such a stay only if he is the subject of a related criminal 
investigation; he has locus standi to assert a claim in the civil forfeiture 
proceedings;  and he must show that the continuation of the forfeiture proceedings 
would affect adversely his right against self-incrimination in the related criminal 
investigation.196 
6.8 Conclusion  
The fight against economic crimes and money laundering in Malawi must be 
supplemented by the introduction of civil forfeiture laws. However, due to the 
potential injustice which civil asset forfeiture poses, the state can circumvent the 
occasioning of injustice by adhering to its obligations under the constitution. The 
state and courts must ensure that each and every forfeiture order is made in the 
interests of justice, by making orders that are not disproportionate or arbitrary, 
                                                          
193   Opedayo (2012: 74). 
194   [2006] EWCA Crim. 1226. 
195   Kennedy (2006: 151). 
196   18 United States Code 981(g)(1) and (2) USA. 
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without losing sight of their deterrent purpose. The orders must past the 
constitutionality test. This is what the social contract demands.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDANTIONS 
7.1 Conclusion 
In the wake of the escalation of economic crimes in Malawi, the fight against money 
laundering has become more real and more demanding. This is evidenced by the 
sudden response to prosecute suspects on money laundering charges only from the 
year 2013, yet the anti-money laundering legislation has been in force since 2006. 
However, Malawi cannot win the fight against money laundering without the use of 
asset recovery as a more relevant deterrent tool which targets the very incentive 
for engaging in criminal behaviour. 
Malawi recognised the usefulness of asset forfeiture by including it not only in 
piecemeal in other pieces of legislation such as the Penal Code and the Corrupt 
Practices Act, but by including it broadly in the Money Laundering, Proceeds of 
Serious Crimes and Terrorist Financing Act. Nevertheless, there is a significant 
oversight in the country’s overall asset forfeiture legal framework because of the 
absence of civil forfeiture. By confining the recovery of tainted property to the 
criminal law sphere, the country runs the risk of making the engagement in 
economic crimes and money laundering a profitable adventure. This is because the 
absence of civil forfeiture serves as an assurance that the state is not in a position 
to prosecute all perpetrators in order to confiscate their illicit property. The lesser 
the likelihood of prosecution, the lesser the deterrence achieved through the few 
prosecutions. 
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The oversight to include civil forfeiture laws can be excused on the basis that the 
international legal framework does not obligate states to introduce civil forfeiture 
as a crime prevention measure. The international legal framework merely 
recommends the adoption of civil forfeiture. However, in view of the benefits which 
civil forfeiture offers to the overall fight against money laundering, this thesis 
contends that the oversight by the international legal instrument is significant and it 
has detrimental implications on the global deterrent stance that they profess. 
Nevertheless, states that are serious about fighting economic crimes and money 
laundering effectively, ought to regard the recommendation to introduce civil 
forfeiture as if it were a mandatory obligation. Malawi has no excuse for not 
adopting civil forfeiture. Thus, this thesis proposes the immediate introduction of 
civil forfeiture in the laws of Malawi. Civil forfeiture will ensure the enhancement of 
deterrence by applying the recovery of illicit property to all situations where a 
conviction-based forfeiture would not be attainable. Such situations include where 
a prosecution is not possible due to illness, death or abscondment of offenders. The 
state can also use civil forfeiture in cases where a prosecution is not ideal, in the 
interests of justice. 
In addition, the use of civil forfeiture ensures that there is effective rectification of 
the injustice that lies in the acquisition of property through criminality, as proposed 
by Robert Nozick in his justice in distribution theory. However, in order to avoid the 
abuse of civil forfeiture, the state must show cause why it cannot prosecute, 
because civil forfeiture must exist only to supplement criminal forfeiture, and not to 
substitute it. 
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The thesis has advanced its arguments within John Locke’s social contract theory 
which recognises the potential of the state to oppress its people through the 
implementation of policies such as crime prevention by using oppressive asset 
forfeiture laws. Thus, the thesis has rejected a model of the social contract as 
proposed by Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes’ theory supports absolutism which serves as 
a conducive environment for oppressive means of government such as the 
enactment of oppressive asset forfeiture rules. The government of Malawi already 
used asset forfeiture laws as an oppressive political tool in the pre-democracy 
times, and the legacy of that law contributed to parliament’s resistance to include 
civil asset forfeiture in the anti-money laundering legislation. The government 
breached the model of social contract as propounded by Locke, by going beyond its 
people-given power, through the enactment and implementation of an oppressive 
law. In view of this history, this thesis is not blind to the possibility of the 
resurfacing of such laws or regimes, and that is why it has argued that the proposed 
civil asset forfeiture law should be one which can pass any constitutionality test. 
The law must be just, fair and centred on proportionality.  
The courts and the prosecution must be awake to the constitutional challenges that 
confront the implementation of civil forfeiture. These challenges include civil 
forfeiture’s potential to violate fundamental human rights such as the right to 
property and fair trial rights. The thesis has proposed the reliance on the 
proportionality test, which dictates that there must be a rational relationship 
between a forfeiture order and the purpose it seeks to serve. The means must 
justify the end. Lessons on how to overcome such challenges can be drawn from 
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the South African, English and American court cases that have been discussed in 
Chapter Six. 
In order to ensure the fairness of the forfeiture regime, the thesis has proposed 
that the civil forfeiture regime must be one which is shaped by the mixed theory of 
punishment. The thesis has deliberately disregarded placing the discussion within 
the framework of either pure utilitarianism or pure retributivism due to their 
shortcomings in explaining and shaping an ideal forfeiture regime. The mixed 
theory advocates for the attainment of utilitarian ends such as deterrence and 
victim-compensation through the constraints of the retributive theory of 
punishment, namely, proportionality of punishment and the prohibition of 
punishment of innocent people. This is the only way the state can ensure that it 
seeks the forfeiture of property from those who do not deserve to keep and enjoy 
the property, while sparing the interests of innocent property owners. Using this 
theory, the state can also ensure that the forfeiture orders will be proportional.  
Further, the thesis has demonstrated that the success of the forfeiture regime relies 
heavily on the state’s ability to trace, seize, freeze and restrain targeted property. 
When these provisional orders are implemented effectively, they ensure that 
criminals are not given an opportunity to hide or dissipate the targeted property 
and keep it out of the reach of the law. Failure by the state to identify and get hold 
of such property will make economic crimes attractive to the people because there 
will be little likelihood that the state can locate and seize their criminal proceeds. In 
essence, the deterrent effect of asset forfeiture rests heavily on the state’s ability to 
make the detection and seizure of illicit property a high probability. 
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In addition, the success of the asset forfeiture efforts relies on the state’s ability to 
preserve the value and condition of seized, frozen or restrained property, until the 
disposal stage. Doing so ensures that the courts make meaningful forfeiture orders 
at the end forfeiture proceedings. Regrettably, there is no coordinated asset 
management system in Malawi, and this poses a threat to the success of asset 
forfeiture. The threat lies in situations where a forfeiture application has been 
denied and the state needs to return the property to the owner. If by the time of 
the return, the property has decayed or has been damaged, the government could 
lose money through damages paid for the damage or loss in value of the property 
caused by mismanagement. The recovery of valueless property also means that 
there will be no property to be returned to victims, thus, defeating the reparative 
aim of asset forfeiture. 
All in all, in all its crime prevention efforts, through both the existing criminal 
forfeiture and the future civil forfeiture schemes, the state must remember always 
that the chief end of its creation and existence is the preservation of its people’s 
rights to property, life and other liberties, granted to them by the law of nature and 
safeguarded by the constitution. The state’s power is also limited by the provisions 
of the constitution. The implementation of both criminal and civil forfeiture must 
reflect this understanding. 
7.2 Recommendations 
In order to ensure the implementation of a comprehensive asset forfeiture regime, 
apart from proposing the introduction of civil forfeiture law, the thesis proceeds to 
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make the following specific recommendations which are critical to the smooth 
implementation of an effective asset forfeiture regime. 
7.2.1 Establishment of an asset recovery unit 
Due to the complexity of civil asset forfeiture, it is cumbersome for the prosecuting 
authority to juggle both the criminal trial proceedings and civil forfeiture 
proceedings. The current trend is for a country to create a specialised unit or 
agency, which is tasked to concentrate on the recovery of criminal proceeds.1 The 
establishment of such a unit in Malawi could enhance efficiency in the discharge of 
justice because the unit could concentrate on the asset recovery processes while 
the prosecuting authorities concentrate on the criminal trial.  
South Africa has the Asset forfeiture Unit (AFU), which is a specialised agency 
established in 1999. It falls under the National Prosecuting Authority and it has 
regional offices in all provinces. The AFU is tasked with the implementation of both 
criminal and civil asset forfeitures under Chapters Five and Six of POCA.  
Further, the UK, through POCA,2 established the Asset Recovery Agency (ARA) 
which became operational in 2003.3 It was a non-ministerial department that was 
tasked to carry out three operational functions, namely; criminal forfeiture, civil 
forfeiture and taxation.4 It was a central specialised unit for handling high profile 
and complex forfeiture cases on referral from prosecution and law enforcement 
authorities.5 However, due to huge start-up costs and its low levels of asset 
                                                          
1  Kempen (2006: 2). 
2  Part 1 of POCA. 
3   Bacarese (2009: 150). 
4  Leong (2009: 203). 
5   Leong (2009: 203). 
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recovery, the ARA was closed and instead, it was merged with the Serious Crime 
Agency (SOCA) in 2008.6 Malawi can learn a lesson from the concerns that led to 
the closure of the ARA. Malawian authorities need to decide whether the asset 
forfeiture unit should be established as an independent agency as was the case 
with the ARA, or to affiliate it to another authority, as the ARA was merged with 
SOCA, and also as the AFU in South Africa exists within the NPPA.  
The proposed unit can also make possible the implementation of the proposal 
made in Chapter Six, that once a civil forfeiture law is introduced, civil forfeiture 
proceedings can run parallel to or can precede criminal prosecutions. The presence 
of the unit, therefore, will ensure that the prosecution authorities focus on the 
criminal trial while the forfeiture unit focuses on forfeiture processes, concurrently. 
Allowing the unit to concentrate on the civil forfeiture proceedings may lessen 
delays in the commencement or conclusion of forfeiture proceedings. This would 
have the advantage of lessening the time within which the state has to manage 
seized or restrained property, which in turn has the implication of reducing the 
asset management costs. Speedy forfeiture proceedings could also lessen litigation 
costs for both the state and claimants, and also the courts. 
7.2.1.1 Operational structure and independence  
In the case of Malawi, for the sake of efficiency, the unit ought to be established 
with the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP), and must have a presence in all 
the regions of Malawi, namely the northern, central, southern and eastern region. 
However, establishing the unit within the DPP’s office would expose it to the 
                                                          
6   Bacarese (2009: 151). 
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debate on operational independence and political interference, which have 
confronted the office of the DPP so far. The success of this unit, therefore, rests on 
the extent to which the executive branch of the government ensures the 
independence of the office of the DPP. 
7.2.1.2 Co-operation with other relevant authorities 
The success of asset forfeiture efforts would depend significantly on the smooth co-
operation between the asset forfeiture unit and other law enforcement authorities. 
The asset forfeiture unit ought to coordinate properly with other key partners in 
order to enhance its efficiency.  In comparison, the South African AFU is mandated 
to establish excellent relationships with its key partners such as the South African 
Police Service and the South African Revenue Service. In Malawi, the unit would 
have to work hand in hand with institutions such as the Malawi Police, the Malawi 
Revenue Authority and the Anti-Corruption Bureau. 
7.2.2 Asset management 
The thesis recommends a revamp of the asset management system. This 
recommendation is made on the basis that currently, there is no coordinated 
system for the management of seized, frozen and forfeited assets under the laws of 
Malawi. For instance, under the CP&EC, seized property is to be managed by the 
court;7 while the AML Act and the CPA suggest that the relevant authority that 
executes a seizure order is solely responsible for the administration of the 
                                                          
7  Section 116(2) of the CP&EC. 
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property.8 The AML Act further provides that the court should appoint a person to 
manage restrained property.9  
Regrettably, there are no clear guidelines or regulations for the implementation of 
critical issues in the management of assets, such as transparency. Transparency is 
an important aspect of a democratic society because the state and its agents must 
remain accountable for their actions. Therefore, relevant authorities must be 
required to keep appropriate records or an inventory of frozen, seized and 
confiscated property.10 The inventory must indicate the whereabouts, value, 
condition and status of litigation.11 The rules must require also the assessment of 
the value of seized, restrained or frozen property, so as to make sure that the value 
of the property is preserved until the conclusion of forfeiture proceedings.12 This 
can guard against subsequent claims by property owners that their assets were 
damaged while they were in the hands of the relevant authority that was tasked 
with their management.13  
Ultimately, there must be an authority responsible for the inspection of the 
inventory, and the results of the inspection must be made public.14 In Malawi, all 
competent authorities are obliged to submit monthly reports on the status of 
seized property to the FIU.15 Thus, the asset management authorities are 
accountable to the people through the FIU. This makes the FIU an ideal authority 
                                                          
8   Section 72(1) of the AML Act and Section 3 of the Corrupt Practices (Disposal of Recovered,  
Seized or Frozen Property) Regulations (Issued under Section 54 of the CPA. 
9   Section 80(2)(b)(ii) of the AML Act. 
10  Brun (2011: 94). See also FATF Best Practices Paper on Confiscation (2012: 10). 
11  Greenberg  et al (2009: 87). 
12  Greenberg  et al (2009: 87). 
13  Brun (2011: 94). 
14  G8 Best Practices Paper on the Administration of Seized Property (2005: 2). 
15   Section 72(2) of the AML Act. 
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for the inspection of the inventory, but the law is silent on the inspection part and 
the publication of the results of the inspection. Thus, the law must be amended to 
include this important aspect. However, it should be noted that the monthly 
reporting obligation relates only to seized property. It does not apply to restrained 
property, which this thesis argues also needs similar treatment and attention. 
7.2.3 Establishment of an asset forfeiture fund 
The law in Malawi stipulates that all forfeited property vests in the state. In order to 
ensure transparency in the disposal of forfeited property, this thesis proposes the 
establishment of an asset recovery account, as suggested by the FATF.16  
South Africa established within its National Revenue Fund a separate account 
known as the Criminal Assets Recovery Account.17 Into this account goes all money 
derived from the fulfilment of forfeiture orders are deposited into this account;18 all 
property derived from the fulfilment of forfeiture order;19 and the balance of all 
money derived from the execution of foreign confiscation orders as defined in the 
International Co-operation in Criminal Matters Act,20 after payments have been 
made to requesting States in terms of that Act.21  
The account can be inspected in order to see how money deposited in it has been 
used by the relevant authorities. This will enhance accountability. Meanwhile, 
depositing confiscated money into the government’s Consolidated Fund, as 
                                                          
16   See FATF Best Practices on Confiscation (2012: 7). See also Interpretive Notes to the Forty  
Recommendations on Recommendation 38 (2012: 6). 
17   Section 63 of POCA. 
18  Section 64(a) of POCA.  
19  Section 64(aA) of POCA. 
20   Act 75 of 1996. 
21  Section 64(b) of POCA. 
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suggested by the current laws, places the money at the risk of being embezzled by 
corrupt public officials, since it is mixed with all other government funds for general 
use in public departments. The risk of the embezzlement of confiscated money 
which is deposited in the general Consolidated Fund would create a vicious cycle, 
whereby the state confiscates stolen assets only to place them in the hands of 
another thief. If the money is deposited in a special fund, it can be easier to monitor 
its usage. 
7.2.4 Negotiated settlements 
Apart from asset forfeiture, this thesis proposes that Malawi should consider using 
negotiated settlements in order to enhance deterrence through the recovery of 
illicit proceeds. This is in pursuit of negotiated justice. Negotiated settlements are 
another convenient avenue for depriving offenders of the proceeds of crime is 
through out of court negotiated settlements.22 Under such settlements, the 
prosecution and a defendant can enter into an agreement agreeing on particular 
charges the defendant will plead guilty to.23 The two parties can confer on the 
prospective sentence or monetary punishment, but they cannot make an 
agreement on the sentencing aspect as that is to be determined by the court.24 In 
some cases, an offender agrees to pay a sum of money or give up his property to 
the state, to the same value as the proceeds of a crime.25  
The different existing forms of settlements are the guilty plea settlements which 
are used in the USA, Canada and the UK; civil settlements in the UK; the deferred 
                                                          
22   Stessens (2000: 58). 
23  Oduor et al (2014: 28). 
24   Oduor et al (2014: 28). 
25   Stessens (2000: 58). 
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and non-prosecution agreements in the USA; and out of court restitution 
settlements in Nigeria.26 For formality’s sake, the settlements must be confirmed by 
the courts.27 In Malawi, the CP&EC gives the platform for such agreements also, as 
it allows for plea bargaining in criminal matters. Malawi’s model offers an 
opportunity for guilty plea settlements, such as those of the USA, Canada and UK, 
as this model is preferred by the common law jurisdictions.28  
Under the CP&EC, plea bargaining is defined as “the process whereby the accused 
and the prosecutor in a criminal case work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of 
the case subject to court approval”.29 The law permits that a defendant can agree 
to plead guilty to a lesser offence, or to plead guilty to only one or more counts of a 
charge.30 The CP&EC does not offer much guidance on how plea bargaining should 
be done. Instead, it gives power to the Chief Justice to make plea bargaining rules. 
It should be noted, however, that since the introduction of plea bargaining in the 
CP&EC in 2010, the Chief Justice has not set the rules yet.  
Generally, negotiated settlements are considered a cheaper and faster avenue to 
asset recovery unlike court processes.31 They offer an attractive alternative for 
prosecutors to avoid lengthy trials and get hold of the criminal loot immediately.32 
This option seems attractive especially in cases where the proceeds are placed in a 
                                                          
26  Oduor et al (2014: 17). 
27   Oduor et al (2014: 17). 
28   Oduor et al (2014: 17). 
29   Section 252A of the CP&EC. 
30  Section 252A (2)(a)(b) of the CP&EC. 
31   Wako (2014). 
32   Stessens (2000: 58). 
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foreign country and the success of the enforcement of a subsequent forfeiture 
order after securing a conviction is uncertain.33  
However, some argue that over-reliance on settlements results in the inadequate 
dealing with the issue of civil forfeiture by avoiding litigation of the salient issues.34 
Further, there is concern that significant assets could be legitimised or retained by 
criminals, by allowing property such as real property which derives from a criminal 
act to be used by the criminals in order to meet the terms of the negotiated 
settlement.35 In addition, over-reliance on settlements has the potential of leaving a 
wrong impression on the public, that the state is not keen to remove a criminal 
from the society by way of imprisonment, nor is it keen to recover criminal 
profits.36 Justice must not only be done, but it must be seen to be done. Therefore, 
negotiated settlements must be approached with caution in Malawi also. 
Further, this thesis submits that negotiated settlements ought to be made in the 
interests of justice, which for purposes of this thesis, means the recovery of the 
totality of all criminal proceeds and any profit, income or interest accrued thereon. 
In the case of Malawi, the CP&EC only allows for settlements with regards to the 
nature of criminal charges and not sentence. This thesis proposes that the state 
should not reach negotiated agreements with the expectation that it should 
persuade the court to reduce the amount of forfeitable property, when it is time to 
present its case on forfeiture. The principles of proportionality must still apply in 
such arrangements, and proportionality in this sense means the recovery of all that 
                                                          
33   Stessens (2000: 59). 
34   Dayman (2009: 246). 
35   Dayman (2009: 246). 
36   Dayman (2009: 246). 
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was illegally gained. The state should not enter into an agreement which leaves a 
criminal with some of the criminal proceeds because the disgorgement of criminal 
assets is the ultimate aim of the asset forfeiture and anti-money laundering 
movement. 
If anything, an agreement should permit only that an offender should surrender all 
criminal proceeds, in exchange of an undertaking by the state not to prosecute him, 
or if a prosecution is pursued, an undertaking to proffer a lesser charge or not to 
seek the imposition of certain forms of punishment such as an imprisonment 
sentence, fine or revocation of a business licence. The experience of the UK in this 
regard, gives a good perspective on how cautious the state must be towards 
negotiated settlements. In the UK, the Serious Fraud Office has the power to enter 
into negotiated settlements in cases of serious fraud.37 It has so far entered into 
settlements with corporate entities that were facing corruption charges, such as R v 
Innospec,38 and R v BAE Systems Plc.39 
BAE Systems was facing multiple charges on corruption. It agreed in a negotiated 
settlement with the Serious Fraud Office that it would not plead guilty to 
corruption, but instead, to plead guilty to one charge of failing to keep reasonably 
accurate accounting records contrary to section 221 of the Companies Act 1985 in 
relation to its activities in Tanzania. BAE Systems also indicated it would pay $30m 
as reparations to the government of Tanzania, and that any fines the court might 
impose as sentence in the case, would be deducted from the same amount. The 
                                                          
37  Alge (2013: 1). 
38   [2010] Lloyd’s Rep FC 462. 
39   [2010] EW Misc 16 (CC).  
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court felt morally bound to keep the fine at a minimum, so as not to eat too much 
into the value of the reparations that were to be made to the Republic of Tanzania.  
This begs the question: did the $30m sum represent all that BAE Systems had 
gained from the totality of the alleged corruption activities? There was failure of 
justice in this case, especially because an offender was left to determine how much 
of their criminal gains they were willing to part with, in exchange with a plea of 
guilt. Offenders will not feel the deterrent effect of the law if they are allowed to 
come to the table to negotiate how much of their proceeds of crimes they must 
surrender and how much they must keep. 
Still in the UK, the ARA was criticised before its closure, for contributing to lengthy 
forfeiture proceedings because it sought forfeiture of the full value of illicit 
proceeds, rather than entering into negotiated settlements for the recovery of a 
proportion of the assets.40 This criticism makes sense when one thinks that lengthy 
forfeiture proceedings have cost implications in relation to litigation and the period 
within which the state must manage seized, frozen or restrained property pending 
the conclusion of the case. However, the deterrent purpose of asset recovery must 
not be compromised by considerations such as delays of forfeiture proceedings in 
the courts.  
Thus, this thesis submits that in as much as negotiated settlements seem to be an 
attractive approach in the interests of time and costs, they should be encouraged 
only with regard to the state’s waiver to prosecute an offender on given charges, or 
an agreement on other aspects of punishment. The settlements must not go as far 
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as allowing an offender to keep some of the illicit assets. There must be maximum 
rectification of the injustice of acquiring property through crime, in both asset 
forfeiture proceedings and negotiated settlements. The concern of the anti-money 
laundering and asset forfeiture regime is not so much about the prosecution and 
imprisonment of an offender, but in the removal of the incentive for the 
commission of economic crimes. Hence, the rectification of an unjust acquisition 
through the forfeiture of the whole value of criminal proceeds, must take priority 
over the need to prosecute and imprison an offender. 
7.2.5 Public-private partnership 
The detection of property liable to prosecution relies significantly on the 
cooperation between law enforcement authorities and the private sector players 
such as banks. Law enforcement would have to rely on the will by banks to comply 
with provisional orders such as production orders for the production of account 
statements or freezing orders against bank accounts. Financial institutions are also 
crucial in relation to the triggering of money laundering investigations though their 
suspicious transaction reporting obligation.41 In addition, the financial institutions 
are useful in following of the paper trail or in identifying beneficial owners of 
certain entities or assets which may be liable to forfeiture. Therefore, the 
relationship between the public and private actors must be nurtured at all times to 
ensure smooth cooperation in matters that have a bearing on the success of the 
anti-money laundering and asset forfeiture efforts in the country. 
                                                          
41   Section 28 of the AML Act requires all financial institutions to report suspicious transactions  
to the FIU. This requirement stems from the FATF’s Recommendation 20. 
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7.2.6 Funding 
This thesis is not blind to the cost implications of the forfeiture processes and the 
management of assets. Thus, the state ought to make sure that there is enough 
money in the budgets of all relevant authorities, so as to enable them to carry out 
their functions in relation to asset recovery and fighting money laundering 
smoothly. The state must provide enough resources to be able to cover all costs of 
asset management.42 In addition, there must be enough funding to meet the 
investigative aspect of asset forfeiture, which is critical at the property 
identification stage. Finally, there must be enough funding to meet litigation costs 
in forfeiture proceedings. 
The case in point is The Republic v Oswald Fywell Gedion Lutepo43 in which the 
defendant was, on 15th June 2015, convicted of conspiracy to defraud the 
government of Malawi of K4,206,337,562, as well as the laundering of the same. He 
was convicted on his own plea of guilt. Following the conviction, the prosecution 
applied for forfeiture order and a pecuniary order against Mr Lutepo. However, the 
state asked for deferment of sentencing proceedings, to allow for the identification, 
assessment, valuation and restraint of realisable property which may be attached 
to the subsequent forfeiture order. In response to the application, the court 
deferred the sentencing proceedings to 30 July 2015. The court ordered the convict 
to make a declaration of all property and business arrangements owned by him. 
Further, it ordered the state to verify the assets the convict is going to declare 
within ten days after he makes the declaration, and thereafter, serve on the convict 
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a list of all the property it seeks to attach to the forfeiture order, at least 14 days 
prior to the sentence hearing. This means that the state has 10 days within which it 
must conclude this exercise. The success of this exercise depends in significant part, 
on the availability of the state’s resources which include transport, office 
equipment and all technical resources investigators may require. 
7.2.7 Technical capacity of relevant authorities 
The proposed asset forfeiture unit, being a specialised agency, must be run by 
personnel with expertise on the subject of asset forfeiture. As part of its mandate, 
the unit can offer training to prosecution and investigative authorities on issues of 
asset forfeiture. This could be more cost-effective, in comparison to sending 
prosecutors or investigators for basic training on asset forfeiture issues in foreign 
countries all the time. Foreign training must be reserved for the complex issues of 
asset forfeiture. For example, the Asset Forfeiture Unit of the USA facilitates 
training for personnel in the Criminal Division.44 The ARA had a similar training 
mandate also.45  
The complexity of the exercise the state is required to undertake in case of The 
Republic v Oswald Fywell Gedion Lutepo46 demands well-trained personnel such as 
investigators who can think outside the box in order to verify Mr Lutepo’s declared 
property. Their expertise will also be required in order determine if he is a 
beneficial owner of certain business arrangements, or if he owns certain property 
which the convict might omit, either wilfully or otherwise, from the declaration. 
                                                          
44   United States Attorney’s Office (2007). 
45   Bacarese (2009: 150). 
46   Criminal Case No 2 of 2013 (High Court). 
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This expertise is needed in order to make sure that at the end of the day, the 
convict is stripped of every ounce of the stolen property or any income, interests 
and profits which derives from the stolen money. Thus, the capacity of the relevant 
personnel in this exercise is crucial to the rectification of the injustice in Mr 
Lutepo’s illicit acquisition. 
7.2.8 Civil recovery of illicit proceeds as a private claimant 
In some cases, criminals may transfer their criminal loot outside Malawi and the 
recovery of such assets may be hampered by the complexities of mutual legal 
assistance.47 Thus, as proposed by the UNCAC,48 Malawi should explore the 
possibility of seeking civil recovery of proceeds of crime that have been placed in a 
foreign country, as a private litigant. This will ensure that the deterrent purpose of 
asset recovery is achieved when criminals place their illicit loot both within and 
outside Malawi. This avenue has been tested before by the Zambian government in 
Attorney General of Zambia v Meer Care and Desai and Others.49 In this case, the 
Attorney General of Zambia sought in an English court the forfeiture and return of 
money suspected to have been stolen by the former president of Zambia, Frederich 
Chiluba, which had been placed in the UK.   
In a similar case, the Nigerian government sought in the English courts in the case 
of Republic of Nigeria v. Santolina & Ors.,50 the recovery of the proceeds of the sale 
of property which a Nigerian Governor, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, had acquired in 
                                                          
47   Oduor et al (2014: 12-13); Claman (2008: 338) 
48   Article 53 of UNCAC. 
49  [2007] EWCH 952 (Ch). 
50   [2007] EWHC 3053 (QB) 
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the UK through his business entity called Santolina Investment Corporation, using 
stolen public funds.  
In the two cases discussed above, the Zambian and Nigerian governments made 
sure that the placement of their stolen public funds in the UK did not become a 
barrier to the rectification of the injustice occasioned by the acquisition of property 
Mr Chiluba and Mr Alamieyeseigha, through proceeds of embezzlement. Going by 
this example, the Malawian authorities, too, should not put their tools down once 
they realise that the targeted property has been hidden abroad. They must seek to 
rectify the injustice in its acquisition by all means. 
All in all, this thesis contends that the key to the combating of money laundering 
does not lie in the criminal law and criminal proceedings sphere alone. Malawi and 
all countries that are keen on preventing and combating economic crimes and the 
laundering of criminal proceeds must seek to find solutions in the civil procedure 
sphere as well, or otherwise, economic crimes will continue to be profitable and 
rampant. This, however, must be done only within the confines of the social 
contract and the mixed theory of punishment, so as to avoid the arbitrary limitation 
of the people’s rights. The state must remember that its chief end is the 
preservation of its people’s rights, and not their infringement. Only then, can civil 
forfeiture pass the potential constitutionality challenges, and become a powerful 
deterrent tool.  
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